Crossroads Asia | Politics | Central Asia

Calls for Deeper Investigations Grow in Kyrgyzstan

A former Kyrgyz prosecutor general has called on the Kyrgyz government to create an  independent commission to review the activities of the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) since 2020.

In an interview with NazarNews on YouTube, former Kyrgyz Prosecutor General Azimbek Beknazarov – more recently among the acquitted Kempir-Abad dissenters – called for the creation of an independent commission to review the activities of the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) since 2020, when Kamchybek Tashiev took it over.

In particular, the curious Kyrgyz practice of kusturizatsia is coming under scrutiny in the wake of Tashiev’s downfall.

As explained by Aksana Ismailbekov in an article for The Diplomat in September 2023:

Kusturizatsia, a term derived from the word for “vomiting” in Kyrgyz, is used to refer to those who damage the state through corrupt practices and economic crimes (such as stealing from the state budget or not paying taxes), and are then forced to pay compensation to the state when they are discovered. When corrupt practices are detected, the perpetrators (mainly influential politicians and prominent businessmen) are given time to voluntarily pay compensation for the damage to the state; otherwise they face possible detention. Thus, kusturizatsia is essentially the legalization of corrupt activities by prominent businessmen and politicians. It occurs outside the rule of law, though has been offered up under the phrase “economic amnesty” by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov.

Kusturizatsia, a term derived from the word for “vomiting” in Kyrgyz, is used to refer to those who damage the state through corrupt practices and economic crimes (such as stealing from the state budget or not paying taxes), and are then forced to pay compensation to the state when they are discovered.

When corrupt practices are detected, the perpetrators (mainly influential politicians and prominent businessmen) are given time to voluntarily pay compensation for the damage to the state; otherwise they face possible detention. Thus, kusturizatsia is essentially the legalization of corrupt activities by prominent businessmen and politicians. It occurs outside the rule of law, though has been offered up under the phrase “economic amnesty” by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov.

In same cases, what is vomited back to the state is cash. The classic example here is the cyclical nature of repeated arrests, releases, and fining of Raimbek Matraimov.

But in other cases, what is yielded to the state are business ventures or properties. 

Ismailbekov outlined one such case back in 2023:

In the worst case scenario, a businessman can lose his entire business if he is forced to share it with individuals close to government agencies, as was the case for Timur, who had a business distributing cement and bricks from Kyrgyzstan to other Central Asian countries. When he resisted, he lost his entire business. This was done in a creative way: the director of the supply company he had long engaged with suddenly refused to sell Timur goods, saying that he had found a new business partner. The company director asked Timur to understand that he was forced to sell goods to another, unidentified, person in the same industry. If the director refused, the state agencies would pressure him with fines for administrative violations. And so, the director was compelled to cooperate with the new business partner, not necessarily one of his own choosing, in order to guarantee his own company was not seized. 

In the worst case scenario, a businessman can lose his entire business if he is forced to share it with individuals close to government agencies, as was the case for Timur, who had a business distributing cement and bricks from Kyrgyzstan to other Central Asian countries. When he resisted, he lost his entire business. This was done in a creative way: the director of the supply company he had long engaged with suddenly refused to sell Timur goods, saying that he had found a new business partner. The company director asked Timur to understand that he was forced to sell goods to another, unidentified, person in the same industry. If the director refused, the state agencies would pressure him with fines for administrative violations. And so, the director was compelled to cooperate with the new business partner, not necessarily one of his own choosing, in order to guarantee his own company was not seized. 

With Tashiev shoved off his perch at the SCNS following his February dismissal by President Sadyr Japarov, his personal network has come under pressure. Tashiev’s nephew has been detained, both Tashiev and his son questioned several times, and numerous associates either questioned or arrested in relation to the Kyrgyzneftgas case.

Beknazarov’s call for deeper investigation into the SCNS’s practices in recent years is likely to be echoed by others now that there’s proverbial blood in the water. 

Whether or not the Japarov government goes after Tashiev himself arguably hinges on whether Bishkek judges letting him off the hook as risker politically than arresting him. Both hold the potential seeds of public discontent. And in Kyrgyzstan – which has had three people-driven revolutions since its independence in 1991 – public discontent can have serious consequences. 

In one view, those seeds are planted already. Japarov ruled in a veritable tandem with Tashiev for five years – putting Tashiev at the forefront of a number of critical government endeavors, such as the battle against corruption and organized crime and the necessary matter of making peace along Kyrgyzstan’s borders with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Tashiev, and the SCNS, had also been behind the crackdown on media – especially outlets that reported years ago about alleged corruption tied to Tashiev, and which the government tried to crush as a result. 

Now the government itself is parroting those reports. But it’s hard to believe that Japarov wasn’t aware of what his own security chief was up to (if he was, that’s also not a great look), and thus calls for a deeper investigation may be met with resistance.

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In an interview with NazarNews on YouTube, former Kyrgyz Prosecutor General Azimbek Beknazarov – more recently among the acquitted Kempir-Abad dissenters – called for the creation of an independent commission to review the activities of the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) since 2020, when Kamchybek Tashiev took it over.

In particular, the curious Kyrgyz practice of kusturizatsia is coming under scrutiny in the wake of Tashiev’s downfall.

As explained by Aksana Ismailbekov in an article for The Diplomat in September 2023:

Kusturizatsia, a term derived from the word for “vomiting” in Kyrgyz, is used to refer to those who damage the state through corrupt practices and economic crimes (such as stealing from the state budget or not paying taxes), and are then forced to pay compensation to the state when they are discovered. When corrupt practices are detected, the perpetrators (mainly influential politicians and prominent businessmen) are given time to voluntarily pay compensation for the damage to the state; otherwise they face possible detention. Thus, kusturizatsia is essentially the legalization of corrupt activities by prominent businessmen and politicians. It occurs outside the rule of law, though has been offered up under the phrase “economic amnesty” by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov.

Kusturizatsia, a term derived from the word for “vomiting” in Kyrgyz, is used to refer to those who damage the state through corrupt practices and economic crimes (such as stealing from the state budget or not paying taxes), and are then forced to pay compensation to the state when they are discovered.

When corrupt practices are detected, the perpetrators (mainly influential politicians and prominent businessmen) are given time to voluntarily pay compensation for the damage to the state; otherwise they face possible detention. Thus, kusturizatsia is essentially the legalization of corrupt activities by prominent businessmen and politicians. It occurs outside the rule of law, though has been offered up under the phrase “economic amnesty” by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov.

In same cases, what is vomited back to the state is cash. The classic example here is the cyclical nature of repeated arrests, releases, and fining of Raimbek Matraimov.

But in other cases, what is yielded to the state are business ventures or properties. 

Ismailbekov outlined one such case back in 2023:

In the worst case scenario, a businessman can lose his entire business if he is forced to share it with individuals close to government agencies, as was the case for Timur, who had a business distributing cement and bricks from Kyrgyzstan to other Central Asian countries. When he resisted, he lost his entire business. This was done in a creative way: the director of the supply company he had long engaged with suddenly refused to sell Timur goods, saying that he had found a new business partner. The company director asked Timur to understand that he was forced to sell goods to another, unidentified, person in the same industry. If the director refused, the state agencies would pressure him with fines for administrative violations. And so, the director was compelled to cooperate with the new business partner, not necessarily one of his own choosing, in order to guarantee his own company was not seized. 

In the worst case scenario, a businessman can lose his entire business if he is forced to share it with individuals close to government agencies, as was the case for Timur, who had a business distributing cement and bricks from Kyrgyzstan to other Central Asian countries. When he resisted, he lost his entire business. This was done in a creative way: the director of the supply company he had long engaged with suddenly refused to sell Timur goods, saying that he had found a new business partner. The company director asked Timur to understand that he was forced to sell goods to another, unidentified, person in the same industry. If the director refused, the state agencies would pressure him with fines for administrative violations. And so, the director was compelled to cooperate with the new business partner, not necessarily one of his own choosing, in order to guarantee his own company was not seized. 

With Tashiev shoved off his perch at the SCNS following his February dismissal by President Sadyr Japarov, his personal network has come under pressure. Tashiev’s nephew has been detained, both Tashiev and his son questioned several times, and numerous associates either questioned or arrested in relation to the Kyrgyzneftgas case.

Beknazarov’s call for deeper investigation into the SCNS’s practices in recent years is likely to be echoed by others now that there’s proverbial blood in the water. 

Whether or not the Japarov government goes after Tashiev himself arguably hinges on whether Bishkek judges letting him off the hook as risker politically than arresting him. Both hold the potential seeds of public discontent. And in Kyrgyzstan – which has had three people-driven revolutions since its independence in 1991 – public discontent can have serious consequences. 

In one view, those seeds are planted already. Japarov ruled in a veritable tandem with Tashiev for five years – putting Tashiev at the forefront of a number of critical government endeavors, such as the battle against corruption and organized crime and the necessary matter of making peace along Kyrgyzstan’s borders with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Tashiev, and the SCNS, had also been behind the crackdown on media – especially outlets that reported years ago about alleged corruption tied to Tashiev, and which the government tried to crush as a result. 

Now the government itself is parroting those reports. But it’s hard to believe that Japarov wasn’t aware of what his own security chief was up to (if he was, that’s also not a great look), and thus calls for a deeper investigation may be met with resistance.

Catherine Putz is managing editor of The Diplomat.

© The Diplomat