China Doesn’t Want a Nuclear Arms Race
Today, pessimism—almost fatalism—reigns in Washington about the United States’ ability to avoid a costly and dangerous arms race with China. Policymakers point to China’s increasingly aggressive policies toward Taiwan, its massive military buildup, and its resistance to engaging in some arms control measures as evidence that Beijing has accepted the inevitability of such a race or is even pursuing one. Worried by intellectual frameworks that emphasize the likelihood of war between rival great powers, Many U.S. leaders and analysts see little choice but for the United States to arm itself, too. But this thinking risks becoming a self-fulling prophecy. The major danger is that an unrestrained arms race increases the likelihood of war over Taiwan or even of a catastrophic nuclear exchange.
But the pessimism about averting an arms race is misplaced. A nuclear arms race, in particular, is not a foregone conclusion—and the United States has real opportunities to curb one. Avoiding a nuclear arms race will require a broader approach than the two-pronged one Washington has recently favored: building up U.S. nuclear deterrence and seeking to force concessions from Beijing by imposing restrictions on trade and technology transfers. American leaders should instead look beyond traditional deterrence, which falls short because its threat-based approach tends to provoke competition over arms, and strive to establish a more fundamental strategic stability through a process of reciprocal de-escalation and compromise. China is likely to be amenable to reciprocal de-escalation: it has a long tradition of moderation in nuclear matters and, ultimately, Chinese leaders do not want a war over Taiwan.
There are recent signs that even U.S. President Donald Trump, who has often boasted about his distaste for compromise, sees the value of engagement. After two U.S.-Chinese bilateral summits this year, in October he suggested that his November trilateral meeting in Shenzhen with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin should focus on “denuclearization.” But Washington will have to become much more consistent in its rejection of an arms race, including by modifying its support for Taiwan and incorporating China into global arms control leadership. A nuclear arms race with China becomes inevitable only if Washington continues to believe it is.
China is undoubtedly pursuing a military buildup, including investments in nuclear weapons. Between 2020 and 2025, China doubled the number of its nuclear warheads, from 300 to 600—a startling increase, although its arsenal remains small compared with the United States’ approximately 3,700 warheads. In 2021, researchers at the Federation of American Scientists announced that China was constructing 350 new nuclear missile silos in three vast sites in Xinjiang and Gansu provinces. Beijing is also pursuing substantial qualitative upgrades to its nuclear weapons, a push it showcased at an October 2025 military parade that unveiled a new sea-launched ballistic missile, two new kinds of intercontinental ballistic missiles, a new air-launched hypersonic missile, and a new long-range hypersonic cruise missile.
Then, this July, the Chinese navy tested a submarine-launched long-range ballistic missile that could carry nuclear weapons. This significant new capability will allow China to launch long-range nuclear strikes that can reach the United States from protected waters near its own coastline rather than having to sail out into the Pacific. A recent editorial in a leading Chinese foreign affairs newspaper took the candid yet disturbing step of explicitly linking China’s rapid nuclear buildup to its desire to exert sovereignty over Taiwan. “The great cause of national reunification,” it asserted, “must rest on a solid, realistic foundation. That foundation is, first and foremost, hard power.” Although such overt nuclear saber rattling remains rare, the link between Beijing’s nuclear forces and the Taiwan issue stretches back over three decades and is also supported by the scholar Tong Zhao’s detailed analysis of China’s nuclear buildup in Foreign Affairs in May.
As China builds up its military, the perception that it is on a collision course with the United States over Taiwan—one that inevitably includes the risk of nuclear escalation—has become widespread in Washington. Taiwan, of course, appears to be an obvious flash point. The United States has long committed itself informally to defending the island while China seeks to unify with it, by force if necessary.........
