Flashpoints | Security | South Asia

India’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Is a Search for Options, Not Substitutes

New Delhi wants more capitals it can call on, not fewer.

On July 6, China’s navy test-launched a long-range ballistic missile with a dummy warhead from a nuclear-powered submarine. It was the second time China had fired a ballistic missile into international waters in recent years, following a test in September 2024. While Beijing sent advance notices to a few countries, the action demonstrated both its increasing reach and capability as part of its nuclear deterrence strategy and willingness to assert its active militarism in the region.

However, much more than that, the timing of the act was crucial. In way, it appeared as a declaration of triumph in the Indo-Pacific for Beijing at a time when countries across the region are grappling with U.S. detachment and recalibrating strategies to protect their national interests through a combination of multilateralism, minilateralism, and bilateral understandings.  

Washington’s condemnation of the test-launch as an incident of “great concern” and its reiteration of “steadfast defense commitments” to its “allies and partners” notwithstanding, U.S. disengagement from the region is no secret. Washington is less enthusiastic about the Quad and remains ambiguous about the “Indo-Pacific” nomenclature in its own strategy. Moreover, Trump’s idea of a G2, a transactional duopoly with China to manage global affairs, does not necessarily counter Beijing’s assertive foreign policy, especially in its widening arc of influence. 

These are sources of huge strategic disruption to India, which was not only one of the first countries to adopt the concept of the Indo-Pacific but has also at the receiving end of Chinese territorial aggression in recent years. Added to this is the growing Sino-Pakistan axis, making real the possibility of a two-front war. New Delhi’s response so far points to preparation for a period of cautious strategic recalibration. India is defining for itself a more autonomous, multi-aligned approach that does not anchor entirely on Washington’s strategic bandwidth and is looking for more partnerships to maintain the balance.  

Three days before the Chinese test-launch, Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae returned from India, where she attended the 16th India-Japan Annual Summit. The summit, according to India’s External Affairs Ministry, produced 16 outcomes, including joint statements and MoUs in the fields of “semiconductors, critical minerals, information and communication technology including AI (Artificial Intelligence), clean energy, and pharmaceuticals.” 

The visit drew ridicule from Chinese media, which reported on the apparent transportation of drinking water from Japan for the consumption of the visiting delegates due to concerns over the quality of tap water in India. Chinese media framed this as nothing less than pure contempt. The Indian media, however, appreciated the outcomes of the summit as both countries “did well to ring-fence their ties from multilateral accords.” Both countries also declared a joint intent to continue with an “updated” Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) posture.   

Beijing’s July 6 test-launch also came on the same day Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi landed in Jakarta, the first stop of his three-nation tour to Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. Both Canberra and Wellington had condemned the Chinese test-launch. Modi’s tour could be an opportunity for India to take the........

© The Diplomat