Crossroads Asia | Society | Central Asia

Central Asians in Russia-Ukraine War: From Forced Recruitment to Economic Recruitment

Has Russia’s war become an extension of the migrant labor economy for Central Asians? 

The Ukrainian governmental initiative “I want to live” («Хочу жить») reported recently that it has identified 12,666 citizens of Central Asia who are fighting, or have fought, on the Russian side since Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. 

Uzbeks make up the largest group from the region.

The numbers are significantly higher than those previously reported. Last year, the same initiative reported that 5,740 Central Asians had, or were, fighting on the side of Russia as mercenaries. In May 2025, it disclosed the names of 1,110 Uzbeks and in June, another 902, while the names of 1,559 Tajik and 687 Kyrgyz were listed in April and August of 2025. 

Despite the irregularity of these updates,  the trend is obvious – more and more Central Asians are fighting for Russia.

The figures not only demonstrate Moscow’s growing reliance on foreign manpower four years into the war, they also point to a shift in recruitment of Central Asians: from early-war coercion and deception toward a more normalized market of war labor.

Money as a Pull Factor

Russia, for the past few decades, has been a major destination for labor migrants from Central Asia for myriad reasons, including visa-free entry, the presence of an existing Central Asian community, familiarity with the Russian language and culture, and so on. At the onset of the Ukraine war, many migrants (mostly in detention or prison) were reported to be pressured, forced, or manipulated into signing contracts with Russia’s Ministry of Defense to spare themselves from long imprisonment or deportation to their home countries due to expired work permits; to receive Russian citizenship; or simply to get employed into civilian jobs and earn good money.

Those practices have not disappeared. However, recent reports from journalists and rights defenders suggest that money and Russian citizenship are now playing a central role, not outright pressure. The participation of  Central Asians in the war has become “business as usual” – a normalized, transactional arrangement. For many, Russia’s war has become a brutal extension of the migrant labor economy. 

The Diplomat has previously reported that some Uzbek migrants joined the Russian army for monetary incentives, among other reasons. A recent report from Azattyk Asia, a Central Asia-focused project of RFE/RL, showed the growing scale of the practice among Central Asians. According to Azattyk Asia, many justify their decision with a need for money, such as loans they have to pay back at home or the desire to build a house, but many often cite receiving Russian citizenship as a compelling benefit.

According to the report, not only are more people from Central Asia fighting for Russia willingly, but they are not morally concerned, nor are they afraid of the consequences of their actions, such as imprisonment at home for participating in armed conflicts on behalf of a foreign state. Recruits believe nothing will happen to them or even if they end up in prison, “Russia gets them out.”

Understanding the dilemma labor migrants face in Russia – prison or poverty versus quick money — and the reality of their nations’ dependence on remittances sent by migrants, the countries of Central Asia do not push for strict punishment for those who join the Russian army. Regional governments have warned their citizens against it, issuing statements reminding them that it’s illegal. Central Asian government have also been helping those who seek to flee the warzone to return home. But those who have faced legal penalties have been punished lightly relative to the potential under the existing laws. Another explanation could be the desire to avoid provoking Russia, as could happen if regional governments took  a more confrontational........

© The Diplomat