Crossroads Asia | Society | Central Asia

Central Asians in Russia-Ukraine War: From Forced Recruitment to Economic Recruitment

Has Russia’s war become an extension of the migrant labor economy for Central Asians? 

The Ukrainian governmental initiative “I want to live” («Хочу жить») reported recently that it has identified 12,666 citizens of Central Asia who are fighting, or have fought, on the Russian side since Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. 

Uzbeks make up the largest group from the region.

The numbers are significantly higher than those previously reported. Last year, the same initiative reported that 5,740 Central Asians had, or were, fighting on the side of Russia as mercenaries. In May 2025, it disclosed the names of 1,110 Uzbeks and in June, another 902, while the names of 1,559 Tajik and 687 Kyrgyz were listed in April and August of 2025. 

Despite the irregularity of these updates,  the trend is obvious – more and more Central Asians are fighting for Russia.

The figures not only demonstrate Moscow’s growing reliance on foreign manpower four years into the war, they also point to a shift in recruitment of Central Asians: from early-war coercion and deception toward a more normalized market of war labor.

Money as a Pull Factor

Russia, for the past few decades, has been a major destination for labor migrants from Central Asia for myriad reasons, including visa-free entry, the presence of an existing Central Asian community, familiarity with the Russian language and culture, and so on. At the onset of the Ukraine war, many migrants (mostly in detention or prison) were reported to be pressured, forced, or manipulated into signing contracts with Russia’s Ministry of Defense to spare themselves from long imprisonment or deportation to their home countries due to expired work permits; to receive Russian citizenship; or simply to get employed into civilian jobs and earn good money.

Those practices have not disappeared. However, recent reports from journalists and rights defenders suggest that money and Russian citizenship are now playing a central role, not outright pressure. The participation of  Central Asians in the war has become “business as usual” – a normalized, transactional arrangement. For many, Russia’s war has become a brutal extension of the migrant labor economy. 

The Diplomat has previously reported that some Uzbek migrants joined the Russian army for monetary incentives, among other reasons. A recent report from Azattyk Asia, a Central Asia-focused project of RFE/RL, showed the growing scale of the practice among Central Asians. According to Azattyk Asia, many justify their decision with a need for money, such as loans they have to pay back at home or the desire to build a house, but many often cite receiving Russian citizenship as a compelling benefit.

According to the report, not only are more people from Central Asia fighting for Russia willingly, but they are not morally concerned, nor are they afraid of the consequences of their actions, such as imprisonment at home for participating in armed conflicts on behalf of a foreign state. Recruits believe nothing will happen to them or even if they end up in prison, “Russia gets them out.”

Understanding the dilemma labor migrants face in Russia – prison or poverty versus quick money — and the reality of their nations’ dependence on remittances sent by migrants, the countries of Central Asia do not push for strict punishment for those who join the Russian army. Regional governments have warned their citizens against it, issuing statements reminding them that it’s illegal. Central Asian government have also been helping those who seek to flee the warzone to return home. But those who have faced legal penalties have been punished lightly relative to the potential under the existing laws. Another explanation could be the desire to avoid provoking Russia, as could happen if regional governments took  a more confrontational stance.  

Recognizing the complicated nature of the circumstances, Kazakh politician Zharkynbek Amantayuly – a member of the lower house of the Kazakh parliament – recently suggested softening the punishment for those who participate in armed conflicts on behalf of other nations. According to Amantayuly, if the recruits are not part of a terrorist group or do not commit war crimes, they should be eligible for lighter punishment because “no one goes to an armed conflict zone without a reason.” 

In the first years of the war, only a few dozen cases were opened annually against Kazakh nationals by Kazakh law enforcement on the ground of fighting in a foreign conflict. However, in 2025, after the identities of hundreds of Kazakh recruits were made public, the number of cases rose sharply to around 700. 

With thousands of its citizens in the war, Tashkent has also been punishing returnees at home, but with light sentences and judgements referring to “mitigating circumstances,” as reported by the Diplomat last year. In 2026 alone, local newspapers reported dozens of cases where returnees received relatively short terms: a 24 year old from Navaiy sentenced to four years, a 20 year old from Tashkent went to prison for five years and so on. The majority of the reported cases from Uzbekistan indicate three years of imprisonment (see for example these five cases – 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 – all reported in 2026). Courts in Tashkent are also punishing the former recruits with home arrest of a couple of years and even by correctional labor, rather than prison terms.

The common pattern, however, remains the same – recruits sign a contract either under pressure or are lured by money, participate in the war for a short period, get injured or realize the horrors of the war, and escape to Moscow, where the Uzbek Embassy organizes their return.

​​Even as voluntary recruitment grows, coercive recruitment persists among the most vulnerable: prisoners, undocumented migrants, and women. In January 2026, Azattyk Asia reported that women labor migrants were also allegedly being sent to the war. While earlier in the war, women prisoners were made to sew mattresses and jackets for soldiers, now they are reportedly being “offered” jobs in the war zone  as nurses, cooks, and launderers. 

“Previously, our organization received only reports about the recruitment of men from Uzbekistan. Now we are receiving complaints that Uzbek women in Russian prisons are increasingly being recruited to take part in the war against Ukraine,” Abdurakhmon Tashanov, chair of the Tashkent-based human rights society Ezgulik, told Azattyk Asia . “Most of them are women who worked as couriers or were engaged in other informal or low-paid work. According to the information we have received, many of them are imprisoned after being set up, with drugs planted on them.”

All the while, Moscow continues treating foreign recruits, including those from Central Asia, as expendable. They are not integrated into elite or protected roles nor are they provided with proper training. Reportedly at least 18,000 people from 128 countries fought or are fighting for Russia and over 3,000 have died. The exact number of Central Asians killed in the war is unknown. So far around 200 Kazakh nationals are estimated to have been killed. Last year, “I want to live” confirmed the deaths of 109 Uzbeks, 196 Tajiks, 38 Kyrgyz, and 27 Turkmen. Given the recent numbers of almost 13,000 recruits from Central Asia, fatalities among them are likely far greater than is currently known.

This research was supported by a Marie Curie Staff Exchange within the Horizon Europe Programme (CARSI, no: 101086415) 

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The Ukrainian governmental initiative “I want to live” («Хочу жить») reported recently that it has identified 12,666 citizens of Central Asia who are fighting, or have fought, on the Russian side since Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. 

Uzbeks make up the largest group from the region.

The numbers are significantly higher than those previously reported. Last year, the same initiative reported that 5,740 Central Asians had, or were, fighting on the side of Russia as mercenaries. In May 2025, it disclosed the names of 1,110 Uzbeks and in June, another 902, while the names of 1,559 Tajik and 687 Kyrgyz were listed in April and August of 2025. 

Despite the irregularity of these updates,  the trend is obvious – more and more Central Asians are fighting for Russia.

The figures not only demonstrate Moscow’s growing reliance on foreign manpower four years into the war, they also point to a shift in recruitment of Central Asians: from early-war coercion and deception toward a more normalized market of war labor.

Money as a Pull Factor

Russia, for the past few decades, has been a major destination for labor migrants from Central Asia for myriad reasons, including visa-free entry, the presence of an existing Central Asian community, familiarity with the Russian language and culture, and so on. At the onset of the Ukraine war, many migrants (mostly in detention or prison) were reported to be pressured, forced, or manipulated into signing contracts with Russia’s Ministry of Defense to spare themselves from long imprisonment or deportation to their home countries due to expired work permits; to receive Russian citizenship; or simply to get employed into civilian jobs and earn good money.

Those practices have not disappeared. However, recent reports from journalists and rights defenders suggest that money and Russian citizenship are now playing a central role, not outright pressure. The participation of  Central Asians in the war has become “business as usual” – a normalized, transactional arrangement. For many, Russia’s war has become a brutal extension of the migrant labor economy. 

The Diplomat has previously reported that some Uzbek migrants joined the Russian army for monetary incentives, among other reasons. A recent report from Azattyk Asia, a Central Asia-focused project of RFE/RL, showed the growing scale of the practice among Central Asians. According to Azattyk Asia, many justify their decision with a need for money, such as loans they have to pay back at home or the desire to build a house, but many often cite receiving Russian citizenship as a compelling benefit.

According to the report, not only are more people from Central Asia fighting for Russia willingly, but they are not morally concerned, nor are they afraid of the consequences of their actions, such as imprisonment at home for participating in armed conflicts on behalf of a foreign state. Recruits believe nothing will happen to them or even if they end up in prison, “Russia gets them out.”

Understanding the dilemma labor migrants face in Russia – prison or poverty versus quick money — and the reality of their nations’ dependence on remittances sent by migrants, the countries of Central Asia do not push for strict punishment for those who join the Russian army. Regional governments have warned their citizens against it, issuing statements reminding them that it’s illegal. Central Asian government have also been helping those who seek to flee the warzone to return home. But those who have faced legal penalties have been punished lightly relative to the potential under the existing laws. Another explanation could be the desire to avoid provoking Russia, as could happen if regional governments took  a more confrontational stance.  

Recognizing the complicated nature of the circumstances, Kazakh politician Zharkynbek Amantayuly – a member of the lower house of the Kazakh parliament – recently suggested softening the punishment for those who participate in armed conflicts on behalf of other nations. According to Amantayuly, if the recruits are not part of a terrorist group or do not commit war crimes, they should be eligible for lighter punishment because “no one goes to an armed conflict zone without a reason.” 

In the first years of the war, only a few dozen cases were opened annually against Kazakh nationals by Kazakh law enforcement on the ground of fighting in a foreign conflict. However, in 2025, after the identities of hundreds of Kazakh recruits were made public, the number of cases rose sharply to around 700. 

With thousands of its citizens in the war, Tashkent has also been punishing returnees at home, but with light sentences and judgements referring to “mitigating circumstances,” as reported by the Diplomat last year. In 2026 alone, local newspapers reported dozens of cases where returnees received relatively short terms: a 24 year old from Navaiy sentenced to four years, a 20 year old from Tashkent went to prison for five years and so on. The majority of the reported cases from Uzbekistan indicate three years of imprisonment (see for example these five cases – 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 – all reported in 2026). Courts in Tashkent are also punishing the former recruits with home arrest of a couple of years and even by correctional labor, rather than prison terms.

The common pattern, however, remains the same – recruits sign a contract either under pressure or are lured by money, participate in the war for a short period, get injured or realize the horrors of the war, and escape to Moscow, where the Uzbek Embassy organizes their return.

​​Even as voluntary recruitment grows, coercive recruitment persists among the most vulnerable: prisoners, undocumented migrants, and women. In January 2026, Azattyk Asia reported that women labor migrants were also allegedly being sent to the war. While earlier in the war, women prisoners were made to sew mattresses and jackets for soldiers, now they are reportedly being “offered” jobs in the war zone  as nurses, cooks, and launderers. 

“Previously, our organization received only reports about the recruitment of men from Uzbekistan. Now we are receiving complaints that Uzbek women in Russian prisons are increasingly being recruited to take part in the war against Ukraine,” Abdurakhmon Tashanov, chair of the Tashkent-based human rights society Ezgulik, told Azattyk Asia . “Most of them are women who worked as couriers or were engaged in other informal or low-paid work. According to the information we have received, many of them are imprisoned after being set up, with drugs planted on them.”

All the while, Moscow continues treating foreign recruits, including those from Central Asia, as expendable. They are not integrated into elite or protected roles nor are they provided with proper training. Reportedly at least 18,000 people from 128 countries fought or are fighting for Russia and over 3,000 have died. The exact number of Central Asians killed in the war is unknown. So far around 200 Kazakh nationals are estimated to have been killed. Last year, “I want to live” confirmed the deaths of 109 Uzbeks, 196 Tajiks, 38 Kyrgyz, and 27 Turkmen. Given the recent numbers of almost 13,000 recruits from Central Asia, fatalities among them are likely far greater than is currently known.

This research was supported by a Marie Curie Staff Exchange within the Horizon Europe Programme (CARSI, no: 101086415) 

Niginakhon Saida is a doctoral research fellow at MALVA Center for the Study of War, Language, and Memory at JGU Mainz.

Central Asia Ukraine response

Central Asian migrant workers in Russia

Central Asian migrants

Central Asians fighting in Ukraine

Central Asians in Russia

Uzbekistan Ukraine response

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