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How to Secure the Straits

27 0
28.10.2026

Over the past month, Iran has made its most intense attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz since the United States and Israel declared war, in February. More than 100 drone and missile launches into the strait have been recorded since the war began; in October alone, a container ship and a bulk vessel sank in the waterway. Meanwhile, in the Red Sea, Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis have sustained their campaign to throttle seaborne trade as they target Saudi Arabia more directly, seizing new territory along the Bab el Mandeb Strait.

These dual maritime crises form part of the same strategic problem—one that, despite its new intensity, has existed for years. In 2019, Iran attacked shipping across the Gulf in response to the first Trump administration’s maximum-pressure sanctions campaign; in 2023, the Houthis launched assaults in the Red Sea following Hamas’s October 7 massacre in Israel. After each of these campaigns, the United States and its partners established maritime coalitions to protect these vital seaborne trade routes. The efforts helped secure the waterways, but they never fundamentally persuaded Iran and its proxies that asymmetric attacks on shipping were an ineffective way to project power. On the contrary, such tactics have only become more appealing to Tehran.

Even now, some shipping persists through both waterways. On October 15, Lloyd’s List Intelligence reported that transit through the Bab el Mandeb Strait was up modestly from August. U.S. naval patrols—as well as creative logistical adaptation by Gulf states, including ship-to-ship transfers, have allowed some oil to move through Hormuz. But shipping still remains throttled, and international actors have not yet found a way to update their deterrence playbook. In 2019 and 2023–24, U.S., European, and Middle Eastern navies formed separate, overlapping defensive maritime coalitions to escort vessels, collect intelligence on evolving threats, and intercept missile and drone attacks. In the United States’ case in 2024, a separate multinational coalition also conducted offensive strikes in Yemen to undermine Houthi maritime capabilities. Today, governments are falling back on the same instinct—to join forces, but not all their forces. The British and the French have proposed a multinational maritime defense coalition to secure the Strait of Hormuz once the war ends, while Saudi Arabia is planning, but has not yet deployed, its own alliance to protect the Red Sea. Neither project includes the United States, which has deployed nearly one-third of its naval warships to the Middle East in an attempt to reestablish freedom of navigation, enforce a naval blockade against Iran, and support U.S. attacks on Iran.

Multiple short-term, insufficiently coordinated defensive missions organized around voluntary contributions can buy down marginal risk for shippers in the near-term but they cannot deliver long-term deterrence. Separate missions embolden Iranian and Houthi leaders, who will interpret them as half-measures that are easily strained by resource scarcity, an inability to adapt quickly to evolving threats, and the absence of real-time intelligence sharing across the two chokepoints. As crises in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea become more linked amid an expanding regional war, replicating the patchwork maritime strategy that never fully worked would be a serious mistake. What is needed instead is a single, sustained multinational effort to secure both waterways that combines American military capabilities with the imprimatur of a unified coalition of Asian, European, and Middle Eastern countries. Otherwise, Iran and the Houthis will again learn that threatening global commerce in maritime chokepoints is a strategy worth repeating.

OVERLAPPING, UNDERPERFORMING

The maritime coalitions now taking shape share a troubling precedent. Twice before, international actors have mounted similar efforts, and their mixed results show why even effective defensive operations fail to prevent renewed attacks in Middle Eastern waterways. In mid-2019, after the first Trump administration launched its “maximum........

© Foreign Affairs