ASEAN Beat | Diplomacy | Southeast Asia

Reasserting Public Scrutiny Over Indonesia’s Foreign Policy

At a time when Jakarta’s foreign policy decisions are particularly consequential and sometimes controversial, public scrutiny of them has strangely diminished.

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto shakes hands with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese during a joint press conference in Jakarta, Indonesia, Feb. 6, 2026.

From time to time, Indonesians have proven themselves attentive to foreign affairs. Public opinion has often been shaped – sometimes sharply – by how the government manages its international relations. Episodes such as the Brunei-gate controversy under Abdurrahman Wahid, the Tangguh gas export deal with China during Megawati Soekarnoputri’s presidency, and the intense debates over China-related issues in the era of Joko “Jokowi” Widodo all demonstrate that foreign policy has never been immune from domestic contestation. Media coverage has often amplified these debates. It somewhat turns diplomatic choices into matters of public judgment.

Nowhere was this more evident than in Indonesia’s engagement with China under Jokowi. His administration elevated China into one of Indonesia’s top three sources of foreign direct investment, particularly in terms of large-scale infrastructure projects. Yet this deepening partnership also prompted anxieties. The arrival of Chinese workers, who were often perceived to live exclusive,  insulated lives at worksites, sparked fears among local communities about job displacement. These concerns, at times, spilled into racialized narratives that dominated headlines and public discourse.

Media coverage played a central role in magnifying these sentiments. One of the most controversial moments came when Tempo magazine published its August–September 2015 edition, featuring a cover that depicted Jokowi with slanted eyes alongside the headline “Welcome Chinese Laborers.” The sentiment reached its peak during the COVID‑19 pandemic. In April 2020, at the beginning of the pandemic, The Jakarta Post reported on local distrust toward Chinese workers, framing it as a potential flashpoint in Indonesia–China relations. Yet these examples were only a fraction of the overwhelming media attention devoted to the issue. The scale of the coverage often mismatched the complexity of the reality.

What makes this wave of criticism striking is its inconsistency. Jokowi’s predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, had also laid an extensive groundwork for closer ties with China. His administration upgraded bilateral relations twice – from a Strategic Partnership in 2005 to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2013 – and actively courted Chinese investment. Even symbolic gestures, such as issuing a Presidential decree to replace the term “Cina” with “Tiongkok” in official usage, signalled a deliberate effort to normalize ties. Yet these moves did not provoke the same level of public backlash. Yudhoyono was never branded a “Chinese puppet” in the way Jokowi was.

The difference lies less in policy than in politics. Under Jokowi, criticism was amplified by opposition groups, particularly Islamist movements and hardliners, who were excluded from power. These groups wielded significant influence in shaping public opinion. They mobilized anti-China narratives as part of a broader effort of political contestation. During Yudhoyono’s presidency, by contrast, many of these actors were accommodated within the governing coalition, dampening their incentive to oppose it.

This political dynamic has shifted again under Prabowo Subianto. His........

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