Two massive Russian attacks on Kyiv in less than a week, renewed Iranian threats in the Strait of Hormuz, and a security crackdown in Turkey are just three of the immediate issues shaping the context of the Nato summit in Ankara on July 7-8.

While Ukraine and Iran will be on Nato’s agenda, the authoritarian drift of its host, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, will be politely overlooked. But as ever, the summit outcome will be determined by the position of the United States.

At last year’s Hague summit, the Nato-sceptical US president, Donald Trump, was placated by the allies’ commitment to spend 5% of their GDP annually on defence by 2035. The challenge this year will be to demonstrate sufficient progress towards that goal, while also addressing Trump’s vision of “Nato 3.0” – involving, according to his secretary of war, Pete Hegseth, “a balanced alliance with Europe in the lead for its own defence”.

Progress towards defence spending appears reasonably on track. In 2025 alone, the Atlantic Council notes: “European allies and Canada increased defence spending by 20% from the previous calendar year.” Six Nato allies (the three Baltic states plus Denmark, Poland and Norway) spent more on defence as a share of GDP than the US. Germany, not among that group in 2025, nonetheless has big ambitions. In absolute terms, it is now Nato’s second biggest defence spender.

The allies have also made strenuous efforts to wean themselves off American-sourced defence systems. But bumps in the road remain. Whereas in 2025, all the Nato allies (bar Iceland, which has no armed forces) met........

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