Arang Keshavarzian: ‘This is the moment for new opposition voices in Iran’
Arang Keshavarzian: ‘This is the moment for new opposition voices in Iran’
'Many, if not most, feel crushed between a deeply repressive and unresponsive political system and an attack on Iran's sovereignty by the United States and Israel.'
Arang Keshavarzian is a professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at New York University. Born in Iran and raised in the United States, his latest book is Making Space for the Gulf: Histories of Regionalism and the Middle East (Stanford University Press).
You have expressed skepticism regarding top-down democratic transitions. Is there a risk of a new form of authoritarianism emerging?
At the moment, everything is extremely uncertain. With the death of the Supreme Leader, a power struggle will unfold in Iran. However, the regime – namely the security apparatus, a portion of the clergy, certain sectors of big business and the political class – has remained united and cohesive. We have not witnessed any significant defections, either before or after the protests and massacres in January. During the June war and the current Israeli and US assault, the military personnel who were killed have been rapidly replaced. At the same time, security forces are patrolling the streets, threatening people against collaborating with “the enemy.” The atmosphere is deeply militarized. Once the war is over, I expect that Iranians will reorganize, and the struggles will unfold in the streets, in workplaces, in universities and in the media.
How does the Iranian public reconcile its own internal struggle for rights with the prospect of foreign interference?
I believe this is a difficult moment for all Iranians. Many, if not most, feel crushed between a deeply repressive and unresponsive political system and an attack on Iran's sovereignty by the United States and Israel. If the regime survives, it is unclear how the public will view those groups – such as the monarchists – who lobbied for and supported a military invasion that killed Khamenei, but also, for instance, killed innocent schoolgirls on the very same day. This could be the moment for new opposition voices, such as the supporters of secular republicanism, to organize and form a platform with wide appeal.
Israel seems to have already begun capitalizing on the current chaos. Do you believe this is merely the opening of a broader front aimed at dismantling the entire “Axis of Resistance” while Tehran is paralyzed?
Yes. Since October 7, Israel has sought to radically reshape the Middle East in its own image. In this regard, the United States – under both Joe Biden and Donald Trump – has supported its actions in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iran. The Israeli government is well aware that public opinion, and perhaps even Congress, could eventually turn against such a high level of alignment of the US with Israel. This might be the last viable window of opportunity for Israel to secure US support for these radical maneuvers.
Western analysis often portrays the Iranian population as a monolithic bloc squarely opposed to the regime. But is there still a social base that supports the Islamic Republic, or one that fears its collapse could lead to “Iraq-style” chaos? How is this segment of the population reacting to the airstrikes and Khamenei's death? Is there a risk that foreign aggression might push even moderates toward a movement of national defense?
Iran is a country of over 90 million people, with vastly different social and economic conditions. The regime still has a significant social base: these are individuals who work directly or indirectly for the state or for parastatal organizations, ranging from cultural centers to the security apparatus. Some are ideologically tied to the Islamic Republic, while others support it for pragmatic and material reasons. Over the past couple of days, many have taken to the streets in organized demonstrations to support the regime and mourn Khamenei, in major cities as well as in smaller towns. At the same time, we saw hundreds of thousands of people protesting against the regime between December and January, alongside the women's liberation movement. Then there is what we in Iran call the “vast gray segment” of society – meaning those who are less politicized, whether for or against the regime. These people hold many grievances, but the war could drive them to support the regime and the military in the name of defending the homeland. This could happen, especially in the absence of appealing, viable, organized alternative political groups to rally behind. There is a high probability that Iranian society will become even more polarized as a result of the conflict.
How can these recent military operations be reconciled with the “America First” doctrine and the promise to put an end to “endless wars”?
I believe there is a real tension between what Trump says and his social base, which is focused on “America First.” They did not react to the operation in Venezuela because it did not result in the deaths of US troops or a spike in inflation, and it was short-lived. This war against Iran carries far more profound consequences and was already highly unpopular.
