Is There a Way to Break the Deadlock in Japan-China Relations?
Tokyo Report | Diplomacy | East Asia
Is There a Way to Break the Deadlock in Japan-China Relations?
Is this the new normal?
Since Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s remarks on November 7, 2025, Japan-China relations have continued to deteriorate, with no signs of a return to normalcy. The APEC summit is scheduled for November 2026, and while Takaichi and Chinese President Xi Jinping are likely to attend, the likelihood of an actual bilateral meeting is very low. With personnel changes expected at the National Congress of the Communist Party of China in the fall of 2027, Japan-China relations are not likely to change dramatically, at least until these changes are finalized. On the contrary, given the structure of China’s foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and Japan-China relations, there is a real possibility that the current deterioration will become the new normal.
This is a difficult reality for Japan, which seeks stable relations with its neighbors and a secure strategic environment. But accepting the new normal, and working to manage the situation while preventing further deterioration, is now the more prudent course.
First, there is the underlying thrust of China’s foreign policy. China aims to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049, effectively seeking to catch up with the United States; 2035 is set as an intermediate milestone. Beijing opposes the U.S.-centered world order and takes a critical stance toward Western values and the U.S.-led approach to security, while supporting the United Nations Charter (at least as interpreted by Beijing), international law, and the U.N. and its subsidiary organizations. China states that it will independently construct an international order based on concepts such as a “new type of international relations.” From the Chinese perspective, the central axis of global conflict is between developed and developing nations. Viewed in this light, Japan, as a U.S. ally, becomes a target for structural criticism; and Japan, which hosts more overseas U.S. troops than any other country and serves as a key U.S. military hub in the Western Pacific, faces particularly intense scrutiny.
Second, U.S.-China relations. While China aims to catch up to the United States and pursues a foreign policy directed at Washington, it also seeks to avoid a direct clash. This is why U.S.-China relations are described as a “competition.” Under Biden, the relationship was characterized as competitive, with the understanding that the two sides would not clash, would cooperate where possible, and would manage relations appropriately. Under Trump’s second term, the May 2026 U.S.-China summit produced the formulation “constructive strategic stability relationship”: competitive in premise, but maintaining the same basic tone of avoiding direct clashes, cooperating where necessary, and managing the relationship. If U.S.-China relations remain relatively stable, China will be freer to adopt a tougher stance toward U.S.........
