There is a pattern in the Sahel that does not fit clearly into either a success or failure story for Russia. Security has gotten worse since Moscow stepped in, yet Russian influence has only deepened. Violence is up, territory has been lost, and jihadist groups are stronger than ever. And still, the juntas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger keep signing more deals, inviting more personnel, and drifting further from any alternative. That contradiction is worth taking seriously.

How Russia Entered The Sahel

To understand Russia’s current position, we first need to understand the collapse of the French Barkhane mission. Operation Barkhane was launched in 2014 and involved 5,000 French soldiers deployed in five Sahel nations. However, it formally ended in November 2022, not because France chose to leave, but because the juntas that seized power in Mali (2020–21), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) made its continued stay impossible.

These were very legitimate complaints that needed to be addressed. However, ten years of military involvement from France had not stopped the jihadists. The feeling of Françafrique: the perceived neocolonial economic and political relationship between France and its former colonies, had caused a great deal of distrust towards France in these countries because of its supposed neocolonialist nature. As anti-France sentiment was at its highest, the military leaders understood how they could use the sentiments for their own benefit. 

Into that vacuum stepped the Wagner Group, which arrived in Mali at the end of 2021. Wagner’s model was familiar from the Central African Republic: small advisory teams embedded with national armies, paired with extractive concessions in gold and natural resources. It offered something Western partners had increasingly withheld: security assistance with no governance strings attached.

After Prigozhin died in 2023, Wagner’s Sahel operations began transitioning to the Africa Corps, a Kremlin-controlled successor entity under Russia’s Ministry of Defence. Africa Corps arrived in Burkina Faso and Niger in early 2024. The institutional model carried over; what changed was the chain of command. Russia’s engagement was no longer deniable.

The Security Balance Sheet 

The data on security outcomes since Russian engagement is, to put it carefully, discouraging. At present, the Sahel region contributes more than 50% of the total militant Islamist violence reported in Africa. The death toll has almost tripled from 2020, reaching an estimated 11,000 deaths in 2024. Niger experienced the largest one-year spike in terrorist deaths globally in 2024.

These figures are especially shocking considering that both the African Corps and the Sahel security personnel have been causing more civilian........

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