Tokyo Report | Diplomacy | East Asia

Beyond the Rupture: Where Are China-Japan Relations Heading?

The evolution of Sino-Japanese relations has rarely followed a linear path – but it has always remained within clear guardrails, even during times of tension.

Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae (left) shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a meeting on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Gyeongju, South Korea, Oct. 31, 2025.

Since November 2025, Tokyo and Beijing have been embroiled in a series of diplomatic crises, causing China-Japan relations to hit their lowest point in the past decade. Comments by Japan’s new leader, Takaichi Sanae, on Taiwan signaled the beginning of the diplomatic crisis. China’s government reacted strongly, imposing restrictions on flights and tourism, banning Japanese seafood imports, canceling cultural exchanges, and ramping up military activities near Japan. 

In March 2026, a knife-wielding Japanese Self-Defense Forces member broke into the Chinese embassy in Tokyo, provoking Chinese anger. Chinese official sources claimed the incident represented a “resurgence of militarist thinking” in Japan.

Recently, Japan’s latest foreign policy document downgraded China’s status to an “important neighboring country,” a step back from “one of the most important bilateral relations” in 2025. 

The ongoing diplomatic crisis has evolved into a multidimensional competition involving historical memory, national identity, military deterrence, and geoeconomic pressure.

How can we best understand the current rupture, and what might the future hold for China-Japan relations?

Realist scholars of international relations might view recent incidents as the predictable byproduct of a shifting power imbalance and the inherent friction of great power politics. However, when considering the broader historical context, the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations has rarely followed a linear path. 

Challenging the traditional view of Japan as a passive “reactive state,” scholars Kei Koga and Saori N. Katada argued in their latest book, “Japan’s Grand Strategy: Liminal Power in an Uncertain World,” that Tokyo has historically been highly proactive in its grand strategy-making. Driven by both structural shifts and domestic politics, Japanese decision-makers continuously construct and reconstruct the country’s strategic posture. Therefore, in the face of an increasingly assertive China, Japan is not merely reacting but actively adapting. 

The complex dynamics of bilateral relations often result from the interplay between structural factors – such as economic interdependence and changing power balances – and domestic factors, including historical memory, bureaucratic politics, and rising nationalism, rather than from a predetermined structural outcome. Ultimately, the trajectory of these bilateral ties is not preordained; it depends entirely on how leadership in both capitals navigates overlapping structural realities and domestic pressures.

Diplomatic Ties: Born out of Pragmatic Considerations

Since the end of World War II, China-Japan relations have been anchored in pragmatic calculation rather than genuine historical reconciliation. Even with the brutal legacy of wartime atrocities vividly etched into public memory, these grievances were intentionally sidelined to facilitate the 1972 normalization of ties. Famously, Mao Zedong even deflected an apology from then-Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, suggesting that the Japanese invasion inadvertently helped unify China under the Communist Party. 

This renewed relationship was forged not by true forgiveness, but by the strategic imperatives of the broader international environment. Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s and 1970s, Beijing sought to counter Moscow’s threat by aligning with Washington and Tokyo. This pragmatic bond deepened during the Deng Xiaoping era. As China pivoted toward economic reconstruction, it found an indispensable partner in Japan, an economic powerhouse eager to invest in exchange for access to China’s massive market under the mercantilist Yoshida doctrine. 

This mutually beneficial, albeit transactional, relationship survived the collapse of the Cold War order. Even as Japan sought a more proactive regional role amid uncertainties regarding long-term U.S. security commitments, and China increasingly sought to cultivate nationalistic sentiment to boost the party’s legitimacy following the Tiananmen incident, Tokyo and Beijing successfully compartmentalized their growing friction. They operated under the pragmatic doctrine of seikei bunri – the separation of politics and economics. Consequently, despite simmering political distrust, the two states benefited from strong economic interdependence, and economic integration between them continued to deepen, sustaining bilateral stability well into the early 2000s. 

The Senkaku Islands Dispute as a Wake-up Call

However, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands crisis in 2010 and 2012 served as a wake-up call for Japan, shattering the illusion that politics and economics could remain forever separated. As economic and military power shifted toward China and clashed with heightened nationalistic sentiment in both capitals, the myth of seikei bunri essentially died. 

When the Japanese government moved to nationalize the islands – which was largely a domestic maneuver to prevent them from falling into the hands of a right-wing nationalist politician – it triggered explosive, state-tolerated anti-Japanese riots across China. Historical memory and territorial sovereignty, previously shelved for pragmatic reasons, had irrevocably returned and haunted the fragile bilateral ties. 

Yet amid this turbulence, the most striking feature of the Senkaku dispute is its paradoxical stability. Despite the dangerous aerial and maritime encounters surrounding the islands, alongside heightened domestic nationalism, both countries have managed to navigate the territorial disputes below the threshold of an all-out conflict. 

More notably, the right-wing Abe administration successfully reached a diplomatic agreement with Beijing in 2014, acknowledging the “different positions” of both parties on the territorial dispute. In other words, the two countries tried to shelve the dispute again. 

This diplomatic flexibility was driven by two powerful guardrails. First, there are the pragmatic economic considerations: four years of intense friction had so severely battered mutual commercial interests that powerful domestic syndicates, most notably the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), exerted immense pressure on Tokyo to stabilize ties. Second, the enduring presence of the U.S. military acted as a rigid structural buffer. It deterred Beijing from overly assertive physical maneuvers while simultaneously restraining Tokyo from any temptation toward military adventurism. While this 2014 consensus did not resolve the underlying dispute, the compounded effect of these two guardrails successfully prevented localized friction from escalating into an all-out confrontation.

The New Normal: What Has Changed?

If the postwar history of China-Japan relations offers a roadmap, it is that the development of bilateral crises is rarely an accident. Generally, flare-ups represent a calculated power play constrained by pragmatic guardrails. Today, however, the fundamental variables of that equation are shifting. Structurally, the military power gap has widened further in Beijing’s favor, fundamentally altering Tokyo’s perception of China from a lucrative economic partner to a primary security challenge. Concurrently, the United States is now urging Japan to assume greater security responsibilities, prompting Tokyo to accelerate its strategic adjustments. 

The domestic guardrails are also fraying. Both Tokyo and Beijing are experiencing rising nationalist sentiment, tying the hands of both governments and hindering efforts to mitigate diplomatic tensions. At the same time, the growing reliance on weaponizing economic tools means that the era of unquestioned economic integration is progressively giving way to modern priorities such as supply chain security and “de-risking” strategies. This shift is weakening the stabilizing influence of economic interdependence. Given the shifting geopolitical environment, it seems reasonable to argue that changes in structural and domestic factors have worsened Sino-Japanese relations, as seen in today’s diplomatic crisis.

However, despite these deteriorating conditions, predicting that this crisis will escalate into a full-scale confrontation may overlook the strategic realities and intentions of both governments’ diplomatic maneuvers. The Chinese Communist Party depends heavily on nationalist rhetoric about national rejuvenation and economic stability to maintain domestic legitimacy. As China’s economy stalls, Beijing has increasingly stoked nationalist feelings to uphold its political authority. Nevertheless, this does not imply that China seeks armed conflict with Japan, which would likely cause severe economic decoupling and provoke direct U.S. military involvement. Therefore, when Beijing weaponizes historical memory by calling an embassy trespass a “new type of militarism,” or when it imposes specific bans on Japanese seafood, these actions are better understood as strategic moves to meet domestic nationalist demands and strengthen political legitimacy.

Similarly, while Takaichi must project strength and an assertive diplomatic posture to satisfy Japan’s conservative base, her government remains tethered to a corporate sector that, despite “de-risking” efforts, cannot survive a complete decoupling from the Chinese market.  Furthermore, the Japanese public, while wary of China, maintains a profound, deep-seated aversion to entering a hot war. 

Therefore, when Japan’s latest Diplomatic Bluebook downgrades China to merely an “important neighboring country,” it should not be viewed as a provocation. Rather, it is a proactive reconstruction of Japan’s grand strategy in light of the new geopolitical reality and domestic environment, a calculated adaptation designed to signal deterrence to Beijing amid the United States’ potential retreat, while reassuring an anxious domestic electorate. 

Essentially, both Beijing and Tokyo leaders remain locked in a complex balancing act. By vigorously competing through rhetoric and economics while carefully controlling the intensity of their disputes, both China and Japan keep their disputes at a tense but stable level of crisis stability. Apart from the new description of China-Japan relations, Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook also notes that the relationship with Beijing is mutually beneficial and grounded in strategic interests, consistent with past characterizations. 

As long as both capitals recognize that sacrificing overall bilateral stability over localized friction is unwise, the channels for pragmatic engagement will remain open, even as their grand strategies grow increasingly cautious and competitive.

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Since November 2025, Tokyo and Beijing have been embroiled in a series of diplomatic crises, causing China-Japan relations to hit their lowest point in the past decade. Comments by Japan’s new leader, Takaichi Sanae, on Taiwan signaled the beginning of the diplomatic crisis. China’s government reacted strongly, imposing restrictions on flights and tourism, banning Japanese seafood imports, canceling cultural exchanges, and ramping up military activities near Japan. 

In March 2026, a knife-wielding Japanese Self-Defense Forces member broke into the Chinese embassy in Tokyo, provoking Chinese anger. Chinese official sources claimed the incident represented a “resurgence of militarist thinking” in Japan.

Recently, Japan’s latest foreign policy document downgraded China’s status to an “important neighboring country,” a step back from “one of the most important bilateral relations” in 2025. 

The ongoing diplomatic crisis has evolved into a multidimensional competition involving historical memory, national identity, military deterrence, and geoeconomic pressure.

How can we best understand the current rupture, and what might the future hold for China-Japan relations?

Realist scholars of international relations might view recent incidents as the predictable byproduct of a shifting power imbalance and the inherent friction of great power politics. However, when considering the broader historical context, the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations has rarely followed a linear path. 

Challenging the traditional view of Japan as a passive “reactive state,” scholars Kei Koga and Saori N. Katada argued in their latest book, “Japan’s Grand Strategy: Liminal Power in an Uncertain World,” that Tokyo has historically been highly proactive in its grand strategy-making. Driven by both structural shifts and domestic politics, Japanese decision-makers continuously construct and reconstruct the country’s strategic posture. Therefore, in the face of an increasingly assertive China, Japan is not merely reacting but actively adapting. 

The complex dynamics of bilateral relations often result from the interplay between structural factors – such as economic interdependence and changing power balances – and domestic factors, including historical memory, bureaucratic politics, and rising nationalism, rather than from a predetermined structural outcome. Ultimately, the trajectory of these bilateral ties is not preordained; it depends entirely on how leadership in both capitals navigates overlapping structural realities and domestic pressures.

Diplomatic Ties: Born out of Pragmatic Considerations

Since the end of World War II, China-Japan relations have been anchored in pragmatic calculation rather than genuine historical reconciliation. Even with the brutal legacy of wartime atrocities vividly etched into public memory, these grievances were intentionally sidelined to facilitate the 1972 normalization of ties. Famously, Mao Zedong even deflected an apology from then-Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, suggesting that the Japanese invasion inadvertently helped unify China under the Communist Party. 

This renewed relationship was forged not by true forgiveness, but by the strategic imperatives of the broader international environment. Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s and 1970s, Beijing sought to counter Moscow’s threat by aligning with Washington and Tokyo. This pragmatic bond deepened during the Deng Xiaoping era. As China pivoted toward economic reconstruction, it found an indispensable partner in Japan, an economic powerhouse eager to invest in exchange for access to China’s massive market under the mercantilist Yoshida doctrine. 

This mutually beneficial, albeit transactional, relationship survived the collapse of the Cold War order. Even as Japan sought a more proactive regional role amid uncertainties regarding long-term U.S. security commitments, and China increasingly sought to cultivate nationalistic sentiment to boost the party’s legitimacy following the Tiananmen incident, Tokyo and Beijing successfully compartmentalized their growing friction. They operated under the pragmatic doctrine of seikei bunri – the separation of politics and economics. Consequently, despite simmering political distrust, the two states benefited from strong economic interdependence, and economic integration between them continued to deepen, sustaining bilateral stability well into the early 2000s. 

The Senkaku Islands Dispute as a Wake-up Call

However, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands crisis in 2010 and 2012 served as a wake-up call for Japan, shattering the illusion that politics and economics could remain forever separated. As economic and military power shifted toward China and clashed with heightened nationalistic sentiment in both capitals, the myth of seikei bunri essentially died. 

When the Japanese government moved to nationalize the islands – which was largely a domestic maneuver to prevent them from falling into the hands of a right-wing nationalist politician – it triggered explosive, state-tolerated anti-Japanese riots across China. Historical memory and territorial sovereignty, previously shelved for pragmatic reasons, had irrevocably returned and haunted the fragile bilateral ties. 

Yet amid this turbulence, the most striking feature of the Senkaku dispute is its paradoxical stability. Despite the dangerous aerial and maritime encounters surrounding the islands, alongside heightened domestic nationalism, both countries have managed to navigate the territorial disputes below the threshold of an all-out conflict. 

More notably, the right-wing Abe administration successfully reached a diplomatic agreement with Beijing in 2014, acknowledging the “different positions” of both parties on the territorial dispute. In other words, the two countries tried to shelve the dispute again. 

This diplomatic flexibility was driven by two powerful guardrails. First, there are the pragmatic economic considerations: four years of intense friction had so severely battered mutual commercial interests that powerful domestic syndicates, most notably the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), exerted immense pressure on Tokyo to stabilize ties. Second, the enduring presence of the U.S. military acted as a rigid structural buffer. It deterred Beijing from overly assertive physical maneuvers while simultaneously restraining Tokyo from any temptation toward military adventurism. While this 2014 consensus did not resolve the underlying dispute, the compounded effect of these two guardrails successfully prevented localized friction from escalating into an all-out confrontation.

The New Normal: What Has Changed?

If the postwar history of China-Japan relations offers a roadmap, it is that the development of bilateral crises is rarely an accident. Generally, flare-ups represent a calculated power play constrained by pragmatic guardrails. Today, however, the fundamental variables of that equation are shifting. Structurally, the military power gap has widened further in Beijing’s favor, fundamentally altering Tokyo’s perception of China from a lucrative economic partner to a primary security challenge. Concurrently, the United States is now urging Japan to assume greater security responsibilities, prompting Tokyo to accelerate its strategic adjustments. 

The domestic guardrails are also fraying. Both Tokyo and Beijing are experiencing rising nationalist sentiment, tying the hands of both governments and hindering efforts to mitigate diplomatic tensions. At the same time, the growing reliance on weaponizing economic tools means that the era of unquestioned economic integration is progressively giving way to modern priorities such as supply chain security and “de-risking” strategies. This shift is weakening the stabilizing influence of economic interdependence. Given the shifting geopolitical environment, it seems reasonable to argue that changes in structural and domestic factors have worsened Sino-Japanese relations, as seen in today’s diplomatic crisis.

However, despite these deteriorating conditions, predicting that this crisis will escalate into a full-scale confrontation may overlook the strategic realities and intentions of both governments’ diplomatic maneuvers. The Chinese Communist Party depends heavily on nationalist rhetoric about national rejuvenation and economic stability to maintain domestic legitimacy. As China’s economy stalls, Beijing has increasingly stoked nationalist feelings to uphold its political authority. Nevertheless, this does not imply that China seeks armed conflict with Japan, which would likely cause severe economic decoupling and provoke direct U.S. military involvement. Therefore, when Beijing weaponizes historical memory by calling an embassy trespass a “new type of militarism,” or when it imposes specific bans on Japanese seafood, these actions are better understood as strategic moves to meet domestic nationalist demands and strengthen political legitimacy.

Similarly, while Takaichi must project strength and an assertive diplomatic posture to satisfy Japan’s conservative base, her government remains tethered to a corporate sector that, despite “de-risking” efforts, cannot survive a complete decoupling from the Chinese market.  Furthermore, the Japanese public, while wary of China, maintains a profound, deep-seated aversion to entering a hot war. 

Therefore, when Japan’s latest Diplomatic Bluebook downgrades China to merely an “important neighboring country,” it should not be viewed as a provocation. Rather, it is a proactive reconstruction of Japan’s grand strategy in light of the new geopolitical reality and domestic environment, a calculated adaptation designed to signal deterrence to Beijing amid the United States’ potential retreat, while reassuring an anxious domestic electorate. 

Essentially, both Beijing and Tokyo leaders remain locked in a complex balancing act. By vigorously competing through rhetoric and economics while carefully controlling the intensity of their disputes, both China and Japan keep their disputes at a tense but stable level of crisis stability. Apart from the new description of China-Japan relations, Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook also notes that the relationship with Beijing is mutually beneficial and grounded in strategic interests, consistent with past characterizations. 

As long as both capitals recognize that sacrificing overall bilateral stability over localized friction is unwise, the channels for pragmatic engagement will remain open, even as their grand strategies grow increasingly cautious and competitive.

Lee Chan Hui is a Master’s candidate of International Relations at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research focuses on Chinese politics, China’s relations with East Asian nations, and the International Relations of Northeast Asia.

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