After 47 years of Cold War and armed conflict, the direct meeting between the delegations of the United States and Iran held in Islamabad the other day was a major step in the process of confidence-building. The first round of their talks remained inconclusive, but it was expected that the two sides would resume dialogue to manage their conflicts in round two. However, given the complicated nature of U.S.–Iran conflicts, expecting the holding of round two so soon was not possible. Had the two sides worked on mending fences by establishing trust, things would have been different.

How can confidence-building measures (CBMs) cause a thaw in U.S.–Iran relations and transform the existing ceasefire into permanent peace? What sort of CBMs can Iran and the United States agree upon which can lead to an agreement ensuring lasting peace between the two countries? What are the impediments to path-breaking CBMs between Iran and the U.S., and how can these obstacles be removed? These are the questions raised by concerned circles to address the issues that led to 40 days of war, the holding of the first round of talks in Islamabad, and the subsequent ceasefire.

Confidence-building measures can be termed an innovative and creative approach to mending fences between the two countries. When the two sides are not on talking terms and their relations are marred by conflict, only by adopting CBMs can they, over time, achieve a positive transformation in their relations. For instance, CBMs adopted by the United States and the former Soviet Union to replace the Cold War with cooperation and peace are a case in point. Likewise, CBMs between China and Russia, and China and the United States, also led to a positive transformation in their relations.

For several years, India and Pakistan also adopted various military and non-military CBMs to ameliorate their ties, but over the last 15 years or so, confidence-building between the two erstwhile neighbours has failed to generate trust and goodwill. The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) by India in May 2025, following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, caused significant damage to Indo-Pak relations because the IWT, from 1960 to 2025, had been a major confidence-building measure aimed at managing water issues, but was put in abeyance by New Delhi.

As far as the prevailing conflict between Iran and the United States is concerned, the two countries have been bogged down in a state of conflict since 1979. Both the U.S. and Iran consider each other enemy states. A paradigm shift took place in Iran–U.S. relations following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in February 1979, when an anti-American regime reversed the pro-American policies of the Shah of Iran.

For years, Iran had been part of the U.S.-led two-pillar policy in the Persian Gulf: one pillar was Saudi Arabia and the other was Iran. With the collapse of this policy in 1979, Iran transformed from a pro-American to an anti-American state. Furthermore, during the Shah’s time, Iran had diplomatic relations with Israel, but after February 1979, Tehran cut off its ties with the Jewish state and adopted an anti-Israeli policy.

The list of Iranian accusations against the United States for shattering trust and confidence is extensive

The list of Iranian accusations against the United States for shattering trust and confidence is extensive

Efforts to mend fences in Iran–U.S. ties have been made in the past but have remained unsuccessful because of a high degree of mistrust, suspicion, paranoia, and ill will between Tehran and Washington. Since 1979, the United States has attempted to destabilise the revolutionary government of Iran and supported Iraq during its war against Iran.

The Iran–Iraq War, which continued from 1980 to 1988, failed to destabilise Iran despite support from the U.S. and pro-American Gulf states. In the meantime, new issues emerged between the U.S. and Iran, which further weakened efforts at confidence-building. Iran’s support for its allies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and the Houthis in Yemen, antagonised both the United States and Israel. Additionally, reports of Iran’s nuclear programme heightened concerns in the U.S. and Israel regarding Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.

The withdrawal of the United States during the first Trump administration in 2018 from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which had initiated nuclear talks during the Obama administration involving Iran, the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and Germany, further complicated the nuclear issue.

The JCPOA, under the IAEA, had attempted to cap Iran’s uranium enrichment, to which Tehran had agreed. However, the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA dealt a severe blow to nuclear confidence-building measures and compelled Tehran to increase its uranium enrichment to around 60%, a level sufficient to conduct a nuclear test.

The U.S. also harmed confidence-building with Iran when, during nuclear talks in Geneva in June 2025, it attacked Iran along with Israel. Likewise, in February 2026, when nuclear talks were again underway in Geneva, Iran was attacked by the United States and Israel. On both occasions, the United States shattered Iran’s trust, which now lies at the heart of stagnation in U.S.–Iran talks.

The role of potential CBMs in mending fences in Iran–U.S. conflicts needs to be examined in two ways. First is the lack of political will and determination, which is an essential component of confidence-building. Because of past experiences, Iran has repeatedly argued that it cannot participate in the proposed second round of Islamabad talks because it does not trust the United States.

It was the U.S. that attacked Iran in June 2025 and February 2026, not vice versa. It was also the U.S. that eroded Iran’s trust by withdrawing from the JCPOA and attacking during ongoing nuclear negotiations in Geneva. Iran further accuses the United States of conspiring to topple its regime and of taking practical steps during the 40 days of war by targeting its civilian and military leadership.

The U.S. is also held responsible by Iran for imposing sanctions and carrying out a naval blockade of its ports. The list of Iranian accusations against the United States for shattering trust and confidence is extensive.

When Iran was engaged seriously in nuclear talks with the U.S., it faced a contradictory situation, having been attacked twice by America. Under such circumstances, launching CBMs between Iran and the United States to address complex issues becomes an uphill task. Moreover, Israel is acting as a spoiler and does not favour an agreement with Tehran without achieving its core objectives of regime change and dismantling Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes.

Second, for a successful process of confidence-building, the concerned parties must remain committed to the process. Instead of pursuing a win–lose outcome, both sides should aim for a win–win situation. In the current U.S.–Iran conflict, however, both sides claim victory rather than focusing on mutual gains through a flexible approach.

For a path-breaking and meaningful process of CBMs, it is also essential that both the United States and Iran create a congenial environment for dialogue. When the U.S. has been threatening to reduce Iran to the ‘Stone Age’ or destroy its civilisation, it becomes difficult to expect CBMs to take off.

Furthermore, the two sides should consider the simultaneous pursuit of Track I, Track II, and Track III dialogues. At present, only Track I dialogue conducted between official representatives has taken place through the first round of negotiations in Islamabad. However, Track II dialogue, involving non-official actors with informal official backing, should also be initiated. Track III dialogue, conducted at the people-to-people level to build mutual trust and confidence, is likewise absent between the United States and Iran.

The process of confidence-building in Iran–U.S. relations can yield positive results only when both sides demonstrate substantial political will and determination. Pakistan may act as a mediator, but it cannot advance meaningful dialogue unless both the United States and Iran adopt a flexible approach towards their contentious issues.

© The Friday Times