Flashpoints | Diplomacy | East Asia

What Role Does Denuclearization Have in North Korea-US Dialogue Today?

Breaking down the denuclearization debate from both sides: North Korea and the United States.

In this Feb. 27, 2019, file photo, then-U.S. President Donald Trump shakes hands with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the Sofitel Legend Metropole hotel in Hanoi, Vietnam, for their second summit meeting.

With his surprise decision to scale back the recent Ulchi Freedom Shield military exercise on the Korean Peninsula, U.S. President Donald Trump clearly signaled his intent to rekindle dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. However, rather than receiving praise for the goodwill measure, the effort drew rebuke from the North Korean government, which reiterated its position that it has no interest in renewing engagement as long as the United States holds onto denuclearization as a policy objective.

This exchange has renewed debates over long-standing denuclearization policies, particularly as Trump continues his overtures toward the Kim regime in hopes of a possible meeting on the sidelines of the APEC summit in November. Some have argued it is time to abandon denuclearization as a policy goal and shift to arms control, while others contend that such a concession would undermine the global nonproliferation regime and place further stress on allied relationships.

Rather than a binary “should they, shouldn’t they” approach, the issue requires a more nuanced examination of the constraints and interests at play. For example, what does the Kim regime mean when it demands that foreign governments drop denuclearization as a precondition for talks? What does the Trump administration hope to achieve by renewing engagement? Further, would dropping denuclearization even be politically sustainable for this administration or other governments?

It’s useful to break down the denuclearization debate, examining the knowns and unknowns for the two sides.

Trump’s Overtures and North Korea’s Response

On August 16, Trump announced the shortening of the annual South Korea-U.S. Ulchi Freedom Shield joint military exercise, reiterating his usual claim that the exercises are costly and adding that they “send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile” to North Korea. He claimed that the Kim regime has been “unthreatening and respectful” during his presidency. 

North Korea’s response came on August 19 in the form of a statement attributed to Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s high-ranking sister. The statement declared that Pyongyang regarded the reduction of exercises as “unworthy of comment” and has “no interest in it at all” due to “the nature of the military drill with a provocative and offensive feature.” North Korea followed that up two weeks later with another statement attributed to an unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesperson, noting “it is pointless to expect any détente in the region” as the “U.S. remains committed to the complete denuclearization of the DPRK” (an abbreviation of North Korea’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). 

But this may be changing. In other contexts, the White House has demonstrated a willingness to abandon status quo policies and pursue rapprochement with authoritarian governments. As a result, the administration may consider shifting from denuclearization-first diplomacy to an approach that de-emphasizes denuclearization through arms control and risk reduction measures, or even eliminates it as a policy objective altogether. 

The Knowns and Unknowns of North Korean Demands

The Kim regime has clearly set a precondition for renewed engagement with the United States: drop denuclearization from the agenda. What is less clear is what North Korea actually expects with this precondition.  

Pyongyang’s rejections of denuclearization evolved following the brief period of diplomacy in 2018-19.  After the failure of Kim Jong Un and Trump to reach an agreement at the February 2019 Hanoi Summit, Pyongyang hardened its stance against denuclearization. In December 2019, North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Kim Song stated that “denuclearization is already gone out of the negotiation table.” Based on numerous statements since, North Korea’s position has become more absolute: denuclearization is not up for negotiation and Pyongyang has no intention to relinquish its nuclear arms. 

Despite the hardline position, the Kim regime has not shut the door completely on potential engagement. North Korea has continued to highlight the “excellent” relationship between Kim Jong Un and Trump, referencing Kim’s “good memories and feelings” towards the U.S. president. Although positive inclinations in a personal relationship do not necessarily translate to rapprochement between governments, these are notable signals that may compel Washington to pursue status quo-changing pathways to engagement. 

A challenge for Washington is that the scope of the required policy change is not yet clear. What specific actions would Pyongyang expect from Washington to signal the end of denuclearization? Does this mean a policy pronouncement, rescission of United Nations Security Council resolutions, or something else? 

It is also unclear whether the Kim regime would be willing to offer concessions in return. There is no indication thus far of what may be negotiable with denuclearization off the agenda, whether it be arms control or other tradeoffs such as reducing North Korea’s military aid to Russia. This creates a risk: if the United States does give ground on denuclearization, Pyongyang could simply walk away from dialogue since it has already met one of its key policy objectives.

The U.S. Debate Over Denuclearization

On the U.S. side, there is a growing recognition that North Korea’s nuclear capability is now an established reality. Three decades of efforts to persuade Pyongyang to relinquish its nuclear weapons have not curbed the Kim regime’s ability to develop a nuclear weapons program of considerable scale and capability. Trump recently said North Korea has 57 warheads, while the South Korean Ministry of National Defense estimated it to be somewhere between 80 and 120.

From the outset, the United States’ goal has been to achieve a nuclear-free peninsula through diplomatic means. This has contributed to a substantial body of policies,........

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