Why a new US–Israeli war against Iran could carry enormous risks
In recent days, three developments have emerged as key preliminary indicators that the US may be preparing to step up its military campaign against Iran. First, the dispatch of a third aircraft carrier strike group alongside additional American forces toward the waters surrounding Iran; second, the directive from the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) to achieve full operational readiness; and third, the continuation of economic pressure, sanctions, and blockades, alongside disputes over the Strait of Hormuz and diplomatic friction surrounding negotiations.
While these developments clearly signal an expansion of military options and an intensification of coercive pressure, they do not, on their own, constitute definitive proof of an executive decision to launch a broad war. This new force posture serves at least three strategic functions: deterrence, diplomatic leverage in negotiations, and operational preparation of a military option. Consequently, while a war posture increases the statistical probability of conflict, it does not in itself demonstrate a definitive decision to enter a major war.
Military power is not measured solely by the quantity of aircraft carriers, planes, or missile launchers. Rather, sustained combat power is a function of the equilibrium between consumption capacity, stockpiles, production, replenishment, human resources, logistics, and the ability to absorb the total costs of warfare.
Military power is not measured solely by the quantity of aircraft carriers, planes, or missile launchers. Rather, sustained combat power is a function of the equilibrium between consumption capacity, stockpiles, production, replenishment, human resources, logistics, and the ability to absorb the total costs of warfare.
Consequently, transforming a military posture into a major war requires the simultaneous presence of at least four structural capacities.
First, a sufficient reserve of munitions and weaponry must exist to execute initial operations and sustain subsequent engagements against Iran—a country that possesses the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the region.
Second, robust equipment replenishment capacity is required, ensuring that if missiles, ammunition, aircraft, defence systems, or command assets are consumed or destroyed during hostilities, military industries can replace them at a commensurate rate—an outcome that appears practical implausible for the US regime.
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