If Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had died in his bed, from illness or old age, his death could have been more dangerous for the Iranian system than many people think. A natural death would have opened a sensitive moment inside the regime: Who replaces him? Can the elites agree? Will the succession process split the leadership? And will the opposition seize the moment and push the street toward larger protests?

This scenario “an internal crisis after a natural death” was closer to what Iran’s opponents wanted. But here is the irony: what Trump and Netanyahu did by killing the Supreme Leader did not weaken the system the way they expected. It saved it from its hardest internal test. 

A natural death could have triggered a succession crisis and maybe street protests

A natural death could have triggered a succession crisis and maybe street protests

If Khamenei had died naturally, the system would have faced a tense transition. In those moments, cracks often appear: competition between institutions, rival factions inside the regime, and disagreement over the next leader.

If the leadership failed to agree quickly, or if divisions became visible, the opposition would have had a rare opportunity. It could argue that the regime is unstable and encourage the street to move. In short, a natural death could have produced a real political crisis, and that crisis could have grown into protests demanding major change.

This was Trump and Netanyahu’s “dream”  but their own actions destroyed it

This was Trump and Netanyahu’s “dream”  but their own actions destroyed it

Trump and Netanyahu wanted the Iranian system to collapse from within. They bet that removing the top figure would produce chaos, widen divisions, and push the public to rise against the regime.

The Iran War: A Great Carbon Emitter

But killing the Supreme Leader did the opposite. It forced many opposition voices into a corner. In wartime, politics changes fast. When a country is attacked, the public debate shifts from internal disputes to national survival. The opposition is pushed to choose: either stand with the nation, or look like it is benefiting from a foreign attack.

That pressure made it harder for the opposition to escalate. It also helped the system present unity at the exact moment it could have been most divided.

In simpler words: By acting recklessly, Trump and Netanyahu saved the Iranian system from the most dangerous moment that could have weakened it; a natural transition marked by an internal vacuum and a fight over succession.

If he died naturally, his son likely would not have succeeded him

If he died naturally, his son likely would not have succeeded him

Under a normal death, in Iran, the “inheritance” issue would have been a major problem. A natural succession could have triggered strong criticism inside Iran: that the system is turning into a family rule, and that the top position is being passed from father to son.

In that situation, it would have been harder to push Mojtaba Khamenei forward as the next leader. The regime would have feared the political cost of a “dynastic” image. And according to this logic, Khamenei himself would not have wanted his son to take the role in a normal transition, because it would damage the system’s legitimacy.

The assassination changed the rules and helped Mojtaba with the backing of the Revolutionary Guard

The assassination changed the rules and helped Mojtaba with the backing of the Revolutionary Guard

The assassination creates an emergency. In emergencies, debate shrinks, decisions speed up, and security logic dominates politics.

READ: Will the US-Israeli war on Iran open the road to Palestinian freedom?

That is where the Revolutionary Guard becomes decisive. After the assassination, the Guard had strong reasons to back Mojtaba Khamenei. He has deep links with the Guard, and he is seen as a reliable choice in a moment of existential threat. He also has support among a younger generation inside the Guard; an older leadership that some of them describe as too cautious and too soft with “the enemy.”

For this younger camp, the assassination becomes a turning point: time for revenge, time for a stronger response, and time for a harder line across the region.

Therefore, Trump did not bring the system down he closed the door on an internal collapse

Therefore, Trump did not bring the system down he closed the door on an internal collapse

If Khamenei had died naturally, Iran could have faced a serious internal crisis: elite divisions, a difficult succession, and a stronger opening for opposition protests. But the assassination did not produce that. It produced unity under pressure, weakened the opposition’s room to move, and allowed the Revolutionary Guard to shape the succession quickly.

So, the real question is not only “who comes after Khamenei?” The deeper question is: how did the assassination change the system itself AND push Iran into a tougher, more security-driven phase?

Trump and Netanyahu wanted a collapse. Instead, they created an outcome closer to an internal rescue and the result may not be a weaker Iran, but a harder one.

Trump and Netanyahu wanted a collapse. Instead, they created an outcome closer to an internal rescue and the result may not be a weaker Iran, but a harder one.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

© Middle East Monitor