*Originally published in 2025 and preserved as part of our archive project.Get E-International Relations delivered directly to your inbox, free of charge. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber to support our work.

What ultimately enables armies to prevail on the battlefield? Competing hypotheses have been advanced to explain the sources of military doctrine, and the debate remains unsettled regarding the relative weight of material, organizational, and sociological variables in shaping doctrinal outcomes. At the core of this debate lies a fundamental question: how can one account for both the divergences and the convergences in the doctrinal development of military organizations? Some armies, when confronted with dire battlefield prospects, demonstrate remarkable resilience—launching counteroffensives and resisting the temptation to capitulate—while others disintegrate rapidly. Why are some forces able to maintain cohesion under extreme adversity whereas others collapse? Why did the North Vietnamese army, despite suffering vastly higher casualties, withstand the technologically superior United States military? Conversely, why did the French army in 1940—defending its homeland as in 1914—crumble in six weeks, suffering fewer than 100,000 combat deaths but losing over two million prisoners, while the army of 1914 endured staggering early losses yet recovered and fought on for years? (Castillo, 2014).

Two enduring imperatives in wartime are cost reduction and the cultivation of organizational agility. These imperatives underpin the necessity of continuous adaptation. Armies that fail to innovate are prone to defeat, even under materially advantageous conditions. History offers multiple illustrations: the United States in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan; Russia in Ukraine; Israel in Lebanon; or France in Mali. A recurrent lesson emerges: the inability to innovate translates into operational ineffectiveness and structural capability gaps. Yet, like all bureaucracies, military institutions often display a strong inertia and resistance to change. The scholarly literature on innovation and military diffusion has largely examined why and how states pursue new technologies, doctrines, and practices, emphasizing material constraints, organizational cultures, and broader sociological dynamics. Neorealist perspectives in particular argue that diffusion stems from systemic security pressures: states adopt innovations to preserve survival, and success depends on their ability to allocate sufficient resources. The organizational and financial capital required for adoption ultimately conditions national choices, which aggregate to shape systemic patterns of diffusion and, consequently, the balance of power.

In many national contexts, defense innovation unfolds within a formalized process: national security priorities are assessed, defense policies are revised, and restructuring efforts reshape military institutions. Crises, however, can dramatically alter the pace and trajectory of change. Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine in February 2022 exemplifies how war can accelerate doctrinal and organizational transformation. Armed forces remain highly responsive to the evolving geostrategic environment and to the shifting character of warfare, including domestic political and societal conditions. Ultimately, military organizations operate under a dual imperative: they must (1) guarantee operational effectiveness in adapting to strategic change, while (2) remaining embedded within, and responsive to, the broader societal norms and values of the polity they serve. It is precisely the tensions generated by this dual framework—between military necessity and societal legitimacy—that have become increasingly visible in the post–Cold War era, and which continue to shape debates on the future of military effectiveness.

Civil-Military Tensions and the Limits of Doctrinal Change: Understanding the Mechanisms of Military Change

Particularly in democratic societies, the military institution often appears out of step with the wider society, as contemporary culture has eroded the traditional “warrior ethos” by devaluing martial values. In modern operational environments—where the support and perception of local populations can be decisive—the use of violence may not only be inappropriate but even counterproductive. As General Walter D. Kerwin noted in the 1970s, “the values necessary to defend society are often in contradiction with the values of society itself. To be an effective servant of the people, the military must focus not on the values of our liberal society, but on the hard values of the battlefield.” This tension highlights structural constraints that limit military freedom of action: the imperatives of victory often collide with liberal norms. Since the armed forces remain bound by the decisions of civilian leaders and by the broader values of society, the very rationality of doctrinal change is deeply affected (Hamel, 2023).

A broad range of socio-political transformations—both within the international system and across domestic economic and social structures—has progressively challenged traditional perspectives on the nature of war, vital interests, and prevailing notions of security and threat. Operational challenges and new technologies have historically acted as primary drivers of wartime innovation. As Farrell and Terriff (2002) argue, Major Military Change (MMC) occurs when technological innovation converges with organizational restructuring, new concepts of warfare, and revised visions of future conflict. Military change unfolds through three interrelated processes: innovation (the development of new technologies, strategies, and force structures), adaptation (adjusting existing military means and methods), and emulation (adopting practices through imitation of other military organizations). Whether a change is “major” or “minor” depends not only on the process but also on its long-term strategic outcome (Farrell & Terriff, 2002, pp. 5–6).

In peacetime, military innovators face the task of articulating what Stephen Rosen has termed a “new theory of victory”—an interpretive framework anticipating what the next war will look like and how it can be won (Rosen, 1991, p. 20). This theory provides the conceptual foundation for subsequent organizational and financial reforms. It requires systematic reflection on the evolving character of war, the identification of emerging military regimes, and the integration of these insights into state strategic practices. Such theorizing, a distinct intellectual enterprise, precedes the bureaucratic transformation of abstract ideas into concrete doctrine and operational concepts.

This capacity depends largely on the intellectual and organizational work of military staffs engaged in strategic thought and operational art. Yet it cannot be assumed. As Hamel (2023) emphasizes, military organizations are state bureaucracies, and policymakers operate within constraints that often inhibit doctrinal or organizational change. Military thought and practice thus remain at once autonomous from, embedded within, and subordinated to the wider society in which they are situated. While war is inherently political, the relationship between political objectives and military means is rarely synchronized. As a result, armed forces frequently fail to adapt—conceptually and operationally—for reasons beyond their direct control, with significant consequences on the battlefield.

Military Diffusion and Globalization: An Asymmetric Process of Strategic Rebalancing

Innovation—technological and otherwise—remains one of the primary drivers of warfare. From the perspective of hegemonic stability theory, the development of war has historically resembled a “pack” dynamic in which followers emulate a small number of pioneers, since “there is an historical tendency for the military and economic techniques of the leading state or empire to be diffused to other states in the system” (Gilpin, 1981, pp. 176–177). Globalization and technological progress further facilitate and accelerate this process. First, dual-use technologies such as computing and software capabilities are not capital-intensive and therefore pose relatively low barriers to entry for new actors. Second, because commercial markets generally innovate at a faster rate than the defense sector, cutting-edge technologies are more easily accessible to a broader range of actors. Third, given the high level of integration in the global economy, recipients of foreign direct investment can leverage externally developed technologies and expertise to produce advanced military capabilities. In short, in the era of globalization, technology inevitably spreads and eventually becomes available to potential adversaries. This helps explain why military technologies tend to diffuse rapidly and broadly across the international system.

Systemic accounts, however, note the diversity of responses among international actors confronted with major military innovations. When a breakthrough begins to demonstrate its........

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