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Is Thailand Waging Its Own ‘Three Warfares’ Against Cambodia? – OpEd

11 0
28.10.2026

Thailand is using psychological pressure, media framing of the conflict as a war against Cambodian scam compounds, and selective legal moves (including abrogating the 2001 maritime MOU) to strengthen its position.

These tools have helped consolidate domestic support for the conservative bloc, reset bargaining over the hydrocarbon-rich overlapping claims, and create cheap facts on the ground.

With Bangkok now focused on internal economic and political pressures, further fighting is unlikely soon; Cambodia is urged to raise the cost of any future clash through stronger internal deterrence.

Thailand’s approach to the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute cannot be understood through military operations alone. The conflict is also shaped by domestic political competition, competing narratives about sovereignty and security, and disagreements over the legal mechanisms for resolving territorial claims on the Thai side. Thailand is combining military pressure, information activities, and legal-diplomatic positioning to preserve its preferred status quo, strengthen domestic political legitimacy, and improve its bargaining position against Cambodia.

This combination is not new in international politics; it closely resembles what is known as the “Three Warfares,” a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) information warfare concept approved by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2003. The concept groups three non-kinetic instruments; psychological warfare, public opinion (or media) warfare, and legal warfare. Their shared purpose is to shape an adversary’s choices and the wider strategic environment before, or instead of, decisive fighting. Psychological warfare seeks to intimidate and wear down the opponent; media warfare seeks to control how a conflict is understood at home and shape narrative abroad; and legal warfare seeks to turn existing laws and legal processes into instrument that claim the legal high ground while constraining the other side.

Even though Thailand is not a unitary actor, where the army, the Senate, the government, and nationalist groups each pursue their own agendas, and some measures have been reactive rather than planned. Yet viewed through this lens, Thai measures that seem separate, a closed checkpoint, a guided press tour, and a revoked treaty, begin to reinforce one another.

The first element, psychological pressure, has been visible since June 2025, weeks after an incident that killed a Cambodian soldier on May 28, 2025. Thai regional commands closed all seven international land crossings with Cambodia, and the government announced it would cut internet services to Cambodian military, security agencies and towns along the border. Thailand also said it would consider blocking exports that could sustain scam operations across the border. When fighting erupted on July 24, Thailand readied six F-16 fighter jets along the frontier and used them against Cambodian targets, a demonstration of an ariel capability that Cambodia does not possess, framed as a staged military operation.

Since the ceasefires, this pressure has taken a more permanent form, where in April........

© Eurasia Review