Can the Nordic Model Save NATO?
In August, at Finland’s request, the Swedish government deployed fighter aircraft and a warship to help patrol Finland’s eastern airspace and the Gulf of Finland against Russian air incursions and drones straying from Ukrainian operations. Critically, the Swedish assets involved were placed under Finnish command and followed Finnish rules of engagement. It was the latest example of how Finland and Sweden, the two newest additions to NATO, have made qualitative leaps in defense coordination.
The Nordic countries have expanded regional collaboration significantly in the past four years. Between them, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden now boast a new long-term defense strategy, a cross-border transit area, frequent joint exercises, and unprecedented levels of command integration. In effect, these governments are forming their own regional deterrence cluster: a like-minded group of states deepening military cooperation to strengthen deterrence and, if required, ensure NATO’s broader collective defense.
The Nordic model offers a glimpse of the adaptive solutions that may sustain NATO through uncertain times. Moscow’s appetite for risk is growing; its military buildup and escalating attacks on European infrastructure suggest that Russia constitutes a long-term threat to the alliance. At the same time, the Trump administration is pushing its European allies to take primary responsibility for the continent’s defense. Europeans must therefore deter a more dangerous Russia with less help.
To strengthen their deterrence and defense capabilities, member states along NATO’s extended frontline—and in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, in particular—should build their own regional clusters and foster a strong latticework of bilateral and “minilateral” partnerships with their neighbors. Regionalization remains a taboo subject among most of the alliance’s political leadership; NATO is, after all, a collective defense alliance founded on indivisible security. But regional efforts at the military level will both make NATO more effective and advance the United States’ vision of a more European NATO.
Nordic-style deterrence clusters are thus a win-win. Yet in its erratic, occasionally aggressive approach to Greenland and the North Atlantic, Washington has risked undercutting the very allies that are delivering what it wants. The United States should use the recently signed Greenland deal as a reset to embrace Nordic defense efforts and create incentives for other allies to follow suit.
Marriage of Convenience
Nordic defense collaboration took its current institutional form in 2009, when recession-era budgetary constraints pushed the region’s five countries to rethink their defense commitments. Finland and Sweden joined NATO members Denmark, Iceland, and Norway in establishing the Nordic Defense Cooperation, primarily in hopes of cutting procurement costs. NORDEFCO boasted some early wins, including cross-border air force training in the uncongested airspace of northern Finland, Norway, and Sweden. But because NORDEFCO spanned NATO members and non-allied states, bureaucratic hurdles and a lenient threat environment quickly sapped momentum from joint procurement.
Only after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine did some Nordic countries begin to see cooperation as a security imperative, not just a way to save money. Finland and Sweden launched a no-limits military partnership that included joint wartime planning. And Norway, despite maintaining its NATO-first approach, gradually embraced operational cooperation with its two non-NATO neighbors in times of crisis. By 2020, when the countries signed........
