The atheistic rule of the Soviet Union over Central Asia came to an end in 1991, giving rise to five independent Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan (hereafter CARs). Soon after their independence, these newly-born states observed a revival of pre-Soviet monotheistic, scriptural, and Sharia-based Islamic model, reminiscent of the Prophet’s time (Refer GK, Thursday, March 26, 2026). However, this pure original Islamic model dented soon for sporadic militant incidents attributed to radical Islamist groups in the region. In response the CARs de-officialized Islam, suppressed jihadist movements, and banned all foreign-funded Islamic organizations operating within their territories.

As an alternative, the CARs adopted a tradition-based Islamic model as the state faith. Rooted in both pre- and post-Islamic customs and practices, this model aligned with their broader supra-nationalist and “cultural nationalism” agendas, as well as their ancestral heritage of hero and saint veneration. For all practical purposes, it was “reimagined” Islam containing blended elements of state paternalism, national patriotism, and a revitalized sense of regional history, culture, and language.

This “reconceptualized” model was upheld by post-Soviet Muslim leadership despite opposition from certain sections of the Muslim clergy, who regarded it as artificial, irreligious, and contrary to the doctrines of the Qur’an, Hadith, and other religious scriptures. Yet, the CARs perceived it peaceful, inclusive, and regime-friendly, in comparison to the reactionary, revolutionary, and potentially regime-threatening form of scriptural or monotheistic Islam. They effectively divinized what is not actually God as per the orthodox Islamic theology- a phenomenon described in academic discourse as “self-Islamized,” “state,” “official,” or “cloned” Islam.

It is neither divinely revealed nor the product of any sustained missionary endeavour. Rather, it combines ancient pagan and animistic and medieval Sufistic traditions together. As such, it embodies centuries-old mystical beliefs, superstitions, and practices revolving around the veneration of heroes, saints, and shrines. It also reflects the imprint of ancient Chinese philosophical belief that death transforms mortals into spirits endowed with significant powers, and that the deceased possess dual souls: one that departs immediately and another that lingers, requiring offerings such as food until it eventually fades.

This tradition is further reinforced by the CARs through the acts of legitimization of personality cults, the museumization of shrines, and the eulogization of saints. Its associated rites and practices display considerable variation, “differing from one city to another, from one neighborhood to the next, and even among individual households-ranging from weekly domestic observances to visits and prayers at tombs and sacred springs.”

Approximately 70 percent of post-Soviet Central Asian Muslims adhere to this form of religiosity, as it involves no rigid external obligations in terms of practices, texts, institutional hierarchies, or mosque-centered worship. Instead, it resonates with their ancestral traditions of hero, saint, and shrine veneration, and connects them spiritually with the divine directly. Its principal exponents, saints and Sufis, are blessed with ideals of pacifism, asceticism, self-restraint, and worldly detachment, and are often believed to possess miraculous (karamat) powers that aid in addressing human, material and spiritual ends.

It is, therefore, unsurprising that its adherents regularly visit the shrines of saints and Sufis for intercession, tying votive threads, burning incense, holding night congregations (shab-i mahfil), reciting hagiographical texts, performing devotional dances and music, offering gifts in cash and kind, and organizing occasional feasts to invoke the blessings of holy men for both this world and the hereafter.

As a state-sponsored project, this traditional Islamic variant is subject to extensive governmental control. Religious texts are selectively filtered, and discussions pertaining to jiha’dist thought are strictly prohibited. The clergy is recruited and managed by the state, while the functioning of mosques, maktabs, and madrassas is closely monitored. This represents a significant departure from the pre-Soviet approach to Islam, when state intervention was minimal and religious authorities and institutions operated with considerable autonomy. During that period, the clergy was community-based rather than state-appointed, and Islamic teachings including puritan or monotheistic interpretations and even discourses on jihad,were disseminated freely. Islam, in essence, was then regarded as a personal matter between the individual and God, practiced voluntarily rather than imposed “from above.”

However, this “reconceptualized” Islam is not without serious implications for the region. It has brought the CARs and Islamist groups into direct confrontation because of their divergent understandings of Islam and its role in society. In addition to rejecting the authoritarian regimes of the CARs and their “customized” version of Islam, Islamists advocate the establishment of a pure theocratic Islamic state in their place. This is why the CARs portray Islamists, both jiha’dist and Tablighis, as potential threats to state security and, therefore, respond through coercive measures with impunity.

Publicly, the CARs do not denounce Islam as a faith; rather, they frame it in a manner that divides it into two opposing strands: “traditional” Islam and “scriptural” or “faith” Islam. The former is represented as peaceful, authentic, and socially acceptable, whereas the latter is depicted as alien, radical, and potentially dangerous. In this way, one form of Islam is officially endorsed and idealized, while the other is delegitimized and stigmatized.

Over time, the perceived jiha’dist threat has been significantly weakened through the establishment of a highly structured security apparatus. It was further marginalized after the post-9/11 US discourse that scriptural or faith Islam is associated with fundamentalism, extremism, and terrorism. While the rationale for suppressing violent jiha’dist groups may sound sensible from the perspective of state security, the same logic is less convincing in relation to non-violent Tablighi Jamaat and Hizb ut-Tahrir missionary groups. These groups generally pursue what may be described as a “soft Islamization” through charity, social work, and da‘wah (invitation to a more scripturally grounded Islam). It is precisely for their peaceful missionary activities that contribute to the growth of scriptural Islamist tendencies, as increasing numbers of Muslims attend mosques, perform animal sacrifice, give alms, and undertake pilgrimage more regularly than before.

Similarly, this “reworked” Islam sharply distinguishes post-Soviet Islam from its pre-Soviet counterpart in both perception and practice. Muslims living in these two periods appear to constitute markedly different religious communities despite sharing the same faith, nationality, and regional background. A similar divide is visible within contemporary post-Soviet Muslim societies themselves. Traditionalists and Islamists increasingly form two opposing communities: one grounded in pre- and post-Islamic practices, and the other in a stricter monotheistic understanding of God. Likewise, one group tends to support the CARs’ secular and state-managed religious order, while the other challenges it as pseudo-Islamic, authoritarian, and anti-Islamist.

Nevertheless, this conflict generally remains non-violent and is expressed primarily through mutual accusations and symbolic contestation. Traditionalists often describe Islamists as “Wahhabis” and dismiss their interpretation of Islam as foreign, dogmatic, and violent. Islamists, in turn, criticize traditionalists as ignorant and religiously degenerated species, accusing them of lacking a proper understanding of Islam, its teachings, and its obligations.

More alarmingly, the “reimagined” Islam is driving at least some segments of the region’s disaffected youth toward “Islamism” and even “jiha’dism” as a catalyst to political change and the establishment of a theocratic state. Some security analysts, therefore, warn that, because of the interplay of endogenous and exogenous factors, the region could become vulnerable to the emergence of Al‑Qaeda type militancy in the future.

Prof. Mushtaq Kaw, Former Director, Centre of Central asian Studies

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