Opinion | The Unsung Patriots Of Kashmir: A Story of Sacrifice, Success & Subsequent Betrayal

The Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen exemplified the spirit of Kashmiris who chose India over terror.

From the standpoint of the Indian State, the formation and deployment of Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen (also known as the Ikhwan or “Muslim Brotherhood" militia) in the mid-1990s stands as one of the most effective, albeit unconventional, chapters in the fight against Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir.

Comprising surrendered Kashmiri militants who chose to side with the forces of the Union, the Ikhwan – led by figures like Mohammad Yusuf Parray (Kuka Parray) – played a decisive role in breaking the back of the insurgency, restoring a measure of normality, and enabling the return of democratic processes in the Valley.

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Their contributions, though achieved through the hard realities of counter-insurgency warfare (what critics have called “strong-arm means"), were instrumental in saving thousands of innocent lives and preserving India’s territorial integrity.

Yet, the systematic targeting and elimination of many Ikhwan members in the years that followed represents a painful chapter where the State – particularly at the level of the Jammu & Kashmir government – failed to adequately safeguard its own allies, often amid political calculations by mainstream regional parties like the National Conference (NC) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP).

The strategic imperative and the Ikhwan’s pivotal role

In the early 1990s, Jammu & Kashmir faced a full-blown proxy war orchestrated from across the border. Pakistan-backed groups like Hizbul Mujahideen, supported by the ISI, had turned the Valley into a battlefield of terror, with militants targeting security forces, civilians, and the very idea of Indian democracy. Conventional policing and military operations alone were proving insufficient against an enemy that blended into the local population and enjoyed safe havens and logistics from Pakistan.

It was in this crucible that the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen emerged. By 1994, splinter groups of former militants had coalesced under Kuka Parray’s leadership into a unified pro-India force. These were not outsiders or mercenaries; they were Kashmiris who had seen the futility and foreign manipulation of the “azadi" militancy and chose to realign with the Indian State. Operating alongside the Army and Jammu & Kashmir Police, the Ikhwan provided critical human intelligence, conducted joint operations, and directly confronted militant networks in areas like Sopore, Baramulla, and the northern Valley. Their insider knowledge led to the elimination of approximately 150 active insurgents and the surrender of over 250 more, fracturing groups like Hizbul Mujahideen and dramatically reducing the level of terrorist violence.

The results were tangible and strategically transformative. Terrorist incidents, which had peaked above 4,400 annually in the mid-1990s, dropped sharply by 1997–98. The Ikhwan’s efforts were instrumental in creating conditions for the 1996 Assembly elections – the first in the Valley after the outbreak of militancy – which re-established elected governance and dealt a body blow to the separatist narrative. Indian Army commanders publicly acknowledged their contribution: in 1998, Lt Gen Krishna Pal lauded the Ikhwan as the “eyes and ears" of the security forces and paid homage to fallen commanders like Wafa Dar Khan, declaring that the force would continue to receive full support in defeating the proxy war.

The “strong-arm means" employed – targeted actions, detentions, and operations that sometimes drew human rights criticism – must be understood in context. This was not peacetime policing but an active insurgency where militants themselves used terror, extortion, and civilian shields. The Ikhwan’s tactics helped neutralise immediate threats, protected the silent majority of Kashmiris who wanted peace, and ultimately saved far more lives than they risked. From the Indian State’s viewpoint, deploying local counter-insurgents was a legitimate, time-tested strategy in asymmetric warfare, mirroring successful models elsewhere in India and the world. It turned the tide without requiring an even larger military footprint.

The post-success abandonment: Systematic targeting and the state’s failure to protect

Success, however, brought its own perils. As militancy receded after 1996, the Ikhwan became prime targets for revenge by surviving militants and their handlers. Many were branded “traitors" and hunted down. Over 150 Ikhwan members are estimated to have been killed in the subsequent years once their “official cover" was stripped.

The Indian State – at the Central level – had initially armed, trained, and integrated elements of the Ikhwan, with several hundred later absorbed into the Jammu & Kashmir Police and Territorial Army on regular stipends. Yet, the withdrawal of active operational protection post-1996 left many exposed. Kuka Parray himself, who transitioned into mainstream politics (forming the Awami League and winning an Assembly seat), was assassinated in 2003. His close aide, Abdul Rashid Khan (Babar), was gunned down days later. Security for these counter-insurgents had been deliberately scaled down by the then state government under the PDP-Congress coalition led by Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, in line with its “healing touch" policy – a move critics at the time described as prioritising appeasement over the safety of those who had risked everything for India.

This was not mere oversight. In many cases, local political dynamics appeared to facilitate the vulnerability. The NC government (1996–2002) under Farooq Abdullah had initially benefited from the Ikhwan’s role in enabling elections but later distanced itself amid public backlash and political rivalry. Ikhwan leaders who contested polls directly challenged NC dominance, creating a “wedge" that led to official apathy. When the PDP assumed power, its policy shifts further exposed former allies. It is particularly damning that these very parties – the NC and PDP – have repeatedly called upon violent terrorist outfits to drop the gun and join the mainstream political process as the route to peace and reconciliation. Yet, when the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen did precisely that – renouncing militancy, aligning with the Indian State, and even entering electoral politics – they were systematically targeted and left to die, with these parties suspected of facilitating the vulnerability through political calculations rather than honouring the implicit promise of protection. Compounding this betrayal was the fact that, under their watch, the criminal justice system in Jammu & Kashmir had all but collapsed, and these very parties (NC and PDP) did nothing meaningful to restore its health. Over 12,000 civilian killings — and several thousand more maimings — at the hands of terrorists were never properly investigated; evidence was never collected as to who conspired, who facilitated, who selected the target, or why. Cases never ended in chargesheets in courts. No police investigating officer dared to investigate, no witnesses dared to depose, no prosecutor dared to prosecute, and no judge dared to put the perpetrators on trial.

All played along in a manner that benefited Pakistan and its proxies, allowing the cycle of impunity to continue while the very Kashmiris who had helped the State defeat terror were left undefended. Suspicions persist – voiced even within political circles – that mainstream regional parties viewed the Ikhwan not as valued partners but as inconvenient reminders of the “dirty war" phase and potential electoral rivals. By turning a blind eye or reducing security, these parties allegedly allowed militants to settle scores, thereby consolidating their own hold on power while projecting a softer image to separatist-leaning constituencies. The Indian State (Centre) had equipped and deployed these men as force multipliers; it was the J&K state apparatus, influenced by NC and PDP politics, that failed to deliver on the implicit promise of lifelong protection.

Hundreds of Ikhwan families were left to fend for themselves, their contributions airbrushed from official narratives as “normalcy" was declared. This abandonment was a strategic and moral lapse – one that the Centre has, in hindsight, recognised as a failure to fully honour those who helped restore India’s flag in the Valley.

In defence of the Indian state: A necessary alliance, a regrettable gap

The Indian State does not shy away from acknowledging this chapter’s complexities. The Ikhwan’s methods were tough because the enemy’s were tougher – a Pakistan-orchestrated campaign that killed far more Kashmiris than any counter-operation. Without the Ikhwan, the 1996 elections, the decline in militancy, and the eventual return to relative peace would have been delayed by years, at enormous human cost.

The Central Government’s defence rests on three pillars: (1) strategic necessity – the Ikhwan delivered results when conventional forces alone could not; (2) initial commitment – public praise, integration of survivors, and stipends for those absorbed; and (3) political context – the post-1996 marginalisation occurred under elected J&K governments driven by local rivalries rather than national security imperatives. The Centre provided the framework; the regional parties (NC and PDP) often prioritised short-term political optics over protecting India’s frontline defenders.

The Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen exemplified the spirit of Kashmiris who chose India over terror. Their systematic targeting after their utility peaked, and the State’s failure – especially at the J&K level – to shield them, remains a lesson in the perils of political expediency. India owes these men and their families an enduring debt. True reconciliation in Kashmir demands not only remembering their sacrifices, but ensuring that future counter-insurgency partners are never discarded once the guns fall silent.

The Indian State’s ultimate success in J&K was built on their blood; its future stability must honour it. It is imperative that the government of India must protect the interests of the people and organisations who stood with the Indian State in the past as well as post 2019 era.

© News18