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The Fight for the Future of Democratic Foreign Policy

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03.11.2026

The midterm elections mark the beginning of the Democratic Party’s 2028 presidential campaign. After two years of debate over the lessons of Kamala Harris’s defeat in the 2024 election, it promises to be one of the most open contests about the future of Democratic policies, including foreign policy, in generations. It also promises to be one of the most consequential. The strategic environment in 2029 is on track to be the most difficult and unforgiving since the height of the Cold War.

Democrats must therefore lay out their ideas early and see how they fare both with voters and against the trajectory of world events. The party is generally split into two camps: centrists who, when it comes to foreign policy, are focused on strategic competition, restoring the United States’ national power, and deepening alliances, and progressives, who propose a more affirmative agenda emphasizing shared challenges and global cooperation. In many ways, this divide has become familiar. But as the second Trump administration continues its project of overturning the post–World War II global order, the debates within each camp are at least as important as the disagreements between them.

If the party’s major foreign policy disagreements—on the future of the international order, on Israel, on artificial intelligence, on China, and on the global economy—are not litigated by prospective candidates, former officials, and prominent thinkers now, and voters are not given the chance to make an informed choice between coherent options, the first year of a Democratic administration could be consumed by indecision and infighting. Democrats must therefore understand where they stand on each of those questions, where centrists and progressives converge, and where the sharpest divisions now lie.

The three Democratic presidents since the end of the Cold War have all made some version of a U.S.-led international order a cornerstone of their foreign policy. But although former President Joe Biden’s rhetoric, with its emblematic “America Is Back” catchphrase, gestured at restoring that order after Trump, Biden did not govern like a restorationist. For the Biden administration, in which I served, the intensifying strategic competition with China and Russia and the onset of shared challenges such as the pandemic marked an external unraveling of the old era that necessitated major changes in U.S. strategy. Biden shifted foreign economic policy away from free trade and globalization toward industrial policy, resilience, and technological leadership, and he pushed back more assertively against Beijing and Moscow than did his Democratic predecessors.

As they reflect on the Biden administration, centrists are actively debating whether a future Democratic administration can restore and reform the U.S.-led international order or whether the United States must adapt to a prolonged period of geopolitical upheaval. For now, the differences are more pronounced in diagnosis than in policy prescriptions. All favor deepening alliances and partnerships, modernizing the military, fixing the defense industrial base, strengthening deterrence, tackling transnational challenges such as global public health, and pursuing hardheaded diplomacy with rivals.

Centrists also agree that Trump has severely weakened U.S. power and institutions, although they remain relatively optimistic about the country’s capacity to recover. But most recognize that the world the next Democratic president would inherit in 2029 is not the world that Biden inherited in 2021. Winning an election will not mean the end of Trumpism. The “America first” movement will likely remain a dominant force in the Republican Party, and the United States’ allies and partners will have to hedge against dramatic shifts in U.S. foreign policy from one election to the next. Even if a Democratic president can rebuild American power and repair damaged institutions, restoring international confidence in the durability of U.S. commitments will be much harder.

Winning an election will not mean the end of Trumpism.

The party’s progressives argue that the U.S. foreign policy establishment failed over the past 25 years by pursuing U.S. primacy at all costs. They see the U.S.-led order as deeply flawed in its design and track record, arguing that Washington’s selective application of the “rules-based order” undermined the order itself. As Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, of New York, put it at the Munich Security Conference in 2026, “in a rules-based order, hypocrisy is vulnerability.” They favor a rules-based order that applies its principles consistently, even if doing so constrains the United States.

Many progressives, led by Bernie Sanders, the independent senator from Vermont, also believe that a global oligarchy poses a threat to democracy and see big business in defense, technology, and finance as part of a corrupt system. They believe that corporate interests have driven excessive military spending, misguided interventions, and a global economy that favors multinational companies over workers.

Progressives see the turmoil of the past two years as accelerating the emergence of a multipolar order, in which the United States has an important, but more limited, role to play. According to the progressive thinker Ben Rhodes, a former deputy national security adviser to President Barack Obama, Washington should “re-engage the world as something other than a hegemon.” Americans are accustomed to seeing the country as an overall force for good, even when it uses military power, but progressives point to U.S. support for Israel’s war in Gaza, and the Trump administration’s actions in Iran and Venezuela as evidence of the enormous damage that interventionism can cause. Many argue that the United States should go to war only in self-defense—and with congressional authorization, as the Constitution requires. They also favor cuts to what they see as a bloated defense budget that encourages presidents to default to military action instead of diplomacy.

New debates, both between and within the various camps of the Democratic Party, are emerging.

Most progressives believe that the greatest threats to American security and prosperity are increasingly transnational rather than geopolitical: runaway artificial intelligence, climate change,........

© Foreign Affairs