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Trump Is Facing a Very Different North Korea

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11.11.2026

Donald Trump has Pyongyang on his mind. In recent months, the U.S. president has made comments to the media suggesting he is in communication with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. In an August 17 Truth Social post, for instance, Trump announced that the United States would scale back joint military drills with South Korea. The decision, he wrote, was “based on my very good relationship with Kim Jong Un,” describing the dictator as “unthreatening and respectful.”

Trump has not been subtle about his desire to restart diplomacy with Kim. With an eye on his legacy and the war with Iran stalemated, he is eager to notch a foreign policy win. During his first term, Trump held two historic U.S.–North Korean summits aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula—but both foundered because of the countries’ disparate expectations for the terms of a deal. Since his reelection, Trump has been looking to reopen talks with Kim. The ball is now in Pyongyang’s court, and Kim has signaled, if not an eagerness for renewed engagement, at least an unwillingness to rule it out. In August, after Trump insisted for the second time that he was in touch with Pyongyang, Kim Yo Jong—the leader’s influential sister—released a statement that read: “Regarding the reports from Washington about recent communication between the top leaders of North Korea and the U.S., I am completely unaware of such matters. It has been stated on numerous occasions that our head of state holds fond personal memories and positive feelings toward Trump. The relationship between the leaders remains excellent.” Although this is far from an agreement to meet, Kim Jong Un is not closing the door.

If leader-to-leader talks materialize, Trump may believe his personal rapport with Kim will yield a deal. But he will be facing a very different North Korea than the one at their last meeting in 2019. The fallout from unfinished diplomacy during Trump’s first term, the COVID-19 pandemic, and global trends such as the sharp escalation in U.S.-Chinese strategic rivalry and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have destabilized the security landscape and created formidable obstacles to peaceful engagement. Meanwhile, North Korea’s continued nuclear and conventional military expansion and the growing support it is receiving from Moscow have strengthened Kim’s hand. Facing an emboldened Pyongyang, Trump can no longer fall back on the same concessions and negotiation tactics he used in previous talks.

For a U.S.–North Korean summit to be successful, the United States must approach it with well-defined strategic goals and a clear understanding of what concessions it is willing to make. Washington should shift its focus away from denuclearization, at least in the short term, to concentrate on more achievable nuclear arms control and safety measures. The United States should also maintain a capable troop presence on the Korean Peninsula and reiterate its security assurances—particularly its nuclear-deterrence guarantees—to regional allies such as South Korea and Japan.

Although diplomacy with North Korea has historically been difficult, Trump is eager to meet with Kim, and both sides want to avoid pushing the Indo-Pacific toward nuclear proliferation or all-out war. Careful engagement with Pyongyang could defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula and lay the groundwork for a more stable security landscape.

Since the U.S.–North Korean summit in 2019, the conflicts in Ukraine and Iran have reshaped the Indo-Pacific in ways that strengthen Kim’s hand. The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran has drawn Washington’s focus away from Asia as, for the third time in the past quarter century, U.S. strategic attention and military assets have surged to the Middle East. The last American aircraft carrier stationed in the Indo-Pacific departed for the Persian Gulf in August, and U.S. strikes on Iran have rapidly depleted American munitions stockpiles. Washington’s Indo-Pacific allies, already strained by Trump’s abrupt policy shifts and punishing tariffs, are now concerned about deteriorating deterrence. Asian economies—many of which are deeply dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies—have contracted as the Strait of Hormuz has remained compromised. Amid signs of further American retrenchment, U.S. allies and partners are increasingly skeptical about Washington’s commitment to the region.

Even more consequential is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has benefited North Korea in numerous ways. Moscow and Pyongyang’s once dormant relationship has flourished as Kim has sent thousands of munitions to replenish Russia’s depleted stockpiles and thousands of soldiers to fight and die in the ongoing ground war. Images of the new memorial to the Korean People’s Army soldiers who have perished in the invasion suggest an already significant loss of North Korean lives. In return, Pyongyang has received generous assistance from Moscow in violation of international sanctions, including abundant financial support for Kim’s regime and technology transfers that have enhanced North Korean military capabilities and may help Pyongyang more accurately deliver intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at the United States. Russian patronage allows Kim to shower his regime’s elites with the economic benefits needed to cement their loyalty.

Still, it is worth questioning how durable this partnership is. After more than four years of grinding warfare with no end in sight, Moscow is increasingly isolated and may be in a poor position to continue supporting Pyongyang. Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine has allowed China to expand its presence in Central Asia, for instance, and Turkey to deepen its influence in Azerbaijan. Russian........

© Foreign Affairs