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Who Killed the Global Economy?

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26.10.2026

China Is Not the Only Culprit

In “The Next Global Economic Crisis Could Be Made in China” (September/October 2026), Michael Froman raises an alarm that China has “outgrown” its export-led model for economic growth. He argues that Beijing’s practice of flooding global markets with heavily subsidized exports will cause a rise in protectionism, followed by a possible collapse of China’s export growth and a material slowdown in the Chinese economy, with a cascade of adverse effects on the rest of the world. Froman rightly argues that China’s surplus is excessive, and that a sudden correction would send shock waves around the world. He is less persuasive, however, in making the case that this risk is especially high right now.

Froman’s forecast may turn out to be correct, but the argument that large global imbalances create risks for the global economy was widespread in the first decade of this century, when global trade imbalances were far higher—almost six percent of global GDP in 2007, compared with around 3.7 percent today. China’s surplus, as a share of global GDP, was about as large then as it is today. But protectionism did not surge. Rather than retaliate against Chinese surpluses at the time, countries chose to absorb them, likely because they were benefiting from China’s low-cost manufactured goods. Countries still making the most of cheap imports may well choose to absorb China’s surplus again.

Although China’s current account surplus has grown explosively in the past few years, this is not necessarily because of Beijing’s industrial subsidies, as Froman contends. China has had an expansive industrial subsidy program since at least 2015, when Premier Li Keqiang launched the “Made in China 2025” program to increase the country’s self-sufficiency in certain critical sectors. Between 2011 and 2023, industrial subsidies broadly measured as a share of China’s GDP were basically stable, according to an August 2025 study by the International Monetary Fund. Although China ran a persistent current account surplus during those years, it averaged only 1.6 percent of the country’s GDP, far below the peak of almost ten percent in 2007. Direct subsidies to listed Chinese companies, one component of China’s subsidy program, fell by a quarter from their 2022 peak to 0.1 percent of GDP in 2025.

The growth of China’s surplus, beginning in 2024, is more likely explained by a rise in the imbalance between........

© Foreign Affairs