The Impact of the Iran War on Washington’s Policy Toward Cuba

Previously, the US saw the Iran war as a model for “rapid regime change,” but the possible failure of this model can make its implementation in Cuba (without direct military intervention) doubtful.

That step declared Cuba an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to US national security and imposed tariffs on supplying oil. Therefore, it created a severe energy and economic crisis.

The Iran War on February 28, 2026, or Operation Epic Fury — joint US-Israel campaign of airstrikes targeting Iran — marked a dangerous step in the US foreign policy priorities under Trump’s team. The Trump administration’s policy of “maximum pressure” towards Cuba has been continued, but the Iran war has had and will have a multidimensional effect on this policy.

The impacts of the Iran war on Washington politics

Cuba condemned the attacks on Iran, which was not pleasing to America. The attack on Iran has focused US diplomatic attention, resources, intelligence, and military capacity heavily on the Middle East. Therefore, in the first weeks of the war, it partly changed Washington’s immediate priorities and marginalized Cuba. The Iran War’s timing took full effect and temporarily diverted the US focus from Cuba.

Trump publicly demanded a “deal” and floated the idea of a “friendly takeover,” and Secretary of State Marco Rubio continued the pressure. In fact, some of America’s ideas about the victory over Iran in the first weeks made the rhetoric of “regime change” and “Cuba is next” stand out. However, with the revelation of the challenges in the war with Iran, the US has not found an immediate opportunity to use hard power in Cuba.

The Iran war also had an impact on the US-Cuba bilateral negotiations from mid-March 2026. Washington sometimes emphasizes an “easy deal” (economic reforms against the partial reduction of sanctions).

Focusing on the ongoing conflict with Iran could be a “challenging variable” for the US and change important goals in the Latin region, so shift strategies toward negotiation.

Certainly, more conflict with Iran (with more American casualties) will reduce America’s ability to change the regime in Latin America.

Washington has always exerted pressure and made accusations such as Cuba’s alignment with Russia, China, and Iran; hosting intelligence facilities; intelligence-defense cooperation with China; and supporting terrorist groups.

While the Americans want to expel Russia and China from Latin America, the current results of the Iran war and Iran’s successes can strengthen the influence of the powers of China, Russia, and Iran in the US ‘s “backyard”.

In March 2026, the Russian tanker (Anatoly Kolodkin) went to Cuba. The meetings and statements of Russian officials also show Moscow’s greater attention to the Western Hemisphere and maintaining friendly relations with Cuba.

The Iran War highlighted limits of US unilateralism, as NATO allies largely refused support for operations. Europe and America, which used to form a united front line in the West, experienced an unprecedented split in their view of the Iran war.

In fact, unilateral, sudden, and shocking changes and decisions of the US are not acceptable for Europeans. If the British Parliament approved an official plan, it declared its opposition to the sanctions of the US against Cuba. In the meantime, probably other European actors will not be parallel with Trump’s harsh policies regarding Cuba.

The attack on Iran provoked a widespread wave of condemnations in Latin America. Undoubtedly, the war with Iran will cause more protests and opposition from Latin American countries regarding the US military policy in Cuba.

While America considers meaningful change in Cuba requiring a change in leadership and governance in Cuba, Iran’s resistance has caused the Cuban authorities to have more hopes to confront America. As the president of Cuba recently said, Withdrawal is not in our dictionary. Therefore, Cuba has announced that it is ready to deal with possible US military aggression.

The extensive costs of the Iran war have made Washington’s desire to implement low-cost soft policies (without direct military intervention) in Cuba increase. Washington hopes to change the Cuban government, either amicably or by force.

Also, despite Cuba’s declaration of readiness for “serious dialogue” between Havana and Washington, bilateral talks continue with the aim of “finding solutions” and canceling unilateral sanctions.

In addition, after the visit of two Democratic representatives of the US Congress to Cuba, the “dialogue” with Cuba is on the mind of most of the Democrats in America.

American voters in the US public opinion — influenced by Iran — favor pragmatism.

Considering the possible and widespread effects of the war with Iran on the upcoming November elections in the US, any victory of the Democrats in the elections can affect the future policy of the United States in Cuba.

The negative effects of Iran’s war inside the US may cause legal and human rights groups to put pressure on Washington to reform policies in Cuba.

Despite the US’s false claims about Iran, the need for a quick and effective victory before the November elections may make Washington willing to take “even more aggressive” measures, including the possibility of military intervention in “occupying” Cuban soil.

The resumption of conflict with Iran and the need for resources and attention to deal with Iran can slow down the full implementation of maximum pressure against Cuba.

If the war with Iran finally reaches the desired result and benefits for Washington, the pressure on Cuba will be greatly intensified; otherwise, it may lead to a pragmatic agreement.

In this scenario, wider economic pressure can force Cuba to accept economic reforms, “peaceful change,” partial agreement, and reduction of some sanctions against the limitation of relations with the BRICS group.

Previously, the US saw the Iran war as a model for “rapid regime change.” But the possible failure of this model can make its implementation in Cuba (without direct military intervention) doubtful.

In this approach, the possibility of Russian and Chinese naval activities in the Caribbean Sea increases with the efforts of Moscow and Beijing to deal with the US more and focus on supporting Cuba. Cuba is likely to move deeper towards Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing.

Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations

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