Flashpoints | Security | East Asia

China’s Arctic Comeback

Many of China’s initial, ambitious Arctic objectives collided with political and logistical realities. Now Beijing is testing out an “Arctic 2.0” strategy.

Drift ice in the middle of the Arctic Ocean, as seen from the deck of the Chinese icebreaker Xue Long.

It has been almost a decade now since Beijing announced its revised Arctic strategy, particularly focused on the development of the Polar Silk Road (PSR), a segment of the Belt and Road Initiative originally conceived as an emerging “blue economic channel” connecting Europe with Northeast Asia via the Northern Sea Route.

The PSR would later be incorporated into Beijing’s 2018 governmental White Paper on the Arctic, as China sought to “understand, protect, develop, and participate in the governance” of the far north, while positioning itself as a “near-Arctic state” and regional stakeholder. While maintaining emphasis on Arctic scientific cooperation, China began to exhibit stronger interests in regional economic, and to a degree strategic, initiatives in the years following the publication of the White Paper.

However, many of China’s initial, ambitious Arctic objectives soon collided with political and logistical realities. Various planned regional investments, from railways in the Nordic region and Russia, to mines in Greenland and Canada, to natural gas co-development in Alaska, failed to materialize. Policy momentum was further stalled by the COVID-19 pandemic, and subsequently by the aftershocks of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Moreover, the political balkanization of the north between Western and Russian spheres of interest further complicated Chinese plans to take a “whole of Arctic” approach to regional economic diplomacy. Beijing soon found itself in the near-impossible position of trying to maintain Arctic cooperation with Russia without slamming the door on other regional governments, especially in the Nordic region.

There was the emerging view that both the PSR and Beijing’s overall Arctic engagement were in danger of falling into abeyance as hard power-based geopolitical concerns swept through the region, and Arctic powers began to fence off their security interests. Around the time China achieved observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013, some Chinese commentators warned that the country was in danger of being shut out of the far north because the region would be “cut up like a melon” by Arctic governments who “refuse to share the cake.”

While the optimism of the last decade has given way to a new practicality, China is showing no sign of ceding the Arctic as it continues to expand its foreign policy arenas. On the contrary, Beijing has undertaken the intricate process of rebuilding its northern policies, steps which have included attempts to breathe new life into the PSR, to expand regional research agendas, to pursue greater science diplomacy, and to take advantage of deepening splits between the United States and other Arctic states within NATO, to present China as an alternative partner in developing and governing the region. 

China’s Arctic comeback has been multifaceted to say the least. Earlier this month, China’s 16th Arctic Expedition, overseen by the country’s Ministry of Natural Resources, was launched, featuring the icebreakers Xuelong, Xuelong 2, and Jidi, and the support vessel Tansuo 3. The vessels are to engage in several different research projects including ice depth measurement, local biology and ecology, seabed surveys, and atmospheric testing, in the Arctic Ocean’s Gakkel Ridge, which arches from the Laptev Sea to the waters north of Greenland. The excursion is scheduled to take place until October this year and includes researchers from Russia, Germany, and other countries.

In addition to accentuating the width and depth of the expedition, Chinese media covering the launch have also frequently used the phrase “providing scientific support for Arctic governance.” It is expected this mission will build on the emerging “three dimensional” approach that China has been taking to its Arctic surveys, reflecting interests in land-based, maritime, and air/space observations. In addition to providing China the means of jump-starting its Arctic research agenda, the expedition sends a loud signal that the country is not prepared to be dissuaded from maintaining a northern presence.

At the same time, while China continues to maintain a cautious approach to its overall engagement with Moscow in the Arctic, there has been an increase in Sino-Russian scientific cooperation in recent years, such as in the study of local undersea geology. 

China also continues to maintain research facilities at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard (Yellow River), and in northern Iceland (China-Iceland Arctic Research Observatory/CIAO), but both sites have undergone recent scrutiny amid concerns about dual-use research detrimental to regional security. In 2025, restrictions were placed on Chinese nationals seeking to research at Universitetssenteret på Svalbard, the only institute of higher learning on the archipelago, and a pair of iconic, Shanghai-made stone lions were recently removed from the Yellow River site in keeping with Norwegian authorities’ attempts to streamline regulations regarding the settlement’s signage, nomenclature, and decor. 

An additional wildcard in China’s research agenda in Svalbard, however, is the degree to which Chinese researchers might participate in Russian plans for an alternative BRICS research and educational facility at Pyramiden, one of the two Russian settlements in Svalbard (the other being Barentsburg). While these facilities have yet to be opened, Chinese research organizations have expressed interest in closer cooperation with Russian counterparts in Svalbard, and in May this year a memorandum of........

© The Diplomat