Limits of Industrial Endurance and Doctrines: Lessons from War in West Asia
The accelerated use of munitions such as long-range precision strike systems has led to critical shortfalls in US supply chains. These constraints are further compounded by dependence on China as a dominant supplier of critical minerals and components in global defence supply chains. A key lesson for India is that future warfighting effectiveness will depend not just on how well equipped a force is at the outset, but on how long it can sustain that level of equipping under real-world industrial and supply constraints.
On 28 February 2026, a combined force of the United States (US) and Israel launched a large-scale military offensive against Iran, code-named Operation Epic Fury by the US, marking a sharp escalation of the long-standing geopolitical problem. The operation was premised on expectations of a rapid victory, driven by assumptions of technological and operational superiority, favourable intelligence, and an assessment that Iran would capitulate to the combined force’s military prowess.
On 1 March, President Donald Trump indicated that operations could last up to four weeks,[1] while the Pentagon stated that the campaign would achieve its objectives without requiring a prolonged ground deployment. However, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth avoided committing to a clear timeline, reflecting uncertainty about the war’s trajectory.[2] By late March, the US had established back-channel contacts with Iran, even though political or military objectives were yet to be achieved.
Around 21/22 March, Washington reportedly opened back-channel communication with Tehran through intermediaries.[3] According to The New York Times, a 15-point proposal outlining a potential way forward to end the conflict was conveyed to Iran via Pakistan.[4] However, deep mistrust continues to shape Iran’s response, particularly after the US strikes occurring after the proposal was shared. As the campaign entered its fourth week, Iranian officials publicly rejected overtures from the Trump administration, signalling resistance to negotiations under military duress.
Although both sides have outlined conditional positions and Pakistan has expressed willingness to facilitate dialogue, there is currently no clear pathway to de-escalation. Active hostilities persist, with continued missile and drone exchanges alongside sustained airstrikes, underscoring the war’s intensity and volatility.[5]
Amid a tentative diplomatic movement, Israel has escalated its operational tempo. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has intensified strikes against critical Iranian targets, aiming to degrade strategic and defence-industrial capabilities before any potential ceasefire. On 24 March, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly instructed the military to maximise damage to Iran’s defence infrastructure within the next 48 hours, highlighting a push to secure tactical gains ahead of possible negotiations.[6]
Overall, the war is ongoing and unresolved, with no immediate resolution in sight. The extremely high tempo of operations during the first 25 days of the war has exposed critical vulnerabilities in the US supply chain. Reports have emerged of shortages of long-range precision-strike weapons, despite denials from senior military and political leadership.[7]
This brief examines the doctrinal evolution within the US Armed Forces that has fostered a risk-averse operational culture and an increasing reliance on long-range precision weapon systems. It further analyses how a high operational tempo involving these systems—often critical and in limited supply—can lead to shortages, potentially increasing dependence on an adversarial nation for key components during wartime.
The brief will then outline lessons for the Indian Army as it undertakes doctrinal and structural reforms, including the raising of Integrated Battle Groups, Rudra all-arms brigades, Bhairav Light Commando Battalions, Shaktibaan Artillery Regiments with Divyastra Batteries and drone platoons. The agility and lethality of these formations will depend on accompanying doctrinal adaptations that enable high-tempo operations, force restructuring, and induction of next-generation weapon systems.
Finally, the brief underscores the importance of aligning doctrinal, organisational and structural reforms with industrial capacity and logistical sustainment capabilities. Any disconnect between these elements could introduce significant risks in the conduct of military operations.
Doctrinal Evolution in the US Armed Forces
The evolution of US warfighting doctrine since World War II has consistently emphasised technological superiority and the use of force multipliers to minimise casualties. In the post-Vietnam era, a close study of the Yom Kippur War revealed a dramatic increase in the tempo and lethality of modern combat, particularly in anti-tank and air defence systems. These lessons informed the development of the ‘Active Defence’ concept, which prioritised firepower over manoeuvre to channel adversaries into vulnerable positions, leading to their destruction. The doctrine attracted criticism for its over-reliance on attrition and firepower at the expense of manoeuvre, prompting further evolution. By the late 1970s, this debate culminated in the emergence of AirLand Battle, which sought to integrate manoeuvre, depth and synchronisation in combat operations.[8]
The end of the Cold War between 1989 and 1991 marked the next major phase of doctrinal transformation.[9] Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, US forces were significantly downsized and re-oriented.[10] This period coincided with a range of military operations, most notably the Gulf War, which demonstrated the effectiveness of precision-guided munitions, stealth platforms, and overwhelming airpower in achieving decisive outcomes with minimal losses. The new doctrine emphasised simultaneity in operations by addressing tactical, operational and strategic depth concurrently........
