This article advances a central claim: the contemporary rise of Trumpism, the global far right, and the crisis of liberal internationalism are best understood not as separate phenomena but as interconnected expressions of a deeper crisis of hegemony, political economy and elite rule. Bringing together Antonio Gramsci’s concept of organic crisis, my own analysis of liberal “crisis machines,” Peter Turchin’s theory of elite overproduction and elite fragmentation, and Arnold Toynbee’s ideas about civilisational decline, the argument suggests that the current historical conjuncture is characterised by a growing inability of established elites to generate legitimacy, competence, consent, and moral authority. This is producing intensified political polarisation, social fragmentation, nationalist mobilisation, elite conflict, and geopolitical instability.

From this perspective, Trumpism is not simply a revolt against liberalism. Nor is the global far right merely an external challenge to a healthy liberal international order. Rather, both emerge from a broader crisis affecting the institutions, elites, and political-economic structures that have dominated the Western-led world since the late twentieth century. The central issue is therefore not whether liberalism or the far right prevails, but whether either possesses the capacity to construct a new hegemonic settlement capable of addressing mounting economic, social, environmental, and geopolitical contradictions. Increasingly, the evidence suggests that neither does. The implications are potentially profound. Historically, periods of hegemonic transition, elite fragmentation, and declining legitimacy have often been associated with intensified coercion, warfare, political violence, authoritarian tendencies, and international conflict. As U.S. hegemony weakens, rival powers rise, and governing elites struggle to maintain authority, the world is mired in a prolonged period of turbulence whose outcomes remain uncertain.

Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 sharpened these questions. His political comeback, following electoral defeat in 2020, the events of 6 January 2021, and years of legal and political controversy, demonstrates that Trumpism has become a durable political force. Rather than representing an aberration, Trump’s re-election and subsequent renewed authoritarian and imperial offensives reveal the depth of the social and institutional crisis from which his movement derives support. Trump continues to present himself as a challenger to liberal globalism, attacking multilateral institutions, international agreements, and cosmopolitan elites. Yet, as I argue, Trump is not an isolationist. His project remains committed to maintaining American predominance, albeit through more unilateral, nationalist, and transactional means. Trump rejects many of the methods traditionally associated with liberal internationalism, but not the pursuit of American power itself. In this sense, Trumpism represents a challenge to liberal hegemony’s form rather than its underlying imperial foundations.

This points toward a deeper continuity often obscured in contemporary political discourse. Despite their intense conflicts over immigration, nationalism, democracy, the rule of law, and international institutions, Trumpism and establishment liberalism share important political-economic commitments. Both remain fundamentally embedded within capitalist social relations. Neither substantially challenges the political and economic power of corporations, financialisation, private ownership, growing inequality, or the broader structures of global capitalism. Trump’s economic policies, like those of previous administrations, continue largely to accommodate major business and financial interests. The contest between Trumpism and liberalism is therefore less about political economy than it is about culture, authority, identity, sovereignty, and competing strategies for organising consent.

This observation echoes Inderjeet Parmar and Thomas Furse’s argument that the Trump administration is not as radical a departure from American establishment politics as many assume. Rather, it combines far-right rhetoric and mobilisation with continued commitment to transnational capitalist interests and U.S. geopolitical predominance. Trumpism mainstreams sections of the far right while remaining deeply integrated into broader elite structures of power.

To understand why such a political formation emerges, it is necessary to situate it within a broader crisis of hegemony. In my Economic........

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