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After The War, A Wider Strategic Space Awaits China And Pakistan

343 0
08.10.2026

The Iran war is not over; it has entered an even more dangerous phase. The opening of the Houthi front has widened the conflict towards Yemen and the Red Sea, while attacks on Saudi Arabia have activated the Makkah Pact and drawn Pakistan more directly into Gulf security. With both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb under pressure, what began as a conflict centred on Iran has become a wider struggle over regional security, energy flows and some of the world’s most important maritime routes.

Pakistan’s role has consequently evolved from mediation and crisis diplomacy towards a more consequential security role in the Arab Gulf, even as it continues to favour an eventual negotiated settlement. China has consistently supported Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts while seeking to protect its enormous energy, trade and investment interests across the Middle East. Their roles are different, but their strategic priorities increasingly converge—on regional stability, secure sea lanes and economic connectivity—potentially opening a much wider space for China-Pakistan cooperation after the war.

I had an opportunity to examine this changing relationship closely during a 10-day visit to China in September. On September 3, I presented a paper, “China-Pakistan Collaboration in the Iran Conflict: Assessment and Post-Conflict Scenarios,” at an international conference organised by the Pakistan Study Centre at Peking University to mark 75 years of Pakistan-China relations. The gathering brought together scholars and policy practitioners, including former Pakistani foreign secretaries and ambassadors who had served in Beijing.

A week later, on September 11, I attended another conference at the Pakistan Study Centre of Fudan University in Shanghai, bringing together contributors to a forthcoming volume on 75 years of Pakistan-China relations, in which an expanded version of my paper will appear as a chapter. Spending nearly two weeks in China also provided an opportunity to gauge Chinese perceptions at a particularly consequential moment in the relationship.

What struck me was not simply the familiar Chinese confidence in Pakistan as an enduring strategic partner. There was also an appreciation that Pakistan’s relevance is no longer confined to South Asia. The Iran war has brought into sharper focus a geographical reality that CPEC had already begun to reveal: Pakistan sits at the intersection of South Asia, Central Asia, Iran and the Arab Gulf, while China’s economic and political interests now extend deeply across all these regions.

Wars are perhaps the most severe test of strategic partnerships. China and Pakistan have enjoyed exceptionally close relations for decades, sustained by historical trust and remarkably consistent alignment on their principal strategic interests. The Iran conflict has tested that relationship outside its traditional geographical setting and, in doing so, has revealed possibilities that extend well beyond the immediate crisis.

Pakistan entered the conflict in an extraordinarily difficult position. Iran is an immediate neighbour; Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are vital economic and strategic partners; the United States remains an important relationship; and China is Pakistan’s principal long-term strategic partner. Islamabad could neither afford a prolonged regional war nor choose one relationship at the expense of the others. Its response combined strategic restraint with active diplomacy. Pakistan maintained its channel with Tehran, coordinated closely with Riyadh and other Gulf capitals, remained engaged with Washington and consulted regularly with Beijing. This unusual access across competing centres of power ultimately gave Islamabad the diplomatic space to mediate.

China stood firmly behind that effort. Beijing’s role differed from Pakistan’s, but their principal objective was substantially the same: contain the conflict, prevent its regionalisation and create conditions for a return to diplomacy. The two countries were therefore not necessarily following identical policies, but they were pursuing compatible........

© The Friday Times