China’s Strategic Retaliation – OpEd
China’s Aug. 25, 2026 counters (drones, dual-use goods, certification) answer U.S. Entity List and tech/defense curbs without a full break: pass costs back, keep global integration, and leave room for a possible Trump–Xi meeting in Washington in September.
Constraints cut both ways—U.S. MNCs are multi-sited, and China’s high-tech still leans on FDI—so over-restriction risks pushing R&D and investment to other Asian markets instead of hurting Washington.
For Indonesia/ASEAN the fight is a squeeze and a chance: stay flexible, deepen open regional trade, and bid for diverted supply chains with reforms, rather than pick a camp or get trapped in overlapping export rules.
Chinese economic countermeasures towards the United States have been increasing in the past months as part of a broader strategy of economic statecraft that reflects an increasing assertiveness of Beijing. Yet, China is not looking to cut all economic ties with the US, and the recent series of countermeasures launched by China in 2026 aims to defend its strategic interests without incurring high economic cost. It is therefore necessary to consider the new Chinese economic countermeasures within the broader framework of its economic retaliation and risk management strategy. These countermeasures are a direct consequence of Washington’s economic restrictions on a series of Chinese companies, including those which are involved in advanced technologies, defence activities and supply chains.
Beijing views the export restrictions, expanded Entity Lists, and investment restrictions imposed by the United States on national security grounds as containment attempts by Washington. Thus, China’s economic countermeasures, as unveiled on August 25, are aimed at passing on to the United States the impact of its own actions, while limiting the potential losses to itself, as it is determined to maintain its deep economic integration with the world. In particular, by........
