The Pulse | Security | South Asia

Sri Lanka’s Opposition Is Trying to Securitize Organized Crime. Voters Aren’t Buying It, Yet.

Many Sri Lankans see recent shootings as violence due to underworld rivalry rather than an existential threat to the state.

Sri Lankans have learned the hard way to take national security seriously. Decades of conflict and their economic impact have shown that security failures have serious consequences. Governments that appeared weak on security have fallen to opposition forces that built their political brand around national security.

This history explains why Sri Lankan opposition political parties have spent the past year trying to frame incidents of organized crime and gun violence as more than a policing problem. They have attempted to convince the people that the National People’s Power (NPP) government is weak on national security.

In 2025, there were 114 shooting incidents and 60 deaths. Although this remains broadly in line with recent figures — 54 deaths in 2023 and 45 in 2024 — Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) chief and leader of the opposition, Sajith Premadasa, described organized crime as a “national security crisis.” These sentiments have been echoed by Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP)’s Namal Rajapaksa.

Opposition parties have argued that such violence threatens public safety, damages confidence among investors and tourists, and puts public officials and elected representatives in danger.

Unlike in the past, this time, the opposition’s national security framing has not yielded the expected results. Recent surveys point in the opposite direction: many Sri Lankans appear relatively happy with the government’s performance.

Verité Research’s February 2026 “Mood of the Nation” survey found that 59 percent of respondents were satisfied with “the way things are going,” the first time that the figure crossed the 50 percent mark in four years of polling, while government approval stood at 65 percent. The same survey reported stronger economic optimism, with 64 percent saying the economy was “getting better,” up from 55 percent a year earlier. Verité’s executive director, Dr. Nishan de Mel, added that the highest positive evaluation was on reducing drugs and crime, even more than on reducing corruption.

A separate island-wide survey by the Social Scientists’ Association (SSA), conducted in early to mid-January 2026 across all 25 districts, found that 70 percent of respondents were satisfied with the government’s response to Cyclone Ditwah.

These findings do not mean that the NPP government is immune to attacks based on national security narratives. They suggest something narrower, but analytically useful, i.e., the conditions that make national security framing politically potent may not be present at this moment. The question is not whether gang violence is real. The question is whether the opposition can persuade a broad audience that there is an existential threat to national security and that the government is incapable of addressing it.

When Does a Public Safety Problem Become “National Security”?

Securitization theory, associated with the Copenhagen School, offers a useful framework to understand national security. According to the Copenhagen School, national security is not an objective condition determined by measurable criteria. Securitization theory, drawing on the work of Carl Schmitt, holds that this is the outcome of a social process.

Issues become “securitized,” or treated as a security issue, when several criteria are met. First, a political actor frames the issue as an existential threat, not simply as harmful, but as something that endangers the survival of a state, for example, its sovereignty, the functioning of institutions, society’s identity, etc. Second, securitization works when leaders frame an issue as existential and the audience accepts it, and that acceptance depends heavily on the credibility of the actor and the context. Third, and most crucially, a relevant audience accepts the framing.

For example, when the Maithripala Sirisena-Ranil Wickremesinghe government was in power (2015-2019), the Rajapaksas managed to convince a large number of Sri Lankans that crime was rising and had become a national security threat, although instances of grave crime had reduced notably from 2014 (when the Rajapaksas were in power) to 2018.

The contrast between 2015–2019 and now is instructive. If securitization succeeded then because the public accepted the messenger and the frame, the question now is why the same strategy is not producing similar results.

Why the Securitizing Move Has Not (Yet) Succeeded

To start with, the audience is not accepting the framing. Verité’s February 2026 survey suggests that most respondents feel broadly satisfied with the country’s direction and that government approval remains high.  It’s hard to convince the public that the government is losing control when the people think that the country is moving in the right direction. The SSA survey shows similar sentiments. Baseline confidence in the government’s performance shapes whether citizens believe it can deal with organized crime.

Secondly, the state has successfully counter-framed crime as a policing issue, with little impact on national security. Senior ministers and the defense establishment have repeatedly said there is no threat to national security. The government has insisted that the performance of the police and security forces has improved since they came to power. Inspector General of Police Priyantha Weerasooriya said a few weeks ago that police performance improved by 50-60 percent in 2025 and reported that weapons recoveries had doubled and narcotics seizures had tripled since 2024. The Navy, too, has ramped up efforts to seize drugs.

Thirdly, Rajapaksas have lost their credibility as guarantors of national security. Securitization depends heavily on the credibility of those making the claim. In the past, politicians such as the Rajapaksas, Wimal Weerawansa, and Udaya Gammanpila were seen as the voice of patriotism. However, because of their disastrous handling of the pandemic, the subsequent economic crisis, public anger over corruption and impunity, and exhaustion with crisis politics, these individuals have little credibility left. The credibility problem extends to the SJB as well, as most of its stalwarts held positions in the government during the Easter Sunday attacks in 2019.

Fourthly, many citizens view the violence as underworld rivalry rather than an existential threat. Organized crime has been a serious problem for many years and can become a national security issue when it captures institutions, intimidates courts, or shapes state decisions. The question is whether the public thinks Sri Lanka is at that threshold now. For many Sri Lankans, much of the current violence appears to involve rival gangs and drug networks targeting each other. In fact, most Sri Lankans, according to the Verité Research survey, think that the government is doing a good job of dealing with crime. Citizens interpret violence as “criminals killing criminals,” and demand tougher policing and faster prosecutions without accepting the claim that the nation faces an existential emergency.

Finally, amplification is not the same as acceptance, and media trust has weakened. Many of Sri Lanka’s private media institutions operate with clear political alignments and have historically played a significant role in amplifying security narratives. These media institutions played a pivotal role between 2001 and 2022 in setting the national security agenda and in convincing Sri Lankans that the Rajapaksas were the guardians of national security.

These media institutions have tried similar tactics in the past year, but the audience has not been as receptive as before. Most Sri Lankans have become more cynical and do not see the media as neutral actors. The rapidly declining trust in mainstream media, a phenomenon that we see around the world, has affected their ability to set the national security agenda.

What Would Make the Narrative Catch Fire?

None of this guarantees the opposition’s strategy will fail permanently. Securitization is context-dependent. Shocks can change what citizens accept.

But for now, Sri Lanka’s opposition has a problem. Sri Lanka’s history makes voters sensitive to national security. Yet that same history has trained them to judge security claims by credibility and lived experience. When polling suggests many credit the government with doing better on drugs and crime, when the state continues to frame shootings as a policing and accountability issue rather than a national security emergency, and when audiences treat mainstream media as politically aligned, labeling the moment a “national security crisis” does not automatically lead to the undermining of the government.

If the government maintains public confidence while containing violence through institutions, securitization attempts may continue to stall. If it stumbles, through a spectacular failure, visible collusion, or paralysis of policing and courts, things can change rapidly. Sri Lanka’s security politics rarely stay neutral for long.

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Sri Lankans have learned the hard way to take national security seriously. Decades of conflict and their economic impact have shown that security failures have serious consequences. Governments that appeared weak on security have fallen to opposition forces that built their political brand around national security.

This history explains why Sri Lankan opposition political parties have spent the past year trying to frame incidents of organized crime and gun violence as more than a policing problem. They have attempted to convince the people that the National People’s Power (NPP) government is weak on national security.

In 2025, there were 114 shooting incidents and 60 deaths. Although this remains broadly in line with recent figures — 54 deaths in 2023 and 45 in 2024 — Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) chief and leader of the opposition, Sajith Premadasa, described organized crime as a “national security crisis.” These sentiments have been echoed by Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP)’s Namal Rajapaksa.

Opposition parties have argued that such violence threatens public safety, damages confidence among investors and tourists, and puts public officials and elected representatives in danger.

Unlike in the past, this time, the opposition’s national security framing has not yielded the expected results. Recent surveys point in the opposite direction: many Sri Lankans appear relatively happy with the government’s performance.

Verité Research’s February 2026 “Mood of the Nation” survey found that 59 percent of respondents were satisfied with “the way things are going,” the first time that the figure crossed the 50 percent mark in four years of polling, while government approval stood at 65 percent. The same survey reported stronger economic optimism, with 64 percent saying the economy was “getting better,” up from 55 percent a year earlier. Verité’s executive director, Dr. Nishan de Mel, added that the highest positive evaluation was on reducing drugs and crime, even more than on reducing corruption.

A separate island-wide survey by the Social Scientists’ Association (SSA), conducted in early to mid-January 2026 across all 25 districts, found that 70 percent of respondents were satisfied with the government’s response to Cyclone Ditwah.

These findings do not mean that the NPP government is immune to attacks based on national security narratives. They suggest something narrower, but analytically useful, i.e., the conditions that make national security framing politically potent may not be present at this moment. The question is not whether gang violence is real. The question is whether the opposition can persuade a broad audience that there is an existential threat to national security and that the government is incapable of addressing it.

When Does a Public Safety Problem Become “National Security”?

Securitization theory, associated with the Copenhagen School, offers a useful framework to understand national security. According to the Copenhagen School, national security is not an objective condition determined by measurable criteria. Securitization theory, drawing on the work of Carl Schmitt, holds that this is the outcome of a social process.

Issues become “securitized,” or treated as a security issue, when several criteria are met. First, a political actor frames the issue as an existential threat, not simply as harmful, but as something that endangers the survival of a state, for example, its sovereignty, the functioning of institutions, society’s identity, etc. Second, securitization works when leaders frame an issue as existential and the audience accepts it, and that acceptance depends heavily on the credibility of the actor and the context. Third, and most crucially, a relevant audience accepts the framing.

For example, when the Maithripala Sirisena-Ranil Wickremesinghe government was in power (2015-2019), the Rajapaksas managed to convince a large number of Sri Lankans that crime was rising and had become a national security threat, although instances of grave crime had reduced notably from 2014 (when the Rajapaksas were in power) to 2018.

The contrast between 2015–2019 and now is instructive. If securitization succeeded then because the public accepted the messenger and the frame, the question now is why the same strategy is not producing similar results.

Why the Securitizing Move Has Not (Yet) Succeeded

To start with, the audience is not accepting the framing. Verité’s February 2026 survey suggests that most respondents feel broadly satisfied with the country’s direction and that government approval remains high.  It’s hard to convince the public that the government is losing control when the people think that the country is moving in the right direction. The SSA survey shows similar sentiments. Baseline confidence in the government’s performance shapes whether citizens believe it can deal with organized crime.

Secondly, the state has successfully counter-framed crime as a policing issue, with little impact on national security. Senior ministers and the defense establishment have repeatedly said there is no threat to national security. The government has insisted that the performance of the police and security forces has improved since they came to power. Inspector General of Police Priyantha Weerasooriya said a few weeks ago that police performance improved by 50-60 percent in 2025 and reported that weapons recoveries had doubled and narcotics seizures had tripled since 2024. The Navy, too, has ramped up efforts to seize drugs.

Thirdly, Rajapaksas have lost their credibility as guarantors of national security. Securitization depends heavily on the credibility of those making the claim. In the past, politicians such as the Rajapaksas, Wimal Weerawansa, and Udaya Gammanpila were seen as the voice of patriotism. However, because of their disastrous handling of the pandemic, the subsequent economic crisis, public anger over corruption and impunity, and exhaustion with crisis politics, these individuals have little credibility left. The credibility problem extends to the SJB as well, as most of its stalwarts held positions in the government during the Easter Sunday attacks in 2019.

Fourthly, many citizens view the violence as underworld rivalry rather than an existential threat. Organized crime has been a serious problem for many years and can become a national security issue when it captures institutions, intimidates courts, or shapes state decisions. The question is whether the public thinks Sri Lanka is at that threshold now. For many Sri Lankans, much of the current violence appears to involve rival gangs and drug networks targeting each other. In fact, most Sri Lankans, according to the Verité Research survey, think that the government is doing a good job of dealing with crime. Citizens interpret violence as “criminals killing criminals,” and demand tougher policing and faster prosecutions without accepting the claim that the nation faces an existential emergency.

Finally, amplification is not the same as acceptance, and media trust has weakened. Many of Sri Lanka’s private media institutions operate with clear political alignments and have historically played a significant role in amplifying security narratives. These media institutions played a pivotal role between 2001 and 2022 in setting the national security agenda and in convincing Sri Lankans that the Rajapaksas were the guardians of national security.

These media institutions have tried similar tactics in the past year, but the audience has not been as receptive as before. Most Sri Lankans have become more cynical and do not see the media as neutral actors. The rapidly declining trust in mainstream media, a phenomenon that we see around the world, has affected their ability to set the national security agenda.

What Would Make the Narrative Catch Fire?

None of this guarantees the opposition’s strategy will fail permanently. Securitization is context-dependent. Shocks can change what citizens accept.

But for now, Sri Lanka’s opposition has a problem. Sri Lanka’s history makes voters sensitive to national security. Yet that same history has trained them to judge security claims by credibility and lived experience. When polling suggests many credit the government with doing better on drugs and crime, when the state continues to frame shootings as a policing and accountability issue rather than a national security emergency, and when audiences treat mainstream media as politically aligned, labeling the moment a “national security crisis” does not automatically lead to the undermining of the government.

If the government maintains public confidence while containing violence through institutions, securitization attempts may continue to stall. If it stumbles, through a spectacular failure, visible collusion, or paralysis of policing and courts, things can change rapidly. Sri Lanka’s security politics rarely stay neutral for long.

Rathindra Kuruwita is a journalist and a researcher from Colombo, Sri Lanka.

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