The Pulse | Security | South Asia

Russia’s Dual Afghan Strategy and Pakistan’s Shrinking Room for Maneuver

Moscow’s deepening relations with the Taliban hint at growing doubts about Pakistan as a counterterrorism partner.

In late May, in a hall outside Moscow, Taliban Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqoob signed a military agreement with Russia. Two days later, back in Kabul, he promised that no neighbor would again strike Afghan territory with the same confidence. The neighbor he had in mind went unnamed but was obvious: Pakistan.

At a May 26 meeting of the security chiefs of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, Russia’s FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov told the assembled representatives that the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is actively recruiting citizens of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, as well as labor migrants inside Russia. He described clandestine networks forming across CIS territory, with functioning financing channels and attack preparations already underway. The Taliban defense minister was among those present.

Bortnikov’s sharpest formulation was directed not at Kabul. He argued that ISKP, allied jihadist groups, and armed anti-Taliban formations are working to undermine Taliban authority with what he called the “active support” of British intelligence. Moscow offered no evidence for that claim, and independent observers have treated it as unsubstantiated; it fits a recurring Russian narrative that places Western intelligence services behind any and all instability on the CIS periphery.

The framing matters less for its accuracy than for its target. Bortnikov stressed that collective security would depend on stability in the Afghan-Pakistan region, and with Taliban leadership in the room and the threat localized in territory outside Taliban control, the warning points implicitly toward the Pakistani border.

Two days after the CIS Security Council session, Russia and the Taliban signed a military-technical cooperation agreement on the sidelines of the International Security Forum, held outside Moscow. Russia’s signatory was Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu; Afghanistan’s was Taliban Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqoob. Zamir Kabulov, Russia’s special envoy for Afghanistan, stated that the agreement would focus on repair and restoration of Russian-made military equipment in Afghanistan.

Agreements of this type typically cover equipment supply, training, repair, and licensing, though analysts note that Moscow’s capacity to deliver advanced systems is constrained by the ongoing war in Ukraine and sanctions. The agreement consolidates a diplomatic trajectory that began with Russia’s recognition of the Taliban government in July 2025 and the removal of the movement from its list of banned organizations. 

Russia is the only state to recognize the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan.

Moscow publicly articulates an acute terrorist threat emanating from Afghan soil while simultaneously deepening ties with the Taliban. That is the dual character of the Russian strategy. The threat narrative reinforces a self-assigned security role across Central Asia; the partnership with Kabul provides the instrument for that role. Russia has for years expressed concern about militant activity from Afghanistan while consistently expanding political and security contacts with the Taliban. 

The Taliban, for their part, read something else into this document.

On returning to Kabul, Yaqoob told journalists at the airport that Pakistan had been striking Afghan territory with confidence in recent months, and that Afghanistan would ensure no neighbor felt such confidence going forward. He acknowledged that Islamabad might have objections to the Moscow agreement, insisting that Afghanistan threatens no one. The shift in tone, delivered immediately after the signing with Russia, signals to Islamabad that Kabul now sees its own leverage.

For decades, Pakistan’s military establishment followed a doctrine of strategic depth, using proxy fighters to project influence in Afghanistan and reduce pressure on its western flank. The environment now is entirely different. Relations with the Afghan Taliban have collapsed into open hostilities, including cross-border air strikes earlier this year and the worst border clashes in years.

Kabul accuses Islamabad of striking Afghan territory at will. Islamabad accuses Kabul of sheltering the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has stepped up attack on Pakistani soil since the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan in 2021. The porous border now incubates both the TTP and ISKP. The strategy designed to give Pakistan depth has instead turned its frontier into a source of threat.

Beyond that, Pakistan is cultivating contacts with the Afghan opposition. Islamabad has, according to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), maintained regular covert contacts with Ahmad Massoud’s National Resistance Front (NRF), and in October 2025 hosted a number of Afghan opposition figures.

At this stage, however, military action against Afghanistan deepens the country’s economic deterioration and creates space for Moscow to entrench its influence. For years Pakistan was Afghanistan’s single largest export market and its main transit channel to the outside........

© The Diplomat