The Pulse | Diplomacy | South Asia

Why India Cannot Escape Blame for Dhaka’s Handing Over of Key Projects to China

In 2015, Bangladesh allotted land to India for the development of an SEZ at Mongla port. India failed to start work on that project. Dhaka handed it to China.

Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping at a bilateral meeting held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, June 26, 2026.

Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s visit to China on June 22-26 saw the two sides sign 17 bilateral instruments. The two governments elevated “their comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership to jointly build a China-Bangladesh community with a shared future,” agreed to explore a 2 2 dialogue mechanism involving diplomacy and defense, and announced plans to implement a Bangladesh-China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.

Two projects, in particular — the Mongla Port Facilities Modernization and Expansion Project and the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP) — announced during Rahman’s visit have India worried as China’s involvement in these projects has implications for India’s national security.

Mongla Port, Bangladesh’s second-largest and second-busiest seaport after Chattogram, is located on the east bank of the Pasur River, 71 nautical miles upstream from the Bay of Bengal. The project here involves developing a special economic zone (SEZ) on a 110-acre plot of land adjacent to the port. China’s state-owned Civil Engineering Construction Corporation will develop the SEZ and has proposed an investment of $650 million in manufacturing industries, warehouses and storage facilities at the SEZ.

India’s concern over China’s involvement in the Mongla port SEZ is its location. It is just 80 km from the Indian border and 188 km from Kolkata.  According to a CNN-News18 report, which cited Indian intelligence sources, there is a “high risk of Beijing installing advanced maritime surveillance systems and electronic intelligence infrastructure at the site.” It will enable China to monitor from close quarters “Indian naval deployments, coastal radar networks, and strategic movements around the Kolkata and Haldia ports.”

Additionally, it would provide Beijing with access to yet another Bay of Bengal port, which could, in turn, increase China’s presence in the Indian Ocean.

As for the TRCMRP, this is a river engineering initiative that involves dredging the Teesta and developing reclaimed land. With Chinese expertise, Bangladesh will be able to manage the Teesta’s waters better and deal with water shortages, floods, and riverbank erosion. India’s problem with the TRCMRP is its location. Although it is on the Bangladeshi side of the border, the proposed river management project is near India’s strategic Siliguri Corridor, a narrow sliver of land that links the Indian mainland with the restive Northeast.

India’s concern over China’s involvement in the Mongla port SEZ and the TRCMRP is understandable to some extent given their proximity to the Indian border.

However, these are far from the first projects China has executed in Bangladesh. China’s role and presence in Bangladesh have grown by leaps and bounds in recent decades. It has been involved in scores of infrastructure projects in Bangladesh, including the building of roads, bridges, and railway lines. Indeed, the Chinese are already engaged in building roads, bridges, and power plants in Rangpur division, Bangladesh’s northernmost district that borders the Siliguri corridor, and where much of the TRCMRP’s work will be focused.

Dhaka’s decision to hand over the TRCMRP and the Mongla SEZ project to China may be part of “a broader policy shift to reroute regional transit dependency away from Indian........

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