When armed factions led by the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham overthrew Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad last December, many observers believed that Russia’s days in Syria were numbered. For decades, Moscow had nurtured close ties with the Assad family; less than a year ago, it bombed areas controlled by HTS. As the head of HTS, Ahmed al-Shara, took the reins in Damascus, The Economist warned that Russia’s military presence in the country was “hanging by a thread.” Russians worried, too. Shortly after Assad’s fall, Russian newspapers bemoaned the loss of a key ally in the Middle East, and military bloggers panicked over the future of Russia’s bases and outposts in the country.

Since then, however, Russia has defied expectations, holding on to its main bases on Syria’s coast—the Tartus naval facility and the Hmeimim airbase—and even entrenching itself in the country’s northeast. Russian diplomats moved quickly to engage the new rulers in Damascus, benefiting from Syrians’ perception that Russia is a great power and Shara’s desire to build positive relations with all external governments. Syria’s new leaders have, in turn, taken a constructive tone with Moscow, hoping for Russian energy, grain, friendly votes at the UN, and possibly, arms. By engaging Russia, Shara’s government also seeks to deter former Assad loyalists from rearing their heads, to warn Western states that Syria can look elsewhere for support on energy and defense, and perhaps even to limit Israeli military action within its borders.

Other interested parties want Russia to retain a modest presence in Syria, too: as different forces vie for clout, Russia has emerged as everyone’s favorite hedge. Both Israel and Turkey calculate that Russia’s influence could be leveraged to prevent the other from becoming too strong. And the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led militia, want Russia on their side in case the United States abandons them or Damascus tries to quash their hopes for autonomy.

The possibility that Russia could retain its foothold in Syria has caused some unease among European officials. In the spring, for instance, members of the European Parliament appealed to Syria’s new government to ban Russia’s military presence. Even if Moscow manages to preserve its bases, however, it will not be among the key players to shape Syria’s destiny. Bogged down in Ukraine, it simply lacks the financial and military resources to do so, and it will be eclipsed by the Arab Gulf states, Turkey, and, should they step up their engagement, the United States and European countries. U.S. and European leaders should accept that Russia will have a modest presence in Syria and avoid forcing Syria’s new government to pick between their help or Russia’s. The best way for Washington and its partners to prevent an ambitious Russian return is to lend concerted and patient support for Syria’s governance and economic recovery.

Russia’s ties with the Assad family go back to the Cold War, when Hafez al-Assad—Bashar’s father—solidified Syria’s place in the Soviet Union’s orbit. When Bashar parachuted into power in 2000, he felt no special affinity for Russia. He traveled to London and Paris before visiting Moscow. But he still maintained Syria’s friendly relations with the Kremlin. A decade later, when he responded to a peaceful uprising with a violent crackdown that escalated into civil war, Russia shielded his regime from UN Security Council sanctions and, eventually, launched a military intervention to prop him up.

By intervening, Russia gained enormous leverage over the trajectory of the war in Syria. In 2017, Russia deployed its military police to certain so-called de-escalation zones as part of an initiative also backed by Iran and Turkey. By........

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