China Power | Diplomacy | Central Asia

What China’s New County Reveals About Its Afghanistan Policy

The administrative change hints at China’s plan for greater integration with Afghanistan – and beyond to Central Asia.

The rugged landscape of the Wakhan Corridor.

For much of the modern era, Central Asia – including Afghanistan and China’s western Xinjiang province – has been treated as a geopolitical periphery. Long viewed as an isolated buffer zone shaped by conflict, “otherness,” and great power competition, this perception is now shifting. Geopolitical realignments, economic and security necessity, as well as regional initiatives are repositioning Central Asia as an emerging hub of trade and cooperation.

That background helps explain China’s establishment of Cenling County in March 2026 along its border with Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor. While some analyses emphasized the security implications of this move, this framing overlooks the broader strategic context. 

The creation of Cenling County aligns with a broader pattern of deepening regional integration and potentially signals strategic intent to realize the long-discussed Wakhan Road. If completed, the route would reconnect Afghanistan and China for the first time in nearly a century.

Cenling County and the Wakhan Road

China’s move to carve out Cenling County from Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County is a continuation of earlier administrative changes. In December 2024, China established two additional counties in Xinjiang: He’an County and Hekang County, which either border or encompass the disputed Aksai Chin region with India.

These changes are part of a broader trend of China consolidating control over its frontier regions. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as well as Afghanistan’s post-2021 political landscape have elevated the strategic importance of Central Asia and Xinjiang in the strategic calculus of China’s government. What was once considered peripheral is increasingly being treated as a core – not only by China, but within Central Asian development strategies. 

Therefore, Cenling County represents not only administrative consolidation, but also a step toward expanding cross-border economic activity and deepening regional cooperation. 

The idea of linking Afghanistan and China through the Wakhan Corridor has been discussed for many years. In 2009, the Afghanistan government – reportedly at the behest of the U.S. government – requested China’s government to permit the construction of a road through the Wakhan Corridor to provide a safer trade and supply route to bypass the volatile Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Despite China’s Foreign Ministry agreeing to conduct a feasibility study, nothing concrete materialized.

Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, the regime has made the construction of the Wakhan Road one of its national priorities. The project is a recurring topic in bilateral discussions with China. The Taliban have promoted the Wakhan Road as a route to connect China with the Middle East  and vice versa, which – if realized – carries potentially significant economic benefit for Afghanistan. Officials in Badakhshan province – where the Wakhan Corridor is situated – have publicly stated that China’s ambassador assured them the Chinese government will approve the Wakhan Road.

The establishment of Cenling County is best understood as part of a broader effort to align administrative control with a trade corridor that has long been discussed but never developed. Narrow narratives focusing solely on security concerns miss the wider picture of how regional developments and growing integration are evolving relations and activity in Central Asia. 

While no formal agreement has yet been announced and the high-elevation road is not near completion, the timing and location of the new county suggests that China is laying the political and logistical groundwork for cross-border infrastructure and cooperation. It is precisely because the idea of the Wakhan Road is not new that the establishment of Cenling County becomes particularly significant. After years of limited moves beyond rhetoric on this project, China’s approach appears to be shifting toward incremental confidence-building measures. 

By formalizing governance structures in this sensitive border region, it appears that China is now positioning itself to regulate cross-border movement, manage security risks, and support future infrastructure development. It also signals to the Central Asian states – including Afghanistan – that China is now taking the Wakhan Road and further regional connectivity seriously. 

More broadly, the new county reflects a maturing of China’s regional strategy, particularly within the framework of the BRI. China’s Xinjiang – together with Central Asia – is increasingly positioned as a key hub for international engagement, regional integration, and economic growth. 

Economic Potential and Regional Connectivity

The establishment of Cenling County should not be understood in vacuum, but within the broader context of regional peacebuilding and deepening cooperation among Central Asian states.

After years of political tension and border clashes, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan have finally settled their territorial disputes, reducing a key barrier to regional connectivity and collaboration. In March 2025, the three countries finalized border delimitation, while Uzbekistan and Tajikistan elevated their relationship to a strategic alliance. This improved regional cohesion – along with increased engagement with Afghanistan – is essential for both regional security and the advancement of BRI-linked infrastructure.

This shift in the regional political environment reduces risk for China and creates more favorable conditions for pursuing projects such as the Wakhan Road. China and the Central Asian states recognize that regional security and development remain closely tied to security and stability in Afghanistan. Since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, Central Asian states have expanded engagement with Afghan authorities on both security and economic issues.

Uzbekistan’s President Shavket Mirziyoyev emphasized, “For sustainable development in Central Asia, it is important to restore Afghanistan’s internal transport links and expand its transit capabilities.” The Wakhan Road would enhance regional connectivity, give Afghanistan direct access to Chinese markets, and reduce reliance on trade routes through Pakistan, which over past decades have been repeatedly disrupted.

Long-delayed regional transit projects via Afghanistan’s territory are now slowly becoming reality. The TAPI gas pipeline now extends 25 km into Afghan territory, with plans to reach Herat by the end of 2026. Similarly, the CASA-1000 energy project is projected to become operational in summer 2027, linking Central and South Asian energy markets. Uzbekistan has also prioritized the construction of the Trans-Afghan railway, aimed at linking Central Asian goods with South Asian ports, which Mirziyoyev claimed would provide a “foundation for Afghanistan’s economic revival.” Taken together, these projects suggest the gradual emergence of Afghanistan’s status shifting from a barrier to a transit node within the region. 

Trade between Afghanistan and Central Asian states reached approximately $2.7 billion in 2025, with Afghan ambitions to expand to $10 billion in 3-4 years. However, severe trade imbalances persist, underscoring Afghanistan’s need for diversified export routes and markets. For example, Afghanistan’s trade imbalance with Kazakhstan is approximately 10-to-1, with only $55 million of the $565 million in trade volume between the two countries being exports from Afghanistan. A recent trilateral initiative involving Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan to establish a joint trade and transit working group to facilitate the export of Afghan products further signals efforts to integrate Afghanistan as a key node in regional development.

For China, the Wakhan Road would provide an additional overland route into Central Asia, facilitate access to Afghan resources, and diversify trade corridors at a time of increasing concern over vulnerabilities of maritime routes. In this context, Cenling County is not an isolated administrative change, but part of a broader effort to signal broader strategic intent for the Central Asia region, including the potential realization of the Wakhan Road. 

Security Risks and Constraints

Despite its potential, the Wakhan Road still faces significant security constraints and is likely years away from realization. Security remains the central concern for China and other regional actors. 

Militant groups operating in Afghanistan – including Islamic State Khorasan Province and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) – pose a direct threat to infrastructure and transit projects, personnel, and regional stability. Attacks on Chinese targets in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan demonstrate the vulnerability of such projects to asymmetric threats from militants, drug traffickers, and criminal groups.

Although Afghan authorities have made significant achievements in curbing opium cultivation, shifts in cultivation toward Badakhshan province – where the Wakhan Corridor is situated – raise concerns about how increased connectivity could enable illicit trafficking. 

Fundamentally, these risks highlight constraints within security and governance capacity that have so far prevented the realization of the Wakhan Road. The viability of the road depends heavily on robust and sustained coordination between Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and other Central Asian states. The risk that militant and criminal actors could target or utilize the Wakhan Road is a key factor influencing China’s cautious approach. Without robust security coordination, the Wakhan Road risks becoming a conduit for instability rather than development.

Addressing these risks will require deeper regional coordination on security and governance. Regional organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) provide frameworks for counterterrorism and border security cooperation. However, the Moscow Format Consultations – which include most of the members of these organizations – remains the only regular, institutionalized regional mechanism that consistently includes the Taliban government. 

Recent discussions within these frameworks have emphasized Afghanistan’s central role in regional security and the need to increase security and defense coordination along Afghanistan’s northern border. China has consistently underscored that “security is the foundation and prerequisite of development.” Beijing’s calls for joint patrols and expanded counterterrorism cooperation in the Wakhan Corridor reflect this position. 

For the Wakhan Road to become viable, Afghanistan will need to demonstrate a sustained capacity to address militant and criminal threats and ensure the protection of foreign investments. 

Growing Significance of Central Asia in a Changing World

The establishment of Cenling County is a relatively small administrative change, but strategically consequential. It reflects a broader shift in how China views its western periphery: not as a distant frontier, but as an integral part of its economic and strategic future.  

The Wakhan Road remains unrealized and significant obstacles remain. Nonetheless, the trajectory of recent regional developments shows that regional actors are prioritizing connectivity, trade, cooperation, and the integration of Afghanistan, even as shared security challenges remain. In this context, the establishment of Cenling County can be interpreted as a confidence-building measure, signaling a willingness to invest in the road – provided that security conditions and coordination improve. 

If realized, the Wakhan Road could contribute to re-establishing Central Asia as a key interregional overland trade hub. The key indicators to watch for include the proposed increase in joint patrols, expanded infrastructure development in Cenling County, and concrete agreements between China and Afghanistan.

More broadly, the emergence of new overland trade corridors across Eurasia – in the Caucasus, Middle East, and Central Asia – reflect an interregional effort to diversify connectivity beyond traditional maritime routes, whose vulnerability has been all too clear in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. In this context, Cenling County is not an isolated administrative move, but aligns with the trend toward regional integration, the inclusion of Afghanistan in regional connectivity, and the growing desire for interregional overland trade routes. 

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For much of the modern era, Central Asia – including Afghanistan and China’s western Xinjiang province – has been treated as a geopolitical periphery. Long viewed as an isolated buffer zone shaped by conflict, “otherness,” and great power competition, this perception is now shifting. Geopolitical realignments, economic and security necessity, as well as regional initiatives are repositioning Central Asia as an emerging hub of trade and cooperation.

That background helps explain China’s establishment of Cenling County in March 2026 along its border with Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor. While some analyses emphasized the security implications of this move, this framing overlooks the broader strategic context. 

The creation of Cenling County aligns with a broader pattern of deepening regional integration and potentially signals strategic intent to realize the long-discussed Wakhan Road. If completed, the route would reconnect Afghanistan and China for the first time in nearly a century.

Cenling County and the Wakhan Road

China’s move to carve out Cenling County from Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County is a continuation of earlier administrative changes. In December 2024, China established two additional counties in Xinjiang: He’an County and Hekang County, which either border or encompass the disputed Aksai Chin region with India.

These changes are part of a broader trend of China consolidating control over its frontier regions. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as well as Afghanistan’s post-2021 political landscape have elevated the strategic importance of Central Asia and Xinjiang in the strategic calculus of China’s government. What was once considered peripheral is increasingly being treated as a core – not only by China, but within Central Asian development strategies. 

Therefore, Cenling County represents not only administrative consolidation, but also a step toward expanding cross-border economic activity and deepening regional cooperation. 

The idea of linking Afghanistan and China through the Wakhan Corridor has been discussed for many years. In 2009, the Afghanistan government – reportedly at the behest of the U.S. government – requested China’s government to permit the construction of a road through the Wakhan Corridor to provide a safer trade and supply route to bypass the volatile Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Despite China’s Foreign Ministry agreeing to conduct a feasibility study, nothing concrete materialized.

Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, the regime has made the construction of the Wakhan Road one of its national priorities. The project is a recurring topic in bilateral discussions with China. The Taliban have promoted the Wakhan Road as a route to connect China with the Middle East  and vice versa, which – if realized – carries potentially significant economic benefit for Afghanistan. Officials in Badakhshan province – where the Wakhan Corridor is situated – have publicly stated that China’s ambassador assured them the Chinese government will approve the Wakhan Road.

The establishment of Cenling County is best understood as part of a broader effort to align administrative control with a trade corridor that has long been discussed but never developed. Narrow narratives focusing solely on security concerns miss the wider picture of how regional developments and growing integration are evolving relations and activity in Central Asia. 

While no formal agreement has yet been announced and the high-elevation road is not near completion, the timing and location of the new county suggests that China is laying the political and logistical groundwork for cross-border infrastructure and cooperation. It is precisely because the idea of the Wakhan Road is not new that the establishment of Cenling County becomes particularly significant. After years of limited moves beyond rhetoric on this project, China’s approach appears to be shifting toward incremental confidence-building measures. 

By formalizing governance structures in this sensitive border region, it appears that China is now positioning itself to regulate cross-border movement, manage security risks, and support future infrastructure development. It also signals to the Central Asian states – including Afghanistan – that China is now taking the Wakhan Road and further regional connectivity seriously. 

More broadly, the new county reflects a maturing of China’s regional strategy, particularly within the framework of the BRI. China’s Xinjiang – together with Central Asia – is increasingly positioned as a key hub for international engagement, regional integration, and economic growth. 

Economic Potential and Regional Connectivity

The establishment of Cenling County should not be understood in vacuum, but within the broader context of regional peacebuilding and deepening cooperation among Central Asian states.

After years of political tension and border clashes, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan have finally settled their territorial disputes, reducing a key barrier to regional connectivity and collaboration. In March 2025, the three countries finalized border delimitation, while Uzbekistan and Tajikistan elevated their relationship to a strategic alliance. This improved regional cohesion – along with increased engagement with Afghanistan – is essential for both regional security and the advancement of BRI-linked infrastructure.

This shift in the regional political environment reduces risk for China and creates more favorable conditions for pursuing projects such as the Wakhan Road. China and the Central Asian states recognize that regional security and development remain closely tied to security and stability in Afghanistan. Since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, Central Asian states have expanded engagement with Afghan authorities on both security and economic issues.

Uzbekistan’s President Shavket Mirziyoyev emphasized, “For sustainable development in Central Asia, it is important to restore Afghanistan’s internal transport links and expand its transit capabilities.” The Wakhan Road would enhance regional connectivity, give Afghanistan direct access to Chinese markets, and reduce reliance on trade routes through Pakistan, which over past decades have been repeatedly disrupted.

Long-delayed regional transit projects via Afghanistan’s territory are now slowly becoming reality. The TAPI gas pipeline now extends 25 km into Afghan territory, with plans to reach Herat by the end of 2026. Similarly, the CASA-1000 energy project is projected to become operational in summer 2027, linking Central and South Asian energy markets. Uzbekistan has also prioritized the construction of the Trans-Afghan railway, aimed at linking Central Asian goods with South Asian ports, which Mirziyoyev claimed would provide a “foundation for Afghanistan’s economic revival.” Taken together, these projects suggest the gradual emergence of Afghanistan’s status shifting from a barrier to a transit node within the region. 

Trade between Afghanistan and Central Asian states reached approximately $2.7 billion in 2025, with Afghan ambitions to expand to $10 billion in 3-4 years. However, severe trade imbalances persist, underscoring Afghanistan’s need for diversified export routes and markets. For example, Afghanistan’s trade imbalance with Kazakhstan is approximately 10-to-1, with only $55 million of the $565 million in trade volume between the two countries being exports from Afghanistan. A recent trilateral initiative involving Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan to establish a joint trade and transit working group to facilitate the export of Afghan products further signals efforts to integrate Afghanistan as a key node in regional development.

For China, the Wakhan Road would provide an additional overland route into Central Asia, facilitate access to Afghan resources, and diversify trade corridors at a time of increasing concern over vulnerabilities of maritime routes. In this context, Cenling County is not an isolated administrative change, but part of a broader effort to signal broader strategic intent for the Central Asia region, including the potential realization of the Wakhan Road. 

Security Risks and Constraints

Despite its potential, the Wakhan Road still faces significant security constraints and is likely years away from realization. Security remains the central concern for China and other regional actors. 

Militant groups operating in Afghanistan – including Islamic State Khorasan Province and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) – pose a direct threat to infrastructure and transit projects, personnel, and regional stability. Attacks on Chinese targets in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan demonstrate the vulnerability of such projects to asymmetric threats from militants, drug traffickers, and criminal groups.

Although Afghan authorities have made significant achievements in curbing opium cultivation, shifts in cultivation toward Badakhshan province – where the Wakhan Corridor is situated – raise concerns about how increased connectivity could enable illicit trafficking. 

Fundamentally, these risks highlight constraints within security and governance capacity that have so far prevented the realization of the Wakhan Road. The viability of the road depends heavily on robust and sustained coordination between Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and other Central Asian states. The risk that militant and criminal actors could target or utilize the Wakhan Road is a key factor influencing China’s cautious approach. Without robust security coordination, the Wakhan Road risks becoming a conduit for instability rather than development.

Addressing these risks will require deeper regional coordination on security and governance. Regional organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) provide frameworks for counterterrorism and border security cooperation. However, the Moscow Format Consultations – which include most of the members of these organizations – remains the only regular, institutionalized regional mechanism that consistently includes the Taliban government. 

Recent discussions within these frameworks have emphasized Afghanistan’s central role in regional security and the need to increase security and defense coordination along Afghanistan’s northern border. China has consistently underscored that “security is the foundation and prerequisite of development.” Beijing’s calls for joint patrols and expanded counterterrorism cooperation in the Wakhan Corridor reflect this position. 

For the Wakhan Road to become viable, Afghanistan will need to demonstrate a sustained capacity to address militant and criminal threats and ensure the protection of foreign investments. 

Growing Significance of Central Asia in a Changing World

The establishment of Cenling County is a relatively small administrative change, but strategically consequential. It reflects a broader shift in how China views its western periphery: not as a distant frontier, but as an integral part of its economic and strategic future.  

The Wakhan Road remains unrealized and significant obstacles remain. Nonetheless, the trajectory of recent regional developments shows that regional actors are prioritizing connectivity, trade, cooperation, and the integration of Afghanistan, even as shared security challenges remain. In this context, the establishment of Cenling County can be interpreted as a confidence-building measure, signaling a willingness to invest in the road – provided that security conditions and coordination improve. 

If realized, the Wakhan Road could contribute to re-establishing Central Asia as a key interregional overland trade hub. The key indicators to watch for include the proposed increase in joint patrols, expanded infrastructure development in Cenling County, and concrete agreements between China and Afghanistan.

More broadly, the emergence of new overland trade corridors across Eurasia – in the Caucasus, Middle East, and Central Asia – reflect an interregional effort to diversify connectivity beyond traditional maritime routes, whose vulnerability has been all too clear in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. In this context, Cenling County is not an isolated administrative move, but aligns with the trend toward regional integration, the inclusion of Afghanistan in regional connectivity, and the growing desire for interregional overland trade routes. 

Philip Acey is a Canadian Ph.D. candidate in International Relations and an independent political researcher and analyst. He conducted four months of research in Afghanistan in 2024-2025 and has worked for over a decade across Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America. His research has advised the U.N. Security Council, diplomats, and humanitarian organizations.

Afghanistan connectivity

Afghanistan-China relations

China-Afghanistan border

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