Mar 19, 2026 13:00 pm IST

Opinion | The Story Of Why Two Iran 'Proxies' Haven't Joined The War Against Israel - Yet

The silence from two of its strongest groups may possibly hinge on two factors.

Aditi Bhaduri Aditi Bhaduri

On March 16, the internet was abuzz with the footage of an Iranian-backed militia infiltrating the US Embassy in Baghdad, using a first-person view (FPV) drone for a reconnaissance mission. It was released by the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) and showed the drone - likely controlled via fibre-optic cable to bypass electronic jamming - flying unchallenged through the heavily fortified complex for nearly two minutes.

On its heels came another announcement by a group calling itself Kata'ib Hezbollah, demanding that every "foreign soldier" leave the country. Its security chief said, "Iraq's instability is due to the malicious American presence, and security will not be achieved until the last foreign soldier leaves Iraqi territory."

The group, which Washington has designated as a "terrorist organisation", is part of the same umbrella organisation known as the PMF, or, as they call themselves, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which has been claiming daily attacks on US interests in Iraq and the region.

These incidents spotlight the role of the proxies that Iran has created, funded, and supported over the years to fight its shadow war with Israel and the US. These include Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the more recent PMF or the AL Hashd-al Shabi in Iraq. There have been other groups such as Islamic Jihad in Gaza, and Shiite groups in Syria and in Lebanon, but they are now defunct or have become bit players.

The PMF has a relatively recent history. These Shiite militia groups appeared as late as 2014, to fight the Islamic State (ISIS) when the Iraqi army proved too inept, weak and corruption-riddled to do so, and Mosul, the second-largest Iraqi city, quickly fell to ISIS. Many of them, trained by the elite Quds force of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and thereafter closely aligned with Iran, won the real battle against the ISIS, which won them both authority and goodwill from the population. Later, they were absorbed into the Iraqi armed forces. However, those that remained closely aligned with Iran, like the Kata'ib Hezbollah, continue to be a law unto themselves, causing friction both within the umbrella movement as well as with the Iraqi state.

These groups have always demanded the withdrawal of US troops from the country. Since the start of the US-Israel war on Iran, according to reports, airstrikes on Iran-aligned armed groups in Iraq, largely believed to be carried out by the US and Israel, have killed and wounded tens of Iraqis. Meanwhile, US bases in Iraqi Kurdistan and the American embassy in Baghdad have sustained multiple drone and missile attacks. Amid repeated attacks on US interests in the country, Washington has ordered all of its nationals to immediately leave Iraq.

The Hezbollah's Assault

Similarly, Iran's other major proxy, the Hezbollah in Lebanon, has opened up a second front, targeting northern Israel. Israel, in turn, has also been bombing Hezbollah strongholds. In fact, Hezbollah has been Iran's most faithful proxy group, created in 1982 in Lebanon to fight Israel's presence in Lebanon, as well as, more covertly, preserve the Shia identity and rights in Lebanon's fragmented polity. What distinguishes Hezbollah is that it is a political party in Lebanon with seats in its parliament and also commands its own private army, which has proved its mettle, at least till now. In 2000, it was Hezbollah that forced an Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, which is a Shia stronghold. Similarly, in 2006, in the Israel-Hezbollah war, the militia was able to stop Israel from crossing over. Hezbollah also played a pivotal role in battling ISIS and other jihadist groups during the Syrian Civil War. When war broke out between Israel and Hamas in October 2023, Hezbollah opened up a second front targeting northern Israel. However, this time Israel retaliated aggressively, including through ground invasions, such that the group was significantly degraded and downsized and its senior leadership decapitated.

Nevertheless, the Hezbollah has joined in this time around, on behalf of Iran, saying it was avenging the killing of the erstwhile Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei. Israel, though, has inflicted heavy damages and casualties: more than 800 Lebanese are reported killed and a million displaced in this round of conflict, according to Lebanese government estimates. Given the disproportionate balance of power and the damage inflicted, the Lebanese government has wanted to ban Hezbollah. Meanwhile, Israel is preparing a ground assault in Southern Lebanon.

The real surprise, however, has been the non-engagement by Iran's other two major proxies - Hamas and the Houthis. Hamas has not only been inactive - something understandable, given that Israel has crippled it, rendering it almost non-existent militarily - but it has even gone a step further and called upon Iran to refrain from attacking Gulf countries. This is possibly because Hamas is also heavily dependent on Qatar, which is sheltering many of the group's operatives on its territory and whose funding kept Hamas in control in Gaza till the war began in October 2023. Qatar has also been the main mediator between the group on one hand and Israel and the US on the other. Hamas, as a Sunni group, was a striking example of Iran prioritising the Islamic and Palestinian identity over sectarian ones. This also won Iran a sizable following amongst Sunnis in non-Arab lands, as being the one to stand up for the Palestinians.

The silence of the Houthis, however, has been inexplicable. This "twelver" Shiite group of Yemen, which appeared in the 1990s and which has been faithfully nurtured, armed and supported by Iran throughout the country's civil war, enabling it to oust the legitimate government, quickly jumped into the fray when the Hamas-Israel war had started. It targeted shipping in the Red Sea and disrupted global trade as 15% of the world's freight passed through these waterways. Losses ran into billions of dollars as trade through the Suez Canal had to be rerouted along the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. The Houthis had attacked Israel with drones and missiles; they had earlier also attacked Saudi oil facilities during Saudi intervention in Yemen's Civil War. Attacks by Israel, the US, and the UK on them had proved futile.

Yet, their silence today may possibly be hinging on two factors. One is strategic patience. Iran may not want to play all its cards at once. Currently, in the 19th day of the war, Iran has managed to inflict significant damage with its relatively cheaper drones and wreak havoc both inside Israel and on its Gulf neighbours by targeting US military bases there. Its proxies in Iraq and Lebanon are also engaging the US troops and Israel, respectively. Further, Iran, with its selective blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, has managed to disrupt global energy flows and hit the global economy. It may not immediately need the assistance of the Houthis and may be waiting for a future escalation to activate the group.

Besides, the Houthis had struck an agreement for ceasefire with the US last year, as also with Saudi Arabia. They may not want further escalation at this point by breaching the agreement. For now, no country has responded to Donald Trump's call to join forces with the US to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. This, however, may change if along with energy flows, global trading is also disrupted. This may be counterproductive.

Further, many analysts believe that the Houthis may also be low on weapons, with supply uncertainty, given the asymmetric war that Iran finds itself embroiled in now. Moreover, there is an insurgency taking place in Southern Yemen and the group may be preoccupied with these matters. Yet, it is battle-hardened and has shown its reach in targeting both Israel and Saudi Arabia. It is doubtful if it would refuse to open up another front if Iran insisted on it. It is, thus, more probable that Iran has not yet called on them to join in. What will be interesting is to see how they respond when - and if - Iran asks for support.

(The author is a senior journalist)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

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