Pakistan’s push to mediate the US–Iran conflict reflects urgency born of economic, security, and geopolitical constraints rather than diplomatic ambition. Its leadership seeks to prevent internal instability while navigating intense regional pressures

In the ongoing conflict between the United States and Iran, Pakistan has recently been projecting itself as a potential mediator, with its Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif stating on X that Pakistan “welcomes and fully supports ongoing efforts to pursue dialogue to end the war in the Middle East, in the interest of peace and stability in the region and beyond. Subject to concurrence by the U.S. and Iran, Pakistan stands ready and honoured to be the host to facilitate meaningful and conclusive talks for a comprehensive settlement of the ongoing conflict,” a position later shared by Donald Trump. Multiple diplomatic actions and statements by both civilian and military leadership—including offers from the Foreign Office to host talks, outreach by Foreign Minister Tahir Hussain Andrabi, and back-channel communications by General Asim Munir with both Washington and Tehran—underscore Pakistan’s efforts to position itself as a facilitator for dialogue. 

While some observers interpret this as a sign of diplomatic relevance, the reality is far more complex. Pakistan’s actions are less about strategic ambition and more about managing a deeply constrained and vulnerable position.

Pakistan today finds itself in an extremely difficult situation. While many countries are affected by the conflict, the impact on Pakistan is particularly severe due to its geographic, economic, and internal security vulnerabilities. Pressure from Saudi Arabia is a key factor. Saudi Arabia, which has faced missile and drone attacks from Iran, has been pushing Pakistan to support it under their recently signed mutual defense pact, under which an attack on one is considered an attack on both—a NATO‑style clause. Moreover, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates potentially joining the war against Iran soon, the situation for Pakistan becomes even more complex.

However, Pakistan cannot easily align against Iran. It shares a long and sensitive border with Iran and has a significant Shia population. Any direct involvement against Iran risks triggering sectarian violence within Pakistan. Domestic unrest has already occurred, as seen recently when over 20 Shia protesters were killed during demonstrations following the killing of Ali Khamenei, something the leadership is acutely aware of.

There is also a deeper strategic concern. Pakistan fears that if there is a regime change in Iran leading to instability or the emergence of a weak government, it could have serious implications for regions like Balochistan, where Pakistan is facing a deadly insurgency. As former Pakistani ambassador to the United Nations Maleeha Lodhi has warned, such instability could create “ungoverned spaces… fertile ground for terrorist groups.” A weakened Iran, or one aligned with rival powers,  could potentially exacerbate unrest in Pakistan’s border regions.

Michael Kugelman, a South Asia expert and Senior Fellow at the Wilson Center, has also stated, “the last thing Pakistan can afford is more escalations and a heightened risk of conflict with Iran,” highlighting the country’s deep internal turmoil and competing security challenges.

At the same time, Pakistan is already dealing with tensions on its western front with Afghanistan, including recent cross-border strikes and retaliatory actions. Following the recent Pakistani airstrikes on a hospital in Kabul, which reportedly killed over 400 people, the Taliban’s stance has hardened, with warnings of further retaliation. Opening another front, even indirectly, would stretch its security apparatus dangerously. There is also a persistent fear within Pakistan’s strategic thinking that involvement against Iran could create an opportunity for India to exert pressure on its eastern front.

Internally, the situation is equally alarming. Pakistan is facing a severe economic crisis, marked by inflation and fuel shortages. Exacerbating this already deteriorating situation, on March 9, 2026, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced steps such as the temporary closure of schools, reduced working days, and work-from-home policies, along with restrictions reminiscent of the COVID period, in response to the severe fuel and economic crisis caused by the war. The gravity of the situation can be gauged from symbolic decisions such as cancelling Republic Day parade and limiting the much-hyped Pakistan Super League to two venues due to fuel shortages and the economic crisis. The economic pressure is intense, and rising inflation along with fuel shortages is creating significant strain on the population.

Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities further limit its options. It has relied heavily on deferred oil payments from Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia. With shifting global energy dynamics and constraints influenced by United States policies, Pakistan finds it increasingly difficult to secure stable energy supplies. It does not have independent decision-making or strategic autonomy like India, which can purchase oil from any supplier. Already on the IMF ventilator, Pakistan continues to rely heavily on oil from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has described IMF conditions as “unimaginable” and said Pakistan has no option but to accept them, reflecting how constrained the government feels due to economic pressure. Given that the Strait of Hormuz is choked—through which a major share of its energy imports passes—it is now finding it even more difficult to manage its energy needs.

Recent statements by Pakistan’s military leadership, particularly General Asim Munir, also reflect this anxiety. At a gathering of religious scholars, he told some domestic Shia clerics that if their loyalty lay more with Iran, they should go there, while simultaneously appealing to prevent external conflicts from affecting internal stability. He also emphasized that violence in Pakistan linked to external events would not be tolerated. These remarks indicate the pressure the state is under and highlight concerns about sectarian tensions. They are not signs of confident diplomacy but of a state striving to prevent internal fragmentation.

In this context, Pakistan’s push for mediation is driven by urgency rather than influence. Both its military and civilian leadership understand that direct involvement in the conflict would be devastating—economically, politically, and socially. This explains the visible desperation in its diplomatic outreach.

While some in India interpret Pakistan’s role as evidence of growing diplomatic importance, that assessment overlooks the underlying reality. Pakistan’s actions are not a demonstration of independent global agency but a response to severe constraints. It is attempting to prevent a situation that could spiral beyond its control. 

© Eurasia Review