The culture of politeness practiced by Afghanistan under Taliban rule ought to conclude with the thirty-seven report by Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of UN Security Council. It is not a narrative of partial domination of a difficult nation. It is a story of a ruling power that has either acted or remained lax internally such that Afghanistan has become a free terrain to armed factions that have regionalist agendas. The question as to whether militants are on the Afghan soil is not a mere question. The question is whether the de facto authorities have created conditions under which they are able to recruit, train, move, raise funds and prepare operation with minimum fuss. Combined with the sanction’s regime of 1988 and the recent renewal by the Security Council in the form of Resolution 2816, the report appears to be more of warning than an update to the world that the world can no longer afford to play a game of diplomatic chicken and duck. 

This report is not an abstract to Pakistan. It highlights an argument ancient as that there is some relation between the violence of Pakistan and the militant infrastructure, which continues to be on the other side of the border. This is significant because Islamabad is no longer treating the issue as a personal issue with Kabul. The latest war and the fact that over 100,000 people displaced during the war proves how easy the proxy pressure may become the face-to-face interstate confrontation. The UN has already issued formal warning to UNAMA which points at the fact that civilians are already paying the price and not security agencies only. Once violence has reached that stage, denial no longer becomes diplomacy, it now starts assuming the form of complicity. In this case, Kabul can defend itself on the fact that it is not patronizing anti Pakistan militancy, but it is a government that cannot or will not guarantee that it is land is not a launch pad, therefore, it is also guilty. 

It is not the ideological one that is the most important in the report. It is operational. States sometimes can coexist with violent rhetoric. They cannot live comfortable lives in the presence of armed forces that can get them better guns, protection, additional funding and training. This is why weapons and trafficking aspect are so significant. Slogans do not keep alive the militant ecosystem in Afghanistan. It prospers with the help of cash, networks, caches, enablers and shadow economy which is far harder to derail once it has incorporated. According to the Opium Survey 2025 and the UN drug reporting, the trend of trafficking has shifted, and it is not exhausted. That is vital because all the routes and contrabands employed in the delivery of drugs, money and other contrabands can equally be used in the delivery of men, equipment’s, and orders. Weak denial of Kabul does not bring about an answer to the ultimate question which the region is raising and which is: who is benefiting by the networks which are still in force? 

The other distasteful implication of the report is that all militant groups are not considered equally. Some appear to face pressure. Everyone else appears to have the breathing space. That is not neutrality. That is selective tolerance, and selective tolerance is a political determination. If one of the groups is provided with greater freedom based on the perceived utility, controllability, or some interim convenience it is not Kabul which is dealing with an internal security concern. It is subcontracting the insecurity. Evidence base provided TTP movement and survival has been expanding over the years besides the CTC study of TTP movement and the current regional studies like the CSIS study of the Pakistan security pressures. Together with the UN report, they all are pointed towards the same direction, namely that permissive space is not a background noise, but rather a force multiplier. 

This is why one should not speak only about the slogans. The actual metric of authority is throughput. What are the arms or guard, warriors or police, financial laundering or combating, free passage or interdiction? According to the report, it is recommended that Afghanistan remains vulnerable to being used by other players like Al Qaeda related elements and ISKP. The latter is still a menace even though the Taliban has destroyed its networks in locations that have been subject to their pressure as portrayed by the ICCT snapshot on the ISKP and the general assessment of the threat posed by the Islamic State. Without mentioning the fact that neighbouring states determine sovereignty by results and not lines of press, Kabul should not take pride under the sovereignty. He or she does not need to be physically present to carry out an operation; if the armed groups are able to move around, re-assemble and strategize then the region is always convinced that Afghanistan is still a hub despite all the denials made. 

It is not that Afghanistan is expected to become an isolating country forever, which is the practical interpretation of the UN report. In other words, the interaction with Kabul is no longer possible as unconditional, immeasurable, and uncorrelated with the verifiable security behaviour. Human contacts are allowed. The diplomatic contact can be sustained. But it is over with us trusting empty promises. The allusion of the principle that responsibility is judged by actions which reduce threat rather than words which rebrand it occurs in the Security Council press release of 1988, in the original Resolution 1988 and in the current page 1988 Committee. There is no need to ask Kabul to work harder with messaging. It should be forced to possess fewer camps, fewer facilitator, fewer routes and fewer excuses. It is what is really needed in the report.

© Eurasia Review