ASEAN Beat | Diplomacy | Southeast Asia

Responding to the Israel-US vs Iran War: Indonesia’s Board of Peace Dilemma Intensifies

The Israel-U.S. vs Iran war is forcing Indonesia to reassess its Gaza Board of Peace stance, balancing neutrality, public pressure, and support for Palestine.

Indonesia faces a strategic choice as pressure mounts at home to withdraw from U.S. President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace amid the escalating Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict. Former Minister for Politics, Legal and Security Affairs and Vice President candidate Professor Mahfud MD recently noted that leaving the BoP would likely not cause significant losses and could be done easily if the government is “not being held hostage.”

President Prabowo Subianto may therefore need to reassess Indonesia’s decisions, especially as the country is increasingly viewed as aligning with U.S. interests – from joining the BoP to signing one-sided trade agreements with Washington. This perception raises concerns that Indonesia is losing its independence in global affairs and drifting away from its long‑standing, free‑and‑active foreign policy.

At the same time, Prabowo has expressed readiness to “evaluate” Indonesia’s role in the BoP. Indonesia has offered to mediate between the United States and Iran, but the chances of success remain low. Instead, the current situation should prompt the government to reconsider whether the BoP framework is still relevant and effective for Indonesia’s foreign‑policy goals.

Indonesia’s role in the BoP during the ongoing conflict in West Asia will likely follow several directions. First, Indonesia is trying to maintain neutrality by offering to facilitate dialogue and urging all parties to prioritize diplomacy. The Iranian Embassy in Jakarta welcomed this offer, although no concrete steps have followed. Iran’s ambassador stated that both Indonesia and Iran are influential middle powers with the potential to promote peace, and that closer cooperation could strengthen regional stability. Indonesia has also increased communication with Middle Eastern countries, shown by its intensified diplomatic engagement with Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

Second, Indonesia is expected to remain in the BoP despite criticism and calls to withdraw. Prabowo has assured local Islamic clerics that if he sees no benefit for Palestine and finds that it is not in line with Indonesia’s national interests, he will withdraw. The government views the BoP as an important platform for addressing the Israel–Palestine issue, allowing Indonesia to defend Palestinian interests even though Palestine is not represented on the board.

Third, the conflict presents an opportunity for Indonesia to strengthen its image as a peace‑oriented country. If Indonesia succeeds in facilitating dialogue, it could position itself as a balancing actor contributing to global stability. Mediation efforts may also help ease economic pressures, especially with rising oil prices.

Although withdrawing from the BoP may appear to be an option, Indonesia would likely lose bargaining power with the United States if it left. Indonesia’s long‑standing strategy is to avoid conflict with major powers such as China and the U.S. while gaining selective advantages, especially in trade negotiations.

This raises a key question: would Indonesia’s geopolitical position become too closely tied to the U.S.? The answer is complex. Indonesia’s trade, investment, and import ties with the U.S. already limit its freedom to some extent. Its BoP membership and efforts to maintain good relations with Washington reflect a cautious approach aimed at avoiding clashes with a major power.

Openly criticizing U.S. actions in Iran could also disrupt Indonesia’s diplomatic agenda, particularly within the BoP. Offering mediation allows Indonesia to maintain balance and promote de‑escalation without directly confronting Washington.

Indonesia is navigating a difficult situation during the Israel-U.S. vs. Iran conflict while trying to assert itself as a middle power committed to peace in BoP even as it faces criticism and economic pressures. This issue is important because Indonesia – long a supporter of Palestine and without diplomatic ties to Israel – is now part of a platform where unlikely actors appear together.

As Indonesia considers reviewing its BoP membership, the decision will shape its future position in the board and its efforts to support Palestinian self‑determination.

Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.

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Indonesia faces a strategic choice as pressure mounts at home to withdraw from U.S. President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace amid the escalating Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict. Former Minister for Politics, Legal and Security Affairs and Vice President candidate Professor Mahfud MD recently noted that leaving the BoP would likely not cause significant losses and could be done easily if the government is “not being held hostage.”

President Prabowo Subianto may therefore need to reassess Indonesia’s decisions, especially as the country is increasingly viewed as aligning with U.S. interests – from joining the BoP to signing one-sided trade agreements with Washington. This perception raises concerns that Indonesia is losing its independence in global affairs and drifting away from its long‑standing, free‑and‑active foreign policy.

At the same time, Prabowo has expressed readiness to “evaluate” Indonesia’s role in the BoP. Indonesia has offered to mediate between the United States and Iran, but the chances of success remain low. Instead, the current situation should prompt the government to reconsider whether the BoP framework is still relevant and effective for Indonesia’s foreign‑policy goals.

Indonesia’s role in the BoP during the ongoing conflict in West Asia will likely follow several directions. First, Indonesia is trying to maintain neutrality by offering to facilitate dialogue and urging all parties to prioritize diplomacy. The Iranian Embassy in Jakarta welcomed this offer, although no concrete steps have followed. Iran’s ambassador stated that both Indonesia and Iran are influential middle powers with the potential to promote peace, and that closer cooperation could strengthen regional stability. Indonesia has also increased communication with Middle Eastern countries, shown by its intensified diplomatic engagement with Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

Second, Indonesia is expected to remain in the BoP despite criticism and calls to withdraw. Prabowo has assured local Islamic clerics that if he sees no benefit for Palestine and finds that it is not in line with Indonesia’s national interests, he will withdraw. The government views the BoP as an important platform for addressing the Israel–Palestine issue, allowing Indonesia to defend Palestinian interests even though Palestine is not represented on the board.

Third, the conflict presents an opportunity for Indonesia to strengthen its image as a peace‑oriented country. If Indonesia succeeds in facilitating dialogue, it could position itself as a balancing actor contributing to global stability. Mediation efforts may also help ease economic pressures, especially with rising oil prices.

Although withdrawing from the BoP may appear to be an option, Indonesia would likely lose bargaining power with the United States if it left. Indonesia’s long‑standing strategy is to avoid conflict with major powers such as China and the U.S. while gaining selective advantages, especially in trade negotiations.

This raises a key question: would Indonesia’s geopolitical position become too closely tied to the U.S.? The answer is complex. Indonesia’s trade, investment, and import ties with the U.S. already limit its freedom to some extent. Its BoP membership and efforts to maintain good relations with Washington reflect a cautious approach aimed at avoiding clashes with a major power.

Openly criticizing U.S. actions in Iran could also disrupt Indonesia’s diplomatic agenda, particularly within the BoP. Offering mediation allows Indonesia to maintain balance and promote de‑escalation without directly confronting Washington.

Indonesia is navigating a difficult situation during the Israel-U.S. vs. Iran conflict while trying to assert itself as a middle power committed to peace in BoP even as it faces criticism and economic pressures. This issue is important because Indonesia – long a supporter of Palestine and without diplomatic ties to Israel – is now part of a platform where unlikely actors appear together.

As Indonesia considers reviewing its BoP membership, the decision will shape its future position in the board and its efforts to support Palestinian self‑determination.

Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.

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