What Sanctions Get Right
The United States frequently uses sanctions or embargoes to rein in malign actors. When policymakers become dissatisfied with the results, they often embrace military action next. Washington, for example, applied sanctions on Iraq for more than a decade before invading the country in 2003. It did the same with Iran, using sanctions to pressure the government into nuclear negotiations in the 2010s and then, after withdrawing from the resulting agreement in 2018, going to war with Tehran in February 2026.
Washington follows this pattern of behavior because sanctions alone rarely—if ever—make a problem disappear, such as by toppling the government responsible. This frustrates Americans, who tend to seek simple, quick, and permanent fixes to foreign policy problems. Many interpret the persistence of these problems as evidence that sanctions are futile. But the effectiveness of sanctions is measured in crises that do not occur—the nuclear test that never happens, for instance, or the shipping lane that remains undisturbed. These successes are invisible, but an adversary’s continuing provocations are not. As a result, American officials often conclude that it is necessary to turn to war.
This logic reflects a misunderstanding about how sanctions work. Sanctions may not be able to achieve maximalist aims, yet when they are deployed in concert with other policy tools, they can help manage problems. They do this by reliably depressing the target country’s economic growth over time. Although this hurts innocent civilians in the targeted countries as their leaders shift the costs from regime supporters to the politically disenfranchised, no government can escape the inexorable math of slowing economic growth. If an economy starts out with a three percent growth rate—roughly the global average—it will double in size in around 23 years. But if sanctions reduce annual growth to one percent, doubling in size will take 70 years, three times as long. Just compare the North Korean and South Korean economies, or look at nighttime satellite imagery of the Korean Peninsula, to see the compounding effects of sanctions over generations. Although sanctions may not change the targeted regime’s aspirations, they reduce its financial wherewithal and may deter other governments from emulating the behavior that precipitated the sanctions.
Wars can overthrow adversarial regimes, but usually only after years of fighting, and fixing the damage afterward takes considerable time and money. Too often the United States misidentifies its foreign policy problems as solvable on the cheap. It took an Allied occupation force of over 1.5 million soldiers to garrison Germany, a country of 80 million, after World War II. Fast forward 60 years, and Washington was not interested in raising the numbers of troops necessary to subdue Iraq, a country of nearly 30 million. Americans today are likewise unwilling to make sacrifices on the scale necessary to vanquish Iran, with its 90 million people—much less China, with its 1.4 billion. The challenges these countries might pose are too large to solve at an acceptable cost. In such cases, sanctions offer an economically sustainable strategy to manage troublesome situations in the long term.
According to the conventional wisdom about sanctions, these measures discourage unsavory behavior by raising its economic costs. If force becomes necessary, they also weaken the adversary in advance of war. This logic has endured since 1935, when the League of Nations sanctioned Italy for invading Ethiopia, in the hope that doing so would induce Italy to call off its invasion or at least temper its ambitions. Yet because the countries imposing sanctions were unwilling to include vital commodities such as oil and coal on the list of sanctioned items, the effort was ineffective.
Sanctions have evolved since 1935. Today, unlike broad sanctions that inflict significant collateral damage, so-called smart sanctions target specific institutions or individuals and are enforced through the banking system, blocking financial transactions linked to sanctioned activities. UN sanctions against Iraq starting in 1990 were, in a sense, the last gasp of the old sanctions regime. Their lifting was contingent on Iraq’s dismantling its weapons of mass destruction program and agreeing to respect Kuwaiti sovereignty. Because verification of the former proved difficult, many of the sanctions remained in place after a 1991 armistice, and they continued through the 2003 Iraq war. After U.S.-led forces invaded Iraq in March 2003 and overthrew Saddam Hussein, it became apparent that the sanctions had been effective. Isolation from the global economy had prevented Iraq from restoring its economy, rebuilding its military, and resuming its development of weapons of mass destruction.
Between the two wars, however, many observers........
