As the region continues to endure the escalating Israeli-American war against Iran, international calls to halt the confrontation are growing louder. Air traffic has been suspended across several countries, economic pressures are mounting, and anxiety is spreading through a region that sits at the heart of the global energy system. The ripple effects are becoming impossible to ignore. The human toll has been severe. Within the first five days of the war alone, Iran reported more than 1,000 deaths, including several senior figures within its central leadership, including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei. Meanwhile, the Gulf states have been shaken by an unfamiliar shock as Iranian retaliatory strikes targeted American and Israeli facilities across the region, attacks that have unsettled their sense of security and stability. Yet the United States has not escaped the consequences either. If anything, Israel may emerge as the war’s principal—if not sole—strategic beneficiary. A quick reading of recommendations issued by major Israeli policy institutes reveals how Israeli strategists view the conflict’s potential gains. Their analyses not only frame the perceived benefits of confronting Iran but also offer a glimpse into the trajectory and objectives Israel may be pursuing in this war. All of this raises a pressing question: what exactly is the United States seeking to achieve—and what does it stand to gain—from this conflict?

Israeli policy institutes have been remarkably explicit about what they believe must be achieved if Israel and the United States wage a joint war against Iran. Their recommendations revolve around a set of strategic objectives that, in their view, should define the endgame of such a confrontation. The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), one of Israel’s most influential think tanks, has argued that the foremost priority should be preventing Iran from rebuilding either its nuclear or missile capabilities once the war subsides. Achieving that goal, according to the institute, would require sustained strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, the disruption of any attempt to revive its missile program, and the systematic crippling of its military-industrial base. A separate report from the same institute urges Israel to continue what it calls the strategy of the “war between wars” against Iran, a doctrine that relies on persistent pressure short of full-scale war. This approach combines covert intelligence operations, limited military strikes, economic sanctions, and diplomatic pressure, ideally carried out in close coordination with the United States. In a third assessment, the institute advised the Israeli government to work actively to reduce the likelihood that Russia or China might assist Iran in rebuilding its military capabilities after the conflict. Another influential policy center, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security – JISS, has framed the objective in even broader terms. In its view, Israel’s strategic goal should extend beyond Iran itself to the dismantling of Tehran’s regional alliance network.

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A report from the Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies goes even further, arguing that a war with Iran should be leveraged to reshape the region’s security architecture. In the center’s view, the conflict presents an opportunity to forge a new regional security alliance bringing together Israel, the United States, and several Arab states, an arrangement that would effectively cement Israel’s position as a central military power in the Middle East. Across a range of Israeli policy studies, a recurring theme emerges: the post-war moment should be used to redefine the region’s security order. Many analysts argue that weakening Iran could open the door to a broader expansion of normalization agreements between Israel and Arab states, with particular attention to the possibility of Saudi-Israeli rapprochement. At the same time, these reports urge Israeli policymakers to keep the war limited in scope and duration. They caution against a large-scale ground invasion and instead advocate a strategy centered on a concentrated aerial campaign, one designed to last weeks rather than years. The objective, in this view, would be either to precipitate the collapse of the Iranian regime or to weaken it sufficiently to alter the regional balance of power.

These recommendations, many of which help explain Israel’s recent policies toward Iran, Lebanon, and the broader region, may also shed light on a question that has surfaced repeatedly in recent days among American commentators and political observers: whether Israel is attempting to draw the Gulf states into the confrontation with Iran. Iran recently denied any involvement in a missile strike targeting Saudi Arabia’s Aramco oil facilities. In the aftermath, American media commentator, Tucker Carlson, a strong critic of Israel, publicly accused Israel of manufacturing incidents that could pressure Gulf states into joining a war against Iran. Such ideas are not entirely absent from Israeli strategic discourse. In 2024, one Israeli commentator controversially suggested that Israel could strike the Al-Aqsa Mosque and attribute the attack to Iran in order to provoke Arab states into confronting Tehran, an extreme proposal intended to trigger a broader regional conflict.

On the other side of the equation, the American president, Israel’s closest ally and partner in the war against Iran, faces mounting challenges at home. President Trump has struggled to justify the war to the American public and even to many within his own political base. The administration has failed to convincingly sell the war domestically, offering little evidence that Iran committed acts of aggression or provocation that would warrant the use of military force. Recent polling reflects this skepticism. Surveys indicate that only about a quarter of Americans support the war, while a clear majority oppose their country’s involvement. Opposition has grown louder in recent days, particularly after reports of American casualties began to emerge. As the war continues, and as the number of wounded and killed inevitably rises, this political pressure is likely to intensify in a conflict that many Americans do not see as their war. In Congress, the divide mirrors the broader national debate. Republicans largely back the military campaign, while most Democrats oppose it. Yet despite these partisan differences, there is a striking point of consensus, few lawmakers believe the Trump administration has articulated a coherent strategy for what comes after the war.

For now, Trump appears to be betting on the collapse of the Iranian regime itself. But even if such an outcome were to occur, it would leave unanswered the most fundamental question, what comes next for Iran?

For now, Trump appears to be betting on the collapse of the Iranian regime itself. But even if such an outcome were to occur, it would leave unanswered the most fundamental question, what comes next for Iran?

That uncertainty is sharpened by the lessons of recent American interventions. A growing body of U.S. policy reviews examining similar wars has cast doubt on whether such conflicts can achieve their stated objectives, raising deeper questions about the wisdom, and the potential gains, of this war.

Despite the failure of American and Israeli plans to topple the Iranian regime, even with the significant blow dealt to its leadership, Washington has shifted its strategy to supporting armed Kurdish groups based in northern Iraq. These groups are now attempting to launch incursions into northwestern Iran, prompting Iranian counterattacks. It appears that regime change in Iran is no easy task, given the country’s cohesive and well-organized political, security, and military structures, as well as its established constitutional and administrative mechanisms for the transfer of power. Neighboring countries believe that any collapse of the regime would lead to a serious security breakdown in the region. There is also concern about the potential emergence of a more hardline faction within Iran. Perhaps the greatest danger lies in the US and Israeli pursuit of regime change without any plan for the aftermath.

In a related development, the U.S. offensive against Iran has triggered a wave of public anger directed at Washington across large parts of the Arab and Muslim worlds, and even in some Western countries. The backlash has taken the form of protests sweeping through major capitals, as well as attacks on American diplomatic missions in several states. These tensions help explain why the U.S. government has recently urged its citizens to leave fourteen countries, most of them in the Arab world, including some of American allies, amid fears that the unrest could escalate further. For many American policy analysts, such reactions were hardly unexpected.

For years, U.S. foreign policy experts have warned successive administrations about the political costs of consistently aligning American strategy with Israeli interests at the expense of broader regional considerations.

For years, U.S. foreign policy experts have warned successive administrations about the political costs of consistently aligning American strategy with Israeli interests at the expense of broader regional considerations.

The current wave of anger, they argue, reflects precisely the kind of backlash those warnings sought to anticipate.

The war has also exposed a deeper problem surrounding the network of American military bases across the region, bases that, rather than providing protection, have increasingly become targets themselves. Their presence has drawn retaliatory strikes, raising difficult questions for the governments that host them. Although Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates publicly rejected the use of U.S. bases on their territory for strikes against Iran, that stance did not shield them from the consequences of the conflict. Iranian retaliatory attacks have nevertheless targeted American military facilities across the Gulf, as well as installations in Jordan and Cyprus. The controversy has extended beyond the Middle East. Spain openly refused to allow U.S. bases on its soil to be used in the war against Iran, a decision that prompted threats from President Trump to curtail trade relations with Madrid. Turkey, meanwhile, has taken a similarly cautious position. Despite hosting American military bases, Ankara has not permitted their use in operations against Iran, whether for offensive or defensive purposes. This approach echoes an earlier moment in 2003, when Turkey refused to allow U.S. forces to launch the invasion of Iraq from its territory. Although that decision initially strained relations with Washington, it ultimately helped recalibrate the bilateral relationship in ways that strengthened Turkey’s strategic autonomy.

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The Israeli–Hezbollah confrontation in southern Lebanon erupted shortly after the launch of the U.S.–Israeli offensive against Iran. On March 2, 2026, Hezbollah fired rockets toward Haifa and the Upper Galilee, framing the attack as retaliation for the assault on Iran. The Lebanese state has little capacity to restrain the group or prevent it from acting. Most strategic assessments now assume that the Houthis will eventually enter the conflict as well, though likely at a moment of their choosing rather than immediately. As a result, the war continues to expand across multiple fronts and in multiple forms.

The economic dimension, in particular, is proving no less consequential than the military one. Losses are already mounting as shipping companies confront rising risks associated with passage through the Strait of Hormuz amid Iranian threats.

The economic dimension, in particular, is proving no less consequential than the military one. Losses are already mounting as shipping companies confront rising risks associated with passage through the Strait of Hormuz amid Iranian threats.

The repercussions could deepen significantly should the Houthis formally enter the war and tighten pressure on the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, an outcome the United States has long sought to avoid .

Today, the world stands sharply divided. Some governments have aligned themselves with the United States and Israel in their campaign against Iran, while others view the war as a clear breach of international law, an act carried out outside the framework of legitimate institutional authority. The danger of this conflict lies not only in the immediate destruction it is causing, but in its potential to ignite something far larger. A single miscalculation could set off a chain reaction capable of engulfing the region, and perhaps far beyond it.

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