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North Korea’s Enemies Within

67 0
02.11.2026

In 2015, the North Korean diplomat Thae Yong Ho received an unusual assignment. Kim Jong Chol, the older brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, was coming to London to attend an Eric Clapton concert, and Thae, who was then stationed in London, was assigned to look after him. Providing direct service to the ruling family confers honor on North Korean officials and their households, so Thae expected his two sons to be impressed.

To Thae’s surprise, his sons were outraged. Ordinary North Koreans could be expelled from university (or worse) for listening to Western music, they told him. And now the Kim family was spending thousands of dollars in a single evening to enjoy entertainment forbidden to all other North Koreans. In the eyes of his children, Thae later wrote in his memoir, Password to the Third Floor, he was a prisoner forced to take care of a prison warden. Their reaction left him ashamed.

The next year, Thae, his wife, and their sons escaped to South Korea. His defection surprised the international community. Only weeks earlier, Thae had been defending the North Korean regime with great fervor. Yet this incongruous behavior is familiar to those who understand life among North Korea’s elite: officials can profess full devotion to the Kim family right until the day they run.

The gap between public conduct and private belief is difficult to observe from the outside. For over a decade, I interviewed dozens of former diplomats, Korean Workers’ Party cadres, military officers, businesspeople, and technicians, all of whom had lived, studied, or worked in Pyongyang. These people ran the party, military, embassies, foreign-currency businesses, and technical programs on which the state depends for its survival. They received the best education, housing, food, and access to influential social networks their country could provide. Some once believed sincerely in the system; others learned early that loyalty was a role they had to pantomime in a nationwide, lifelong performance—now with Kim Jong Un as the maestro. Nearly all described an elite class under growing strain.

Since Kim Jong Un came to power in December 2011, he has tightened his grip on the country’s elites by carrying out sweeping purges of the old guard of senior party officials and military officers and executing others for minor political missteps. Many members of North Korea’s elite fear that they or their families can be killed at the drop of a hat. And their escape routes are narrowing; since Kim sealed off the borders during the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of North Korean defectors reaching South Korea has plummeted.

Those North Koreans who still manage to escape increasingly come from the elite. As of August 2024, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service reported that the number of defections from North Korea’s upper class recorded under Kim Jong Un was two and a half times the combined total observed during the reigns of Kim Il Sung (1948 to 1994) and Kim Jong Il (1994 to 2011). The absolute number remains small—in the hundreds—and it would be a mistake to interpret this trend as a harbinger of imminent regime collapse. North Korea is remarkably effective at preventing private grievances from becoming organized opposition. The regime does not need every official to believe in it. But it needs its doubters to feel isolated and alone in their skepticism and disillusionment.

North Korea has long been referred to as the “Hermit Kingdom,” but that term offers the wrong impression of the country. It is not totally isolated from the world. It is a nuclear-armed state with diplomatic relations with over 160 countries, and it has the world’s fourth-largest standing army and highly skilled cyber-operators. The vast majority of the population may be fed a robust diet of state propaganda, but most elites are exposed to life outside North Korea. They have a reasonable sense of how the world works and their country’s place in it. And yet they have to live with intense cognitive dissonance, at once understanding the real world and having to create, enforce, and trumpet the state’s official narratives to their countrymen and foreigners.

Many high-ranking North Koreans are finding it harder to sustain this balancing act. Access to privilege can purchase compliance—and terror can enforce it—but the state will not give elites what they increasingly want: guaranteed security for them and their families and a viable future for their children. Kim can allay some frustrations by doling out luxury apartments, promotions, and access to extravagant lifestyles. He cannot address the deeper sources of discontent without relaxing the very controls that protect his family’s rule from challenges to its power. The regime remains capable of suppressing any organized resistance in the country, but the growing disaffection of the elite threatens to weaken the state from within. Kim presides over a system increasingly marked by doubt, suspicion, and pervasive anxiety. When the chips are down and North Korea faces a true crisis, its most powerful leaders may not know who they can trust and where they can turn.

Most of the more than 34,000 North Koreans now living in South Korea came from the poor northern provinces along the Chinese border. Many of them fled to the south to escape famine and economic hardship. They had little access to the regime’s inner workings, even if they had tremendous experience of its cruelty and depredations. In contrast, elite escapees come from a wholly different world. They are products of Pyongyang, a capital of roughly three million that is closed to most of the country’s 25 million citizens. They grew up with relatively reliable electricity and running water, and attended schools designed to educate the next generation of regime operators. They benefited from the new construction of luxury residential districts, extravagant resort towns such as Samjiyon and Wonsan-Kalma, and the country’s sustained economic growth in the face of heavy international sanctions. North Korea’s elite serve in a range of occupations beyond just the party cadre ranks, the military, and the security services; they can be artists, software engineers, restaurant managers, and much else. The regime groomed them from birth to serve the party and the Kim family.

Consider the family of Ri Jong Ho and his son Hyunseung Lee. Ri spent three decades in Office 39, which earns and manages foreign currency for the leadership. Kim Jong Il appointed him to senior trade and economic posts, and in 2002 the state awarded him a Hero of Labor medal and a Kim Il Sung watch, prestigious honors and a recognition of his loyalty and patriotism. Ri’s son attended some of the country’s finest educational institutions, including Kumsong Academy and Pyongyang Foreign Language Institute, which prepare the children of senior cadres to enter high positions in the party. Hyunseung and his sister were also among the rare few North Koreans who were permitted to study abroad in China. By his mid-20s, Hyunseung was already a party member, working in China, and was trusted to chair a branch of the Kim Il Sung Youth League while helping facilitate millions of dollars in trade between Chinese companies and North Korea. This family faithfully served their country while living at the highest echelons of their society and enjoying the best creature comforts. But their privileged positions did not make them safe.

The shocking 2013 execution of Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong........

© Foreign Affairs