Features | Diplomacy | East Asia

Trump Goes to Beijing: What to Watch

China’s belated confirmation of the visit reflects Beijing’s broader approach to Washington under Trump’s second administration: do not initiate, do not refuse, and do not compromise.

U.S. President Donald Trump greets Chinese President Xi Jinping before a bilateral meeting at the Gimhae International Airport terminal in Busan, South Korea, Oct. 30, 2025.

On May 11, Beijing announced that U.S. President Donald Trump would visit China from May 13 to 15 – just two days before his summit with President Xi Jinping was due to begin. 

Trump had publicly confirmed his visit dates back in March. For months, Beijing’s public response remained deliberately noncommittal: “China and the United States are in communication regarding U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposed visit.” Preparatory diplomacy continued in the background, including a bipartisan congressional visit to Beijing that raised issues likely to feature in Trump’s agenda: market access for U.S. firms, Boeing aircraft sales, tariff relief and agricultural purchases.

Beijing’s delayed confirmation was a calibrated response to a transactional president who treats diplomacy less as institutional statecraft than as deal-making theater. Trump had floated a two-day visit; China announced three days. Whether driven by protocol, bargaining or both, the extra 24 hours carried political meaning: if Trump was coming to Beijing, he would do so on China’s agenda.

That choreography reflects Beijing’s broader approach to Washington under Trump’s second administration: do not initiate, do not refuse, and do not compromise. Do not initiate, because Beijing has no interest in rewarding Trump’s instinct for diplomatic theater and agenda-setting spectacle. Do not refuse, because shutting the door on a guest is not China’s style, and keeping the door open preserves diplomatic flexibility. Do not compromise, because national security, the One China principle, and technological sovereignty remain non-negotiable.

The summit agenda will be packed. Taiwan, trade, nuclear safety, Iran, artificial intelligence, and rare earths may all feature. On the surface, the meeting will be all handshakes and protocol. Underneath, it will be a test of strength across three connected fronts, determining which side can better convert leverage into diplomatic advantage.

Taiwan: The Core of the Core

Taiwan will be the Trump-Xi summit’s underlying political issue. For Beijing, it is not one item among many. It is the issue that defines the political boundary of the relationship. During the preparatory congressional visit, Chinese officials again stressed that the United States must adhere to the One China principle if it wants stable relations with China.

This is where Trump’s transactional instincts create both opportunity and risk. His instinct is to turn every issue into a deal. But Taiwan is not a soybean contract or a Boeing order. Any attempt to use Taiwan as a pressure card would meet Beijing’s strongest resistance. Conversely, any hint that Washington might dilute its commitments to Taiwan in exchange for Chinese purchases or trade concessions would alarm U.S. allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific.

The most likely outcome is therefore not a grand bargain over Taiwan, but a struggle over language. Beijing will press for stronger U.S. reassurance on the One China principle and opposition to Taiwan independence. Washington will seek to avoid any visible retreat from existing policy. The danger lies in ambiguity. Trump may prefer a formulation that sounds like a breakthrough but creates uncertainty among allies.

For Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian states, this may be the most consequential part of the summit. The question is not only what Trump and Xi say about Taiwan, but whether the meeting alters perceptions of U.S. reliability. In the Indo-Pacific, deterrence depends not merely on military capability, but also on confidence in political commitments.

Trade: Trump Wants Numbers; China Wants Optionality

The second thread is trade. Trump needs visible economic wins. His domestic audience understands aircraft orders, farm purchases, tariff reductions, and investment pledges more easily than abstract language about strategic stabilization. That is why Boeing aircraft and agricultural contracts are likely to return to the center of summit expectations.

This resembles managed trade. It is not about rules-based liberalization. It is about numbers that can be announced, photographed, and sold politically. For Trump, expanded purchases of soybeans, corn, beef, or other agricultural goods would reassure rural constituencies hurt by years of tariff volatility. A Boeing order would support his manufacturing narrative. Limited tariff adjustments would allow him to claim that China moves first.

China may accept some of this. It has incentives to stabilize the relationship. Its economy still benefits from reduced tariff uncertainty, U.S. investment, and access to the U.S. market. Chinese........

© The Diplomat