ASEAN Beat | Diplomacy | Southeast Asia

The Quiet, Careful Growth of Philippine-Taiwan Ties

Manila is exploiting the space between its One China policy and functional cooperation with Taipei.

On October 2, the Philippine Coast Guard commissioned BRP Sarangani, a retired Taiwanese Coast Guard cutter formerly known as the Kinmen. The transfer is unusual because Taiwan only transfers decommissioned vessels to states that officially recognize Taiwan’s statehood, which the Philippines does not. 

Furthermore, the vessel did not sail from Kaohsiung to Manila under the Taiwanese flag, government-to-government, the way Taipei’s other patrol-vessel donations have gone to Palau, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu – states that recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan). Instead, the Philippine nongovernmental organization We Protect Our Seas (WPS) Foundation quietly acquired the Kinmen, renamed it, repainted it, and handed it to the Philippine Coast Guard in a ceremony that never mentioned where the ship had come from.

The reason for this indirect approach is obvious: the Philippines adheres to the One China policy and would not like to provoke China. Unofficial engagements with Taiwan, carried out by states like the United States, France, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Germany that formally recognize China, are a global default. China explicitly tolerates their economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. 

So what makes the Philippines’ engagement with Taiwan different, and why is Manila engaging with Taiwan so extensively now when its relationship with China is tenser than in the past two decades? 

The Philippines as a Distinct Case

For most of the above-mentioned states, Taiwan policy is about standing up for democracy and alliance management, conducted at a safe distance – being geographically far away from the immediate threat of military conflict with China. However, the Philippines is in close proximity to Taiwan. The Philippine province of Batanes lies south of Taiwan, near the Bashi Channel, placing it closer to spillover from the Taiwan conflict. 

Adding to this are 200,000 Filipino workers currently in Taiwan, whose evacuation during a Taiwan crisis would pose an emergency for the Philippine government. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has publicly stated that Taiwan’s security is inseparable from the Philippines’ own, making clear that Taiwan is a national security question rather than an elective foreign policy stance.

Yet Manila must tread carefully. Anything it does with Taiwan that upsets China is directly visible in Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, affecting Filipino sovereignty and fisheries. 

The Philippines’ increased engagement with Taiwan predates the Marcos administration. Taiwan is the Philippines’ ninth-largest trading partner, with established cooperation in education, agriculture, and healthcare and growing interest in semiconductors and start-ups. Under Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte (in office from 2016-2022), the Philippines and Taiwan signed a bilateral investment agreement in 2017 – the first major investment agreement in the last 25 years – under Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy, with cooperation extending across trade, investment, education, and labor mobility. But this engagement made sense given that the Philippines was in a state of rapprochement with China. 

What has changed now is the strategic significance of Philippines-Taiwan engagement. Economic and cultural ties are increasingly accompanied by institutional and maritime cooperation. In April 2025, the Philippines eased restrictions on official exchanges with Taiwan, facilitating travel for economic and trade-related purposes. This was highlighted by Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung’s visit to Manila, the second such foreign minister visit to the Philippines since 1975. Taiwan’s subsequent proposal to open a second representative office in Cebu to deepen the “Taiwan-Philippine Corridor” further signaled an effort to deepen institutional engagement. 

Maritime cooperation has become increasingly apparent. What began as crisis management........

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