The Eurasian Charter And The Road To UN Negotiations – OpEd
The author says Belarus and Russia will open talks on 25 Sept. 2026 in New York, on UNGA’s sidelines, on a “Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity”—a 2023 Belarus idea now moving to interstate text, with a first round through 2026–27 and a draft aimed at a Minsk leaders’ meeting in autumn 2027. Core slogans: sovereignty, equality, civilizational diversity, indivisible security, plus economy, tech, and culture.
Voices compiled: Belarus’s Vladislav Zasukhin calls it a transition framework, not a UN replacement; Mumbai’s Shoaib Khan wants a decentralized SCO–EAEU–ASEAN “network of networks,” consensus, WTO-compatible rules, and new bodies (a CSCE-style conference, small secretariat, dispute and CBM tracks) without a anti-Western military alliance; Kyrgyzstan’s Esen Usubaliev floats a “new Helsinki” that could even include the EU; Shandong’s Edmund Sheng says middle powers need real vetoes and workaday files (customs, pandemics, climate migration); Russia’s Andrey Gorokhov outlines Belarus chairing, a zero draft after launch, and rotating capitals.
From Jakarta the author ties it to Prabowo-era Russia/BRICS/Belarus ties, food security, and “independent and active” multipolarity: watch how Eurasia writes rules, because Indo-Pacific order is not sealed off.
On 25 September 2026, negotiations on the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century are scheduled to be launched in New York on the sidelines of the high-level week of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly. After nearly three years of discussions through international forums, bilateral consultations, and academic circles, the idea introduced by Belarus in 2023 is now entering the stage of interstate negotiations.
Belarus and Russia are promoting the Charter as a framework for relations among states in Eurasia, with sovereignty, equality, diversity, and indivisible security as its core principles. Its scope extends beyond security to encompass economic and humanitarian cooperation, technology, and inter-civilizational relations.
An increasingly multipolar world means that more centers of power have to interact within a single international system. The issue, therefore, is not only how power is distributed, but also how relations among those centers are governed.
This is where the Charter is positioned. The idea seeks to move multipolarity beyond the question of power distribution toward a discussion of principles, rules, and mechanisms that could serve as the basis for interstate relations in Eurasia.
Following the launch in New York, the first round of negotiations is planned to take place through the end of 2026 and continue into 2027, with the text targeted for completion before being submitted to a meeting of Eurasian leaders in Minsk.
For countries outside Eurasia, this development deserves attention. Changes in the balance of power and the security architecture of Eurasia will also affect the broader strategic environment, including the Indo-Pacific.
For this reason, I have sought to examine how the idea is understood across different countries in Eurasia through a series of interviews previously published separately by LenteraMerah, an Indonesian media outlet, and now brought together in a single article.
The diversity of these perspectives shows how the discussion surrounding the Charter is moving from its basic principles toward more concrete questions of how a new order will be built and negotiated.
From Belarus, the discussion of the Charter comes through the perspective of Vladislav Zasukhin, Analyst to the Assistant Director at the Center for the Study and Development of Continental Integration “Northern Eurasia,” Republic of Belarus, on the idea itself and the changes in the global order that he sees taking place.
Vladislav views the Eurasian Charter of Multipolarity and Diversity as a systemic response to the structural crisis of the existing world order and the transition from unipolarity toward multipolarity. In his view, the Charter is not merely a framework for regional cooperation, but an........
