As the world’s attention is focused on the conflict in the Middle East, a catastrophic war still rages in Sudan. What impact will Iran’s war with the United States and Israel have on its ability to continue supplying the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Sudan with drones? Experts argue the Middle East war will constrain how many drones Iran can spare for General Burhan’s SAF, but not necessarily cut them off completely.

Multiple investigations and Western officials say Iran has supplied the SAF with Mohajer6 combat drones (and likely other UAVs) since early 2024, with evidence from satellite imagery and downed systems over Sudan. These drones have already played a role in SAF battlefield gains around Khartoum and other areas. Indeed some commentators think the SAF would never have been able to take back Khartoum without Iranian drones.

In January 2024, evidence emerged of an SAF drone downed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Drone expert Wim Zwijnenburg identified it as a Mohajer-6, manufactured by Iran, known for its 6.5-meter length and capacity for guided munitions strikes. Further satellite imagery from Wadi Seidna military base revealed additional drones matching Iranian models, confirming their active deployment. Evidence also emerged of an Iranian cargo plane repeatedly visiting Port Sudan from Bandar Abbas, Iran, coinciding with the documented use of Iranian drones in January.

There has been particular international unease that when Iran supplies such drones to the SAF, it is also essentially putting them in the hands of the Islamist militias, including the Muslim Brotherhood, upon who General Burhan and the SAF are so reliant. There are also concerns that the SAF and allied Islamist factions not only secured Iranian-made drones, but also that the hardline Islamist militia, AlBaraa bin Malik, had members trained in Iran to operate these systems.

Recent USIsraeli strikes and a short but intense war last year severely damaged parts of Iran’s missile and drone production infrastructure and key supply networks for components such as engines, electronics and propellants. Iran is now in a race to rebuild those facilities while facing expanded sanctions targeting the very procurement networks that feed its UAV programmes.

This means Iran has to juggle several priorities with a weakened industrial base. These include reconstituting its own strategic stockpile for deterrence and use against US-Israeli forces, as well as continuing to try and supply its partners and proxies in the region and beyond. 

Arming Sudan’s SAF is something of a priority as it does serve Iran’s interest in extending influence along the Red Sea and into the Horn of Africa, but Sudan is not as strategically central as Russia or Iran’s immediate regional proxies. Analysts already warn that if Iran’s production capacity is constrained, exports of drones and components to partners like  “could diminish,” with knockon shortages “across the board.” In practice, that usually means Tehran prioritises frontline theatres it considers vital and trims or slows deliveries to more peripheral clients.

Therefore the most likelymediumterm effects for the Sudan conflict are that fewer new Iranian drones and munitions might reach the SAF, or deliveries might be spaced out more, as Iran diverts production to replenish its own stocks and sustain higherpriority partners. It is likely there will be a greater reliance by SAF on the Iranian systems already in Sudan, such as the Mohajer6 and possibly the Ababil3 models. The SAF are also likely to have to resort to smuggled spares, rather than large fresh shipments. Some continued flow of drones is still expected from Iran to the SAF, because Sudan remains a useful, relatively lowcost way for Iran to project power in the Red Sea, but at a lower scale than if Iran’s industry were intact.

In other words: the war doesn’t automatically “run Iran out” of drones for Burhan, but it likely tightens the supply, raises maintenance and spareparts problems, and forces Tehran to make harder tradeoffs that are unlikely to favour Burhan and the SAF first. It remains to be seen how the SAF and their allies adapt to this.

© Eurasia Review