Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal, drawing from the shared Amu Darya, reopens the long-unsettled question of the country’s water rights, since Soviet-era Protocol 566 and later Central Asian arrangements allocated only 2.1 BCM to it without Afghan participation.

While the canal promises food security and rural employment, possible withdrawals approaching 10 BCM raise legitimate downstream concerns for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, especially in dry years, and must be managed under principles of equitable use and no significant harm.

The article calls for an inclusive basin agreement featuring joint technical data-sharing, drought rules and efficiency improvements so that Afghanistan’s development proceeds transparently rather than unilaterally.

The Qosh Tepa Canal, under construction in northern Afghanistan, is more than an irrigation project. It is a test of Central Asia’s ability to manage a shared river in a changing political and climatic environment. It has also brought back an unresolved question that remained hidden for decades: how should Afghanistan be accommodated in the use and governance of the Amu Darya?

For Afghanistan, the canal carries obvious national importance. It is intended to bring water to dry lands, expand agriculture, improve food security, create rural employment and support economic recovery in a country that has endured decades of conflict, poverty and drought. It is also notable that a financially constrained country has undertaken such a large irrigation project largely through its own effort and resources, without waiting for major international assistance. This element of national self-reliance deserves recognition.

However, Qosh Tepa cannot be viewed only as a domestic Afghan development project. It draws water from the Amu Darya, one of Central Asia’s major transboundary rivers. The river is shared by Afghanistan and the lower riparian states, especially Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, whose agriculture, settlements and rural economies depend heavily on its flows. Any large diversion from such a river naturally raises questions of rights of lower riparians, environmental safeguards and regional confidence.

The canal reportedly starts from the Amu Darya in Kaldar district of Balkh province, close to Afghanistan’s northern border and opposite Uzbekistan’s Surkhandarya region near Termez. It is not a minor local watercourse, rather is a major abstraction from an international river system whose waters are already heavily used downstream.

The Amu Darya is one of Central Asia’s largest rivers, with an estimated long-term average annual runoff of roughly 75–79 billion cubic metres (BCM), depending on the dataset and method used. This represents the river system’s natural water resources rather than the quantity available for additional withdrawals, since substantial volumes are already committed to irrigation, other uses and environmental requirements. During the Soviet period, the river was extensively developed to support large irrigation schemes, particularly cotton cultivation in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

In September 1987, the Soviet authorities adopted Protocol No. 566, which provided for the annual allocation of approximately 61.5 BCM among four Soviet republics: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In preparing these allocations, the Soviet planners assumed that Afghanistan would withdraw only 2.1 BCM annually from........

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