Oceania | Diplomacy | East Asia | Oceania

Why Hasn’t China Criticized Australia’s National Defense Strategy?

Unlike in 2024, China sees an opportunity to influence Australia. That has led Beijing to refrain from criticism.

Since 2023, Australia has committed to updating its defense strategy documents on a biennial basis in order to assess changes in the strategic environment and adjust its strategic thinking accordingly. On April 16, 2026, Australia released the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the 2026 Integrated Investment Program (IIP). In this year’s defense strategy, Australia placed particular emphasis on the threat posed by China. 

Australia’s NDS explicitly identifies China’s national power and military capabilities as the primary factors shaping the Indo-Pacific region. It also highlights the risks posed by the activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the China Coast Guard (CCG) in international waters, including the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

Compared with the 2024 strategy, the 2026 NDS uses clearer language on China. It not only directly names the regional impact of the PLA and the CCG but also omits the 2024 assessment that China-U.S. communication could help manage disputes.

Based on experience, when policy documents released by foreign governments address the impact of China, Beijing often responds forcefully by accusing Western countries of clinging to the so-called “China threat” narrative. For example, in response to Australia’s 2024 NDS, China’s Foreign Ministry urged Australia to “abandon its Cold War mentality” and stop making an issue of China at every turn. China’s Defense Ministry likewise criticized Australia for hyping up the “China threat” as a pretext for expanding its own military capabilities. Even though the 2024 NDS only emphasized the impact of China-U.S. competition on the strategic environment, Beijing still issued a strong response.

However, despite Australia’s more direct references this year to the impact of the PLA and the CCG, as well as its more pessimistic assessment of the future strategic environment, no Chinese government agency has issued any response to Australia’s NDS. China’s muted reaction toward Australia appears to stand in sharp contrast to its past wolf warrior diplomacy, which emphasized a willingness to “dare to struggle.”

This raises a question: what has driven the change in Beijing’s response to Australia’s defense policy?

China Sees an Opportunity to Influence Australia

Looking back at the current state of Australia-China relations, the two countries are restoring diplomatic and economic ties even as military frictions continue to increase. Since Anthony Albanese became Australia’s prime minister in 2022, Canberra has sought to repair the strained relationship with Beijing that developed under the Morrison government. At the same time, Albanese has also strengthened Australia’s defense cooperation with the United States in response to China’s expanding military threat in the Indo-Pacific. 

Maintaining a balanced approach between the two major powers is consistent with Australia’s national interests. However, following Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency, Australia’s defense relationship with the U.S. has come under pressure.

Like other countries with close security ties to the U.S., Australia has faced demands and policy pressure from the Trump administration as Washington calls on its allies to shoulder greater defense responsibilities. During the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth urged Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles to raise Australia’s defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP. In June, the U.S. also launched a review of the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine program. These pressure tactics prompted Australia to demonstrate its commitment to defense by increasing military spending and supporting U.S. shipbuilding efforts. However, they have also undermined Australian confidence in cooperation with the U.S. under the Trump administration.

This erosion of trust has had its most direct impact on Australian public perceptions of the United States. Since Trump returned to office, the share of Australians who trust the U.S. has fallen sharply from 56 percent to 36 percent, reflecting deep distrust toward the U.S. under the Trump administration. At the same time, Australian views of China have become increasingly balanced. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the proportion of Australians who regard China as a security threat has gradually declined, while the proportion who see China as an........

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