Historically, the US has often found Pakistan’s military leadership to be a more reliable partner than its elected governments. Civilian administrations must navigate competing domestic interests, public opinion, coalition politics, and electoral accountability. Military rulers face no such constraints. They are therefore better positioned to deliver on Washington’s strategic priorities without having to justify those decisions to a skeptical electorate.

This dynamic has persisted despite consistently low public perceptions of the US within Pakistan. Surveys conducted over the years, including by the Pew Research Center, have frequently shown Pakistan among the countries with the most unfavorable views of America. Yet Washington’s preference for engaging Pakistan’s military establishment has remained remarkably consistent, most recently exemplified in Vice President J D Vance’s “joke”: “I have joked that I have two very, very important people in my life, an Indian and a Pakistani. The Indian is my wife, and the Pakistani is Field Marshal Munir.”

The pattern is difficult to ignore. From Field Marshal Ayub Khan in the 1960s, to General Yahya Khan in the early 1970s, General Ziaul Haq in the 1980s, General Pervez Musharraf after 2001, and now Field Marshal Asim Munir, successive military leaders have served as Washington’s principal interlocutors in Islamabad. The reason is straightforward: Policies that advance American strategic interests often carry significant political costs within Pakistan. Elected politicians must absorb those costs. Military rulers........

© Indian Express