Flashpoints | Diplomacy | East Asia

Breaking Down the State of Play in Sino-North Korean Ties

The Xi administration has been slow to adapt to its ally’s developments, and this summit represented an attempt to reset relations.

From June 8-9, 2026, Chinese leader Xi Jinping made his first state visit to North Korea in seven years. Both governments highlighted the enduring strength of bilateral ties, yet the rhetoric from the engagement masked years of political stagnation and strategic drift in the relationship since Xi’s last trip to Pyongyang in 2019. The Kim Jong Un regime’s self-imposed COVID isolation gave way to deliberate steps toward deepening ties with the Kremlin rather than Beijing. The summit, then, was a key indicator of the current state of play in ties between China and North Korea.

While many outside observers watched intently for notable signs of strategic realignment, the visit was devoid of the substance seen in other summit-level events that North Korea has hosted in recent years. 

Ultimately, Xi’s state visit was largely a pro forma exercise intended to re-establish a baseline for engagement rather than to break new ground in Sino-North Korean relations. Observers can expect the two governments to proceed with working level meetings in various sectors (e.g., trade, tourism, science, sports, etc.), while the biggest question remains whether the two governments will actually take steps to increase military cooperation. 

The Bilateral Relationship Before Xi’s visit

There was a stark contrast in bilateral relations between Beijing and Pyongyang prior to and after Xi’s last state visit to North Korea in 2019. Ahead of that trip, Xi was a fixture in Kim’s foreign policy designs, warranting a summit-level meeting prior to each of Kim’s follow-on engagements with then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump. In total, Kim made four visits to Beijing from 2018 to 2019 before Xi finally reciprocated in traveling to Pyongyang. After that trip, however, there were no bilateral meetings between the two for years, and it was Russian President Vladimir Putin, not Xi, who emerged as the foreign leader most frequently engaged with Kim during that time.

North Korea’s COVID lockdown was a key transition period for the Kim regime’s policy designs. The self-imposed isolation allowed for a reset in multiple areas of governance while few officials were permitted to enter or leave the country, including foreign diplomats. It was during this time that the North Korean government focused on a triple track approach of internal stability, military modernization, and restructuring external relationships. Under the first track, the Kim regime took measures to re-indoctrinate the population and reorganize the economy under the central government. This included rooting out black market activity that had been fueled largely by goods smuggled in from China, including foreign media and cell phones.

The second track was wholesale modernization of the Korean People’s Army, but the most notable evolution came in the adoption of new nuclear forces. Rather than relying upon a Chinese nuclear umbrella, the Kim regime took concrete steps to develop wide-ranging delivery vehicles for its stable of nuclear warheads including rail-launched ballistic missiles, strategic cruise missiles, and nuclear-capable rocket launcher systems. 

At the same time, the Kim regime’s third track focused on restructuring its external relationships under new policy paradigms. This notably included the abandonment of unification with South Korea as it demonstrated a willingness to accept two sovereign states on the Korean Peninsula, as well as the decision to back Russia in its war against Ukraine given Pyongyang’s newfound leverage in its engagements with the Kremlin. Less advertised has been the stagnation of Sino-North Korean ties as Beijing had to figure out how to adapt to a more self-assured North Korea.

In 2025, the two governments began rekindling their bilateral engagement, most notably with Kim’s return to Beijing. Traveling to the Chinese capital to observe Victory Day celebrations alongside other world leaders, Xi held a one-on-one meeting with Kim and signaled a willingness to return to North Korea. Nine months later, Xi followed through.

Xi Jinping’s State Visit

The state visit largely adhered to established diplomatic choreography and featured no noteworthy departures from precedent. On the first day, Xi participated in a large welcome ceremony at Kim Il Sung Square, held summit talks with Kim, attended a banquet, and observed an arts performance. On the second day, Xi laid flowers at the Sino-North Korea Friendship Tower, visited the Central Cadres School of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and departed following a small group luncheon with Kim Jong Un and their spouses. The symbolism was familiar and carefully choreographed, emphasizing continuity rather than innovation.

That same message was reinforced in the Chinese and North Korean op-eds published via the Rodong Sinmun national newspaper on the morning of Xi’s arrival – one from the North Korean side, and one attributed to Xi. Neither article announced concrete initiatives; rather, both emphasized the historical bonds between the two countries and called for a new era of cooperation built upon their shared revolutionary heritage.

Overall, the visit reflected a distinctly party-centric approach. It may seem natural for North Korea to emphasize Workers’ Party of Korea representation as counterparts to the Chinese Communist Party; however, it meant that there was a different cast of officials present for Xi’s visit than those involved in North Korea’s other recent summits. It is........

© The Diplomat