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Sanctions as Foreign Policy: Do They Work, and Who Bears the Cost?

28 0
16.06.2026

Every time a major international crisis erupts, the announcement follows within days, sometimes hours. A press conference. A podium. A row of flags. And then the words: ” We are imposing sanctions. It has become the default opening move of Western foreign policy, a signal that something is being done, that behavior will not go unpunished, that there are consequences.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, there has been an explosion of economic sanctions. The data collected by the Global Sanctions Database shows that, whereas 200 sanction programs were in existence in the previous decade, the figure has now grown to 600 sanction programs. About 12 percent of all existing country pairs and 27 percent of world trade are currently affected by some form of sanction. The United States alone has imposed three times more sanctions than any other country or international body, and the list of justifications keeps growing: terrorism, narcotics, human rights violations, weapons proliferation, election interference, and more.

But here is the question that rarely gets asked at those press conferences: Do they actually work? And if the evidence on that question is as mixed as it is, then who exactly is paying the price?

What Sanctions Actually Are And Why They Are So Appealing

In essence, economic sanctions are coercive foreign policy measures. There are many kinds of economic sanctions, such as trade sanctions, which prevent the inflow or outflow of trade products to and from other countries; financial sanctions, which target the freezing of assets of an offending nation and also prevent it from using global banking institutions; targeted or ‘smart’ sanctions, which specifically target individuals or organizations; and industry-specific sanctions. 

Their political appeal is obvious. They occupy the space between doing nothing and going to war. They let a government demonstrate resolve, satisfy domestic audiences demanding action, and avoid the human and political costs of military intervention. As mentioned in one of the most widely read analyses in Foreign Affairs, this is exactly why sanctions have become such an easy way out, because “presidents are always eager to impose sanctions but wary of lifting them.” The mere imposition of sanctions represents strength, while their reversal represents weakness.

The sanctions that followed the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 perfectly exemplified this approach. Within several weeks after the invasion, the West managed to freeze more than $300 billion in Russian central bank reserves, barred Russia’s commercial banks from using SWIFT, slapped export controls, and sanctioned many individuals and entities. In terms of economic pressure tactics used, this was certainly unprecedented, according to the analysis by Chatham House. But would they make any difference?

The Leaders Stay. The People Pay.

The central problem with broad economic sanctions is a gap between design and reality. They are designed to pressure governments by making populations suffer enough to force a change in leadership or policy. An example of this phenomenon is Iran, which becomes increasingly evident every day, especially coming up to 2026. The sanctions by the U.S. and other countries against Iran had become much harsher after the launch of the ‘maximum pressure’ policy by the Trump administration in 2018, and when they were imposed again during the second term of President Trump in January 2025, they wrecked the lives of average Iranians without destabilizing the Islamic regime’s leaders.

The sanctions re-imposed by the United States on Iran in November 2018 led to a rise in the cost of imported medicines as Iran’s national currency declined by about 70 percent against the dollar. The average monthly salary had dropped to the equivalent of around $450, making even domestically manufactured drugs out of reach for ordinary people. By March 2026, the situation had deteriorated further still: the rial was trading at over 1 million to the dollar, less than half its value just nine months earlier, with inflation running at 49 percent even as Washington continued rolling out new Iran-related oil designations on a near-monthly basis throughout the year.

The humanitarian carve-outs that are supposed........

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